# Hegemony

#### This file has a two sections –

#### Section 1 – Hegemony Bad – 7 parts

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* Sustainability debate – US cannot continue leading
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#### Section 2 – Hegemony Good – 4 parts

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* Impacts – yeah, US hegemony is some cool shit
* A2 impacts – some fools think heg is bad, LOL

# Hegemony Bad

## Uniqueness

### Hegemony Low 1nc

#### U.S. is in decline—broken economic and especially political systems

Jakob Augstein, “Once Upon a Time in the West,” SPIEGEL ONLINE, 8—4—11, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/opinion-once-upon-a-time-in-the-west-a-778396.html>,

The word "West" used to have a meaning. It described common goals and values, the dignity of democracy and justice over tyranny and despotism. Now it seems to be a thing of the past. There is no longer a West, and those who would like to use the word -- along with Europe and the United States in the same sentence -- should just hold their breath. By any definition, America is no longer a Western nation. The US is a country where the system of government has fallen firmly into the hands of the elite. An unruly and aggressive militarism set in motion two costly wars in the past 10 years. Society is not only divided socially and politically -- in its ideological blindness the nation is moving even farther away from the core of democracy. It is losing its ability to compromise. America has changed. It has drifted away from the West. The country's social disintegration is breathtaking. Nobel economist Joseph Stiglitz recently described the phenomenon. The richest 1 percent of Americans claim one-quarter of the country's total income for themselves -- 25 years ago that figure was 12 percent. It also possesses 40 percent of total wealth, up from 33 percent 25 years ago. Stiglitz claims that in many countries in the so-called Third World, the income gap between the poor and rich has been reduced. In the United States, it has grown. Economist Paul Krugman, also a Nobel laureate, has written that America's path is leading it down the road to "banana-republic status." The social cynicism and societal indifference once associated primarily with the Third World has now become an American hallmark. This accelerates social decay because the greater the disparity grows, the less likely the rich will be willing to contribute to the common good. When a company like Apple, which with €76 billion in the bank has greater reserves at its disposal than the government in Washington, a European can only shake his head over the Republican resistance to tax increases. We see it as self-destructive. The same applies to America's broken political culture. The name "United States" seems increasingly less appropriate. Something has become routine in American political culture that has been absent in Germany since Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik policies of rapprochement with East Germany and the Soviet Bloc (in the 1960s and '70s): hate. At the same time, reason has been replaced by delusion. The notion of tax cuts has taken on a cult-like status, and the limited role of the state a leading ideology. In this new American civil war, respect for the country's highest office was sacrificed long ago. The fact that Barack Obama is the country's first African-American president may have played a role there, too.

#### U.S. is in decline--fiscal and military overstretch

Richard Heinberg, senior fellow, Post Carbon Institute, "Geopolitical Implications of 'Peak Everything'," SOLUTIONS JOURNAL, 1--12, [www.postcarbon.org/article/660520-geopolitical-implications-of-peak-everything](http://www.postcarbon.org/article/660520-geopolitical-implications-of-peak-everything), accessed 4-9-12.

Yet despite America’s gargantuan expenditures on intelligence gathering and high-tech weaponry, and its globe-spanning ability to project power and to influence events, its armed forces appear to be stretched to their limits having continuously fielded around 200,000 troops and even larger numbers of support personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan for the past decade, where supply chains are both vulnerable and expensive to maintain.¶ In short, the United States remains an enormously powerful nation militarily, with thousands of nuclear weapons in addition to its unparalleled conventional forces, yet it suffers from declining strategic flexibility. The nation still retains an abundance of natural resources, but its consumption rates of many of those resources have grown to nearly insatiable levels, necessitating growing flows of resource imports from other nations. Meanwhile, its ability to pay for those imports is increasingly in question as its domestic economy shrinks due to financial system volatility, government spending cutbacks, high unemployment, an aging workforce, and shrinking average household net worth. For all of these reasons, the U.S. is widely characterized as “an empire in decline.”

### Hegemony Low 2nc

#### Leadership is low—multiple factors

NUECHTERLEIN 11 (David, political scientist and author, 10/9/11, “Coping with America's waning world influence” Richmond Times Dispatch) http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/oped/2011/oct/09/tdopin02-nuechterlein-coping-with-americas-waning--ar-1367955/

CHARLOTTESVILLE -- Four notable episodes in recent months underscore the reality that the United States no longer possesses the major influence around the world that it enjoyed in the 1990s or during the Cold War years. Examples: When Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner met European finance ministers in Poland last month and prodded them to act boldly to resolve the eurozone crisis, the European leaders reacted negatively to his intervention. They said this was a European matter and didn't require advice from Washington. ("Europe shuns Geithner's advice: bristles at him intruding," Washington Post, Sept. 17) Newly appointed Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, while visiting Iraq in July, pressed its leaders to tell Washington how many U.S. troops it wished to remain when the current agreement runs out in December. Iraq's leaders have failed for six months to reach a decision. Panetta, in a public statement, asked: "Do they want us to stay, don't they want us to stay?" He concluded with a blunt statement: "Dammit, make a decision." ("Panetta presses Iraq for decision on troops." New York Times, July 11) The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, spent the past five years cultivating a personal, as well as professional, relationship with Pakistan's top military leaders. He asked them to take action against Taliban insurgents who use Pakistan's territory to attack U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. Now, on the eve of his retirement, Mullen testified on Sept. 21 before the Senate Armed Services Committee that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) had aided Afghan insurgents who attacked the U.S. embassy in Kabul and killed or wounded scores of personnel. ("Mullen's testimony challenges Pakistani leaders on terrorism." Bloomberg News, Sept. 22) Finally, there is Israel. For nearly a year, President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pleaded with Prime Minister Netanyahu to stop West Bank settlement expansion so that peace talks can be restarted with the Palestinians. Netanyahu steadfastly refused these requests. Palestine's leader, Mahmoud Abbas, asserts he will not return to negotiations until Israel stops building. So, the impasse continues. What accounts for this decline in U.S. influence on crucial foreign policy issues that face President Obama? One reason is that world politics have changed markedly over the past 10 years. In addition to the disruptions caused by the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. economy suffered a massive blow on Sept. 15, 2008, when the banking system nearly collapsed, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Also, U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq proved far more difficult to conclude than expected, and the financial cost rose to several trillion dollars at a time when the federal budget went deeper into debt to pay for both domestic spending and the wars. A second factor is the emergence of half a dozen aspiring powers that challenge what they view as an oppressive American hegemony. This is true in Europe, South Asia, the Middle East and even Latin America. These states — China, India, Iran, Turkey, Russia, Brazil — are competitors with Washington for influence on four continents. Twenty years ago, U.S. influence in those areas went largely unchallenged. Finally, domestic political change in the United States impacts its foreign policy. Americans are disenchanted with the cost of accepting the world policeman role that Washington carried out for more than half a century. Both political parties reflect this changing public mood. It isn't the isolationism that President Roosevelt encountered in the 1930s, but instead a non-intervention policy by U.S. forces. Barack Obama responded to this sentiment with his "no boots on the ground" policy on Libya. In the current issue of Foreign Affairs (Sept.-Oct.), a noted University of Virginia historian, Melvyn Leffler, concludes that the tragedy of 9/11 "did not change the world or transform the long-term trajectory of U.S. grand strategy." He argues that America's "quest for primacy, its desire to lead the world, … its concern with military supremacy" and "its sense of indispensability" have not changed and will continue to be the guiding factors in future policy. Leffler reflects a Wilsonian point of view, that America should be a beacon to the world and use its influence to lead and make the world a better place. American voters rejected Wilson's worldview in 1920, and during the next 20 years the country largely withdrew from world responsibility. World War II changed that trend. Although Barack Obama prefers to have a foreign policy based on the Wilsonian model, history has dealt him a poor set of cards. His urgent task now is to rein in an overstretched foreign policy and respond to the realities of budget constraints and a public that is simply tired of interventions abroad. The mood may not last 20 years. But it is also possible that we are entering an era during which the voting public will not permit future presidents to lead the world in the way Woodrow Wilson sought to do, and failed.

### Hegemony Low – Economy 1nc

#### U.S. is no longer an economic hegemon, will no longer be able to preserve the global ecnomy

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and *Pax Americana,*”INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 2012, Wiley, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x/full, accessed 6-9-12.

The United States still wields preponderant military power. However, as discussed above, in the next ten to fifteen years the looming fiscal crisis will compel Washington to retrench strategically. As the United States’ military power diminishes, its ability to command the commons and act as a hegemonic stabilizer will be compromised. The end of the United States’ role as a military hegemon is still over horizon. However, the Great Recession has made it evident that the United States no longer is an economic hegemon. An economic hegemon is supposed to solve global economic crises, not cause them. However, it was the freezing-up of the US financial system triggered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis that plunged the world into economic crisis. The hegemon is supposed to be the lender of last resort in the international economy. The United States, however, has become the borrower of first resort—the world’s largest debtor. When the global economy falters, the economic hegemon is supposed to take responsibility for kick-starting recovery by purchasing other nations’ goods. From World War II’s end until the Great Recession, the international economy looked to the United States as the locomotive of global economic growth. As the world’s largest market since 1945, America’s willingness to consume foreign goods has been the firewall against global economic downturns. This is not what happened during the Great Recession, however. The US economy proved too infirm to lead the global economy back to health. Others—notably a rising China—had to step up to the plate to do so. The United States’ inability to galvanize global recovery demonstrates that in key respects it no longer is capable of acting as an economic hegemon. Indeed, President Barak Obama conceded as much at the April 2009 G-20 meeting in London, where he acknowledged the United States is no longer able to be the world’s consumer of last resort, and that the world needs to look to China (and India and other emerging market states) to be the motors of global recovery. Other recent examples of how relative decline and loss of economic hegemony have eroded Washington’s “agenda setting” capacity in international economic management include the US failure to achieve global economic re-balancing by compelling China to revalue the renminbi, and its defeat in the 2009–2010 “austerity versus stimulus” debate with Europe.

### Hegemony Low – Military 1nc

#### Hard power is low—troop reductions

Shanker 11 (Thom 10/10/11, “Army Leaders Warn Against Shrinking Forces Too Much” New York Times) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/us/army-leaders-warn-against-excessive-troop-cuts.html

WASHINGTON — The Army’s two top leaders argued Monday against shrinking their service too much, warning that the nation may have to rethink its defense strategy if the ground forces become too small. The two officials — John M. McHugh, the Army secretary, and Gen. Ray Odierno, the new chief of staff — acknowledged that the Army might be told to cut the number of soldiers even below the 520,000 total that now is the target for this decade. General Odierno noted that the Army’s force level was about 480,000 before the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and at that number was supposed to be able to join the other services in carrying out two major wars at one time, according to the national military strategy. Then came the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — and the Army proved too small to sustain both conflicts, growing to its current strength of 570,000. Joining Mr. McHugh during a news conference at the annual session of the Association of the United States Army, General Odierno was asked what would happen if the Army was ordered to keep shrinking after it reached 520,000 beginning in 2015. “We will have to change the strategy and what we are able to do if we continue to fall below a certain level,” General Odierno said. “And that’s what we have to discuss as we talk about matching these budget cuts to strategy.” Both Mr. McHugh and General Odierno said the Army could, with difficulty, do its share in meeting the $450 billion in cuts already ordered. Mr. McHugh echoed Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta’s concerns that it would be “catastrophic” if the Pentagon were ordered to find hundreds of billions of dollars in additional cuts. That would happen if the special Congressional committee on the budget could not identify $1.2 trillion in additional savings, kicking in automatic reductions in a process called sequestration. The entire military, of course, has experienced two significant programs of budget cuts and troop reductions in its recent history: once after the Vietnam War and once again after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Just as the military will be squaring off against Congressional budget-cutters, the individual services will be squaring off against one another to preserve their shares of the eventual, smaller Pentagon spending plan. And, in that, the Army is struggling against an emerging national security approach in which ground forces, which did the most and suffered the most in Afghanistan and Iraq, are viewed as less relevant today against risks on the horizon, whether an ascendant China, a nuclear North Korea or a nuclear Iran. General Odierno said similar arguments were made about the irrelevance of American ground forces before, and were disproved by the attacks of Sept. 11. “We have to be ready for unknown contingencies,” General Odierno said. “We have never predicted the next conflict that we will be in. So it is incumbent on us as an Army to ensure that we have a force that is ready to deal with these unknown contingencies, as well as roles that we will play in other strategies and other contingencies that we will be planning for.” The officials pledged to avoid mistakes of past force reductions, when the Army fielded what were called “hollow” units without enough people and equipment to actually carry out their missions. Mr. McHugh and General Odierno said the Army would allocate money to match the size of the personnel with sufficient stocks of equipment to sustain readiness and meet requirements of future operations. Options include decreasing the number of combat brigades. General Odierno expressed skepticism about calls for moving some of the service’s heavy tank units out of the active component and into the National Guard.

#### Hard power low—budget cuts

Riley 11 (Charles, 10/20/11, “Pentagon's Nightmare: $1 Trillion In Cuts” //www.4029tv.com/r/29537482/detail.html)

NEW YORK (CNNMoney) -- What's the easiest way to scare the biggest, baddest fighting force on the planet? Budget cuts. Already facing a $350 billion reduction in funding over the next decade, top Pentagon officials are worried that number could rise to $1 trillion. The problem? The debt super committee and gridlock on Capitol Hill. A product of the debt ceiling deal, the committee must cut at least $1.5 trillion in debt from the overall federal budget over 10 years. If it fails to do that or it deadlocks, automatic cuts will be triggered at the Pentagon. (Super committee: Who are these guys?) Dubbed "the trigger," defense cuts were supposed to force lawmakers to compromise on debt reduction, acting as a powerful and politically unthinkable deterrent. But, Washington being Washington, the committee appears to be making precious little progress. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta is worried. "It will truly devastate our national defense," Panetta told lawmakers last week. "We will have to hollow it out ... I don't say that as scare tactics. I don't say it as a threat. It's a reality." Defense hawks are also up in arms. Sen. John McCain suggested last week that if the super committee fails to reach an agreement, Congress should nullify the Pentagon budget cuts. "The Congress is not bound by this," McCain said. "It's something we passed. We can reverse it." Why all the hubbub? An awful lot of ships, planes, weapons systems and soldiers are at stake. The Pentagon is facing a worst case scenario of up to $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next decade if the super committee fails, according to an analysis by the Center for a New American Security, a defense think tank. "That's a fairly drastic drop-off in defense spending," said Travis Sharp, one of the report's authors. "I'd call that a cliff." The center estimates that the Pentagon can absorb up to $550 billion in budget cuts without affecting the military's "ability to protect vital American interests worldwide, engage key allies and modernize after a decade of grueling ground wars." But if cuts reach $1 trillion, the military -- and its mission -- will look very different. According to the report, the Army and Marines might be forced to cut troop strength to pre-2001 levels. Ships would go unbuilt, aircraft orders would be cancelled and capabilities diminished. The United States would no longer be able engage in two major conflicts at the same time.

### Hegemony Low – Military 2nc

#### military cannot fight and win the counter-insurgency wars that dominance demands

David P. Calleo, University Professor, Johns Hopkins University, "Unipolar Illusions," SURVIVAL v. 49 n. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 73-78.

Given our future's high potential for discord and destruction, having a hegemonic superpower already installed might seem a great good fortune. Yet, recent experience also reveals that America's global predominance has been seriously overestimated. Put to the test, American power counts for less than expected. While the United States is lavishly outfitted for high-technology warfare, pursuing a hegemonic agenda in today's world requires different capabilities for more primitive forms of combat, like countering guerrilla warfare and suicidal terrorism. The American military loathes this kind of fighting and, to date, has not been very good at it. Greater success would seem to require a different sort of military - with more and cheaper troops, trained for intimate contact with the enemy, and prepared for high casualties. Controlling hostile populations will demand extensive linguistic and policing skills. The United States is now spending heavily to compensate for its deficiencies, but is still far short of the resources needed to prevail.

### Hegemony Low – Soft Power 1nc

#### Soft power low—budget cuts

Thompson 11 (Andrew, senior majoring in History and Political Science, “Cutting foreign aid will hurt U.S. foreign policy” The Daily Cardinal) http://www.dailycardinal.com/opinion/cutting-foreign-aid-will-hurt-u-s-foreign-policy-1.2638825#.TqBuG94g-Io

Congress began debating the future of US foreign aid last week, with many legislators seeking to cut funding in light of current federal budgetary constraints. Despite the nation's weak economy and poor outlook for recovery, cutting foreign aid is simply the wrong answer—especially in light of America's waning influence in world affairs. Both the Senate and House of Representatives have proposed reductions in the $60 billion State Department budget ranging from $12 billion in the House plan to $8 billion in the Senate plan. The reduced budget would force the State Department to spend on operations and security, leaving little money left over for humanitarian assistance.American bilateral aid is essential to maintaining American influence through a soft-power, or "smart" power, approach. American cultural and economic influence grew throughout the Cold War, in large part because of bilateral American aid through the Marshall Plan. This aid is essential to many governments throughout the world who are friendly towards the United States and our ideals. Maintaining and growing these relationships is all the more essential in the present context of international affairs, as terrorism continues to be a thorn in the side of the West. The hard-power approaches of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other military activity throughout the Middle East and Africa, have had a discernable impact on Islamic terrorism; hard-power approaches have also created conditions under which terrorism grows. Consider the Afghanistan-Pakistan boarder, where America has been following a hard-power approach for ten years. Despite American efforts, terrorist incidents originating from this region have grown. Thus hard-power is only successful when complimented with soft-power.

#### Soft power low—reliance on hard power instead

Lagon 11 (Mark, World Affairs, “Soft Power Under Obama” ISN)

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-Insights/Detail?lng=en&id=133416&contextid734=133416&contextid735=133415&tabid=133415&dynrel=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4,0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233

One irony of the Obama presidency is how much it relies on hard power. The president came into office proposing a dramatic shift from George W. Bush’s perceived unilateralism, and most of his predecessor’s hard-edged counterterrorism tactics and massive deployments in wars abroad. Yet after three years, Obama has escalated forces in Afghanistan, embraced the widespread use of unmanned drones to kill terrorists at the risk of civilian casualties, kept Guantánamo open, and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in a thoroughly unilateral fashion. What he hasn’t accomplished to any great degree is what most observers assumed would be the hallmark of his approach to foreign affairs—a full assertion of the soft power that makes hard power more effective. His 2008 campaign centered on a critique of President Bush’s overreliance on hard power. Obama suggested he would rehabilitate the damaged image of America created by these excesses and show that the United States was not a cowboy nation. Upon taking office, he made fresh-start statements, such as his June 2009 remarks in Cairo, and embraced political means like dialogue, respectful multilateralism, and the use of new media, suggesting that he felt the soft power to change minds, build legitimacy, and advance interests was the key element missing from the recent US approach to the world—and that he would quickly remedy that defect. Yet President Obama’s conception of soft power has curiously lacked the very quality that has made it most efficacious in the past—the values dimension . This may seem odd for a leader who is seen worldwide as an icon of morality, known for the motto “the audacity of hope” and his deployment of soaring rhetoric. Yet his governance has virtually ignored the values dimension of soft power, which goes beyond the tradecraft of diplomacy and multilateral consultation to aggressively assert the ideals of freedom in practical initiatives. The excision of this values dimension renders soft power a hollow concept. The Obama presidency has regularly avoided asserting meaningful soft power, particularly in its relations with three countries—Iran, Russia, and Egypt—where it might have made a difference not only for those countries but for American interests as well. His reaction to the challenges these countries have posed to the US suggest that it is not soft power itself that Obama doubts, but America’s moral standing to project it.

#### Soft power low—Obama won’t use it

Lagon 11 (Mark, World Affairs, “Soft Power Under Obama” ISN)

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-Insights/Detail?lng=en&id=133416&contextid734=133416&contextid735=133415&tabid=133415&dynrel=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4,0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233

That President Obama should have excluded it from his vision of America’s foreign policy assets—particularly in the key cases of Iran, Russia, and Egypt—suggests that he feels the country has so declined, not only in real power but in the power of example, that it lacks the moral authority to project soft power. In the 1970s, many also considered the US in decline as it grappled with counterinsurgency in faraway lands, a crisis due to economic stagnation, and reliance on foreign oil. Like Obama, Henry Kissinger tried to manage decline in what he saw as a multipolar world, dressing up prescriptions for policy as descriptions of immutable reality. In the 1980s, however, soft power played a crucial part in a turnaround for US foreign policy. Applying it, President Reagan sought to transcend a nuclear balance of terror with defensive technologies, pushed allies in the Cold War (e.g., El Salvador, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines) to liberalize for their own good, backed labor movements opposed to Communists in Poland and Central America, and called for the Berlin Wall to be torn down—over Foggy Bottom objections. This symbolism not only boosted the perception and the reality of US influence, but also hastened the demise of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. For Barack Obama, this was the path not taken. Even the Arab Spring has not cured his acute allergy to soft power. His May 20, 2011, speech on the Middle East and Northern Africa came four months after the Jasmine Revolution emerged. His emphasis on 1967 borders as the basis for Israeli-Palestinian peace managed to eclipse even his broad words (vice deeds) on democracy in the Middle East. Further, those words failed to explain his deeds in continuing to support some Arab autocracies (e.g., Bahrain’s, backed by Saudi forces) even as he gives tardy rhetorical support for popular forces casting aside other ones. To use soft power without hard power is to be Sweden. To use hard power without soft power is to be China. Even France, with its long commitment to realpolitik, has overtaken the United States as proponent and implementer of humanitarian intervention in Libya and Ivory Coast. When the American president has no problem with France combining hard and soft power better than the United States, something is seriously amiss.

### Hegemony Low – Soft Power 2nc

#### U.S. soft power is low now--multiple reasons

Mitchell B. Reiss, “Restoring America’s Image: What the Next President Can Do,” SURVIVAL v. 50 n. 5, October 2008, pp. 99-114.

America's image in the world today is not all that it should be. Blame for this is most often assigned to President George W. Bush, but greater responsibility rests with deeper changes in the international system: the resentment (and fear) caused by the preponderance of American power, the loosening of alliances after the demise of the Soviet Union, a fundamental rethinking of the laws of war and peace in an age of terror, the co-branding of the United States with the forces of modernity and globalisation, and a demographic change that has sidelined the post-Second World War generation with their historical memories of American bravery and generosity. The next US president can start to restore America's image by setting a new tone, adroitly managing the US presence in the Persian Gulf and adopting new policies on climate change, immigration, world trade, and Guantanamo Bay. Even so, resurrecting America's image will be a slow, long-term process.

#### Even high soft power won’t check anti-Americanism

David P. Calleo, Professor, John Hopkins University, FOLLIES OF POWER: AMERICA'S UNIPOLAR FANTASY 2009 p 67.

The U.S. certainly has abundant soft power. Its high culture can scarcely be considered inferior to anyone else's - in the arts and sciences or in higher education and research - not least because the polyglot U.S. has historically been a refuge for persecuted talent from around the world. But America's accomplishments in high culture are rivaled by others and scarcely justify America's claims to a unipolar status. American popular culture, however, is so widely diffused that it can claim a unique global stature. Does its attractiveness to the world's masses translate into usable soft power? Arguably, foreigners often find most appealing those aspects of American popular culture most vociferously in opposition to America's own political, social, and military establishments. In any event, admiration for American popular culture does little to obstruct populist anti-Americanism. Terrorists eat at McDonald's, wear blue jeans, and download popular music.

### Hegemony Low – Hard power fails

#### **Hard power fails – Egypt proves**

Goodman 7/8 [Melvin A. Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy. Goodman is a former CIA analyst and a professor of international relations at the National War College. <http://consortiumnews.com/2013/07/08/us-finds-influence-hard-to-buy/> July 8, 2013]

For decades the U.S. government has ladled billions upon billions in military assistance to countries that either don’t need it or use it to suppress popular uprisings. But all that money has bought very little in terms of genuine influence with the recipients, ex-CIA analyst Melvin A. Goodman writes ¶ The current crisis in Egypt and the inability of the United States to formulate a policy and to have any influence in Cairo marks another setback for U.S. foreign policy, which relies too heavily on military assistance.¶ Too many pundits and analysts believe that U.S. military aid to Egypt, which amounts to $1.3 billion annually, is a source of leverage in the Egyptian domestic crisis. Well, it isn’t … and the same could be said for the lack of U.S. influence, let alone leverage, with any of the top recipients of U.S. military assistance.¶ The top six recipients of U.S. military aid (Israel, Egypt, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey) provide very little return on our investment. Israel has overwhelming military dominance in the Middle East and doesn’t require military aid. In fact, the United States is constantly and deliberately embarrassed by the Israeli government despite the huge amounts of military assistance that Israel has received over past decades.¶ Egypt has received more than $60 billion in military and economic aid over the past three decades with no indication that Egyptian policy was susceptible to U.S. influence. Cairo doesn’t violate its peace treaty with Israel because of U.S. assistance; it adheres to the treaty because it is in Egypt’s interest to do so.¶ Pentagon officials believe that close ties between U.S. and Egyptian armed forces helped the Egyptian military council become a force for social cohesion rather than repression. A retired commandant of the U.S. Army War College, Major General Robert Scales, has argued that “they learn our way of war … but they also learn our philosophies of civil-military relations.” If only this were true.¶ The most futile example of U.S. military aid programs is the case of Pakistan. The Bush and Obama administrations have sent billions of dollars in aid to Islamabad, but Pakistan has never stopped its double dealing on pledges to fight the Afghan Taliban. At the same time, the United States has never used its assistance to promote democracy in Pakistan. The U.S. military presence in Pakistan, including its efforts at so-called assistance, merely contribute to militant anti-Americanism.¶ Military assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan does not contribute to U.S. goals and objectives in the region. No sooner had U.S. forces withdrawn from Iraq than the Obama administration announced multibillion-dollar arms sales to Iraq, including advanced fighter aircraft, tanks and helicopters.¶ This deal was announced as the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki worked to consolidate his authority, create a one-party Shiite-dominated state, and abandon the U.S.-backed power-sharing arrangement. Meanwhile, Iraq has improved its bilateral relations with Iran, raising the prospect that U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf could encounter U.S. weaponry in a future conflict.¶ With the United States winding down its combat role in Afghanistan, the government of Hamid Karzai is already demanding $4 billion annually for its military and policy forces over the next decade. Afghanistan is unable to use effectively the assistance that it receives, and thus far has been unable to create a military force that can counter the Taliban threat.¶ The surge in recent years in incidents of Afghan soldiers killing U.S. and European military personnel, and the increased corruption in Afghanistan that is fueled by U.S. dollars argue for very limited assistance.¶ Turkey is the sole case where huge amounts of military assistance provide some influence in getting Turkish support for U.S. diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East. But the recent violence in Istanbul’s Taksim Square could one day match the combustion in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, and Prime Minister Recep Erdogan – Turkey’s most important leader since Ataturk – doesn’t appear receptive to demands for a genuine, pluralistic democracy. For the first time since he came to power, Erdogan appears politically vulnerable. At this particular time, Turkey needs more genuine political debate, not U.S. military assistance.¶ The United States gives military assistance to numerous countries that do not need it or do not deserve it because of serious human rights violations. The recent sale of $30 billion in arms to Saudi Arabia was ill-timed because it is more likely that such aid would be used to suppress demonstrations for reform in Bahrain than in any other scenario.¶ Eastern European countries need economic and political stability, not modern military technology. Indonesia, a country with numerous human rights violations, receives $20 million annually in military aid.¶ While the Obama administration was conducting a feckless debate over whether a military coup had taken place in Cairo, the Egyptian military rapidly emerged as the dominant political force in the country. It is also the richest (and most corrupt) institution in the country, and hardly needs U.S. largesse.¶ There is no external security threat to Egypt that requires the huge weapons platforms that its military forces demand. The United States was slow to criticize the authoritarian actions of former presidents Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi, and we still have no strategy for fostering political and economic reform in Cairo.¶ At the very least, the Obama administration needs to call a coup a coup, and begin to suspend military assistance to the interim Egyptian government. U.S. policy should be based on getting Egypt to establish a coalition government and to begin a consensus-based transition process.¶ Cutting future military aid to Egypt would give the United States an opportunity to reduce military assistance to Israel as well. Such measures would send a necessary signal to U.S. allies and clients that military aid will not dominate the implementation of U.S. foreign policy.¶

#### Fall of heg inevitable

Chomsky 13 [Noam, an emeritus professor of linguistics at MIT and a prolific critic of American politics and foreign policy, adapted from Uprisings, a chapter in Power Systems: Conversations on Global Democratic Uprisings and the New Challenges to US Empire, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/feb/04/us-control-diminishing-own-world>, February 4, 2013]

The major energy-producing countries are still firmly under the control of the western-backed dictatorships. So, actually, the progress made by the Arab spring is limited, but it's not insignificant. The western-controlled dictatorial system is being eroded. In fact, it's been being eroded for some time. So, for example, if you go back 50 years, the energy resources – the main concern of US planners – have been mostly nationalised. There are constantly attempts to reverse that, but they have not succeeded.¶ Take the US invasion of Iraq, for example. To everyone except a dedicated ideologue, it was pretty obvious that we invaded Iraq not because of our love of democracy but because it's maybe the second- or third-largest source of oil in the world, and is right in the middle of the major energy-producing region. You're not supposed to say this. It's considered a conspiracy theory.¶ The United States was seriously defeated in Iraq by Iraqi nationalism – mostly by nonviolent resistance. The United States could kill the insurgents, but they couldn't deal with half a million people demonstrating in the streets. Step by step, Iraq was able to dismantle the controls put in place by the occupying forces. By November 2007, it was becoming pretty clear that it was going to be very hard to reach US goals. And at that point, interestingly, those goals were explicitly stated. So in November 2007 the Bush II administration came out with an official declaration about what any future arrangement with Iraq would have to be. It had two major requirements: one, that the United States must be free to carry out combat operations from its military bases, which it will retain; and, two, "encouraging the flow of foreign investments to Iraq, especially American investments". In January 2008, Bush made this clear in one of his signing statements. A couple of months later, in the face of Iraqi resistance, the United States had to give that up. Control of Iraq is now disappearing before their eyes.¶ Iraq was an attempt to reinstitute by force something like the old system of control, but it was beaten back. In general, I think, US policies remain constant, going back to the second world war. But the capacity to implement them is declining.¶ Declining because of economic weakness?¶ Partly because the world is just becoming more diverse. It has more diverse power centres. At the end of the second world war, the United States was absolutely at the peak of its power. It had half the world's wealth, and every one of its competitors was seriously damaged or destroyed. It had a position of unimaginable security and developed plans to essentially run the world – not unrealistically at the time.¶ This was called "grand area" planning?¶ Yes. Right after the second world war, George Kennan, head of the US state department policy planning staff, and others sketched out the details, and then they were implemented. What's happening now in the Middle East and north Africa, to an extent, and in South America substantially goes all the way back to the late 1940s. The first major successful resistance to US hegemony was in 1949. That's when an event took place that, interestingly, is called "the loss of China". It's a very interesting phrase, never challenged. There was a lot of discussion about who is responsible for the loss of China. It became a huge domestic issue. But it's a very interesting phrase. You can only lose something if you own it. It was just taken for granted: we possess China – and, if they move toward independence, we've lost China. Later came concerns about "the loss of Latin America", "the loss of the Middle East", "the loss of" certain countries, all based on the premise that we own the world and anything that weakens our control is a loss to us and we wonder how to recover it.¶ Today, if you read, say, foreign policy journals or, in a farcical form, listen to the Republican debates, they're asking, "How do we prevent further losses?"¶ On the other hand, the capacity to preserve control has sharply declined. By 1970, the world was already what was called tripolar economically, with a US-based North American industrial centre, a German-based European centre, roughly comparable in size, and a Japan-based east Asian centre, which was then the most dynamic growth region in the world. Since then, the global economic order has become much more diverse. So it's harder to carry out our policies, but the underlying principles have not changed much.¶

#### US military unstainable – economic realities

Stars and Stripes 13 [John Valinder, Provider of independent news and information to the U.S. military community, comprised of active-duty servicemembers, DoD civilians, and contractors, “If the US steps back in Europe, will allies step forward to fill the void?”, <http://www.stripes.com/news/if-the-us-steps-back-in-europe-will-allies-step-forward-to-fill-the-void-1.212469>, March 13, 2013]

Of all the places U.S. troops are stationed around the world, no place seems to cause as much consternation as the military’s robust presence in wealthy western Europe.¶ With defense spending set to undergo its biggest squeeze in a generation, many lawmakers are once again taking a hard look at Europe and asking the question: What is the military still doing there?¶ “One of the things we’re hearing a lot around the Hill here is, maybe we don’t need forces in Europe anymore,” said Rep. Buck McKeon, R-Calif., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, last week during a hearing on the military mission in Europe. “We’re so far advanced there, maybe we can pull all those troops home and it would be a big money savings. And then the way things are going right now financially, that would be a great thing. That’s what we’re hearing.”¶ The military is already scaling back to accommodate the steep automatic budget cuts mandated by sequestration, with furloughs planned for civilian workers, reductions to numerous on-base services, cuts in training that could eventually hamper readiness and a smaller overall active duty force.¶ But with still no sign of a deal in Washington to stave off the $500 billion in additional defense cuts that come with sequestration, budgetary pressures and Congressional scrutiny could put further pressure on the military to reevaluate its mission across the Atlantic.¶ While turning away from Europe would have strategic consequences for the military, whose commanders view the region as a key launching pad for hotspots in Africa and the Middle East, some experts argue that Europe is more than capable of picking up the slack should the U.S. downsize there.¶ According to a recent report by the RAND Corporation, the Pentagon could save up to $500 billion over 10 years if it would simply tell its European allies in NATO that they now have the security lead in defending shared interests in the region, allowing the U.S. to assume a more backseat role in Europe.¶ For example, pushing allies into the operational lead around the Mediterranean perimeter, for counter-piracy operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and for providing the bulk of ground and tactical air forces that serve as a strategic counterweight to Russia could provide big savings, according to RAND.¶ America’s European allies together spend 200 billion euros ($260 billion) on defense annually, or about four times more than Russia.¶

#### Military cuts guts global leadership

Metz 6/19 [Steven, Research professor of national security affairs and director of research at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, “Strategic Horizons: After Military Drawdown, Will America Come Back?”, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13031/strategic-horizons-after-military-drawdown-will-america-come-back>, June 19, 2013]

For more than 50 years, U.S. national security strategy has undergone cycles of strategic retrenchment and renewal. After World War II, the United States rapidly demobilized, giving the Soviet Union and its proxies like North Korea an opening for armed aggression. By the end of the Truman administration, America had begun an extensive military buildup and a significant expansion of its alliances and security commitments. Another round of retrenchment came after Vietnam; once again, renewal followed. Under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan, defense spending increased, and the military fielded an array of new weapons systems and developed innovative doctrine and concepts. While the armed forces shrank under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, there was no real strategic retrenchment—the United States expanded its global commitments, solidifying its role as the "indispensable" nation. The decade after Sept. 11 saw U.S. security commitments grow and a rapid expansion of the military and defense establishment.¶ ¶ Now the historical pattern seems to be holding. The United States has again begun retrenchment: disengaging from a major role in Iraq and Afghanistan, slashing defense spending and beginning to cut the armed forces. The Obama administration's 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance instructed the military to stop preparing for large-scale, protracted counterinsurgency operations. What has not happened, though, is any diminution of America's security commitments or disengagement from parts of the world. The mantra is to do as much as before but do it with less. Policymakers, military leaders and national security experts contend that if the Department of Defense becomes more efficient, if allies and partners substitute for a shrinking U.S. military and if future presidents make smart choices, the United States can retain its global influence on the cheap. Unfortunately, history and logic suggest otherwise. ¶ ¶ One of the big problems with influence on the cheap is that, as military experts often phrase it, "the enemy has a vote." If the United States denudes itself of the capability for a type of conflict, that is exactly the conflict America's enemies will try to pursue. And as Libya and Syria show, today's world is so deeply connected that violence has cascading effects, destabilizing entire regions. Conflict can no longer be cauterized and ignored. When faced with an insurgency that threatens U.S. interests, a future president is less likely to stay out than to throw an undersized and inadequately prepared military into the fray. It is not hard to imagine the results.¶ ¶ As the defense budget declines, the U.S. military can do three things: It can cut force structure, cut personnel costs or spend less on new technology, training, professional education and leader development. All have risks. Deep cuts in force structure will leave future presidents with fewer strategic options when facing threats or crises, particularly if multiple crises occur simultaneously or if success depends on sustained, large-scale U.S. involvement. A U.S. president who commanded a U.S. military only capable of short operations or striking targets from afar simply may not have the means to protect vital national interests. Phrased differently, slashing too much force structure today mortgages America's future security.¶ ¶ Cutting personnel costs, like many a good idea, can also turn out badly if done wrong. If military service becomes less attractive, it will be harder to recruit and retain the highest quality personnel. The United States could potentially end up with a military that is both smaller and lower quality. Finally, spending less on new technology, training, education and leader development is risky as potential opponents like China spend more and a growing proportion of military technology comes from the private sector rather than defense labs, making it available to anyone with the cash. The qualitative advantage the U.S. military has over its enemies will not likely disappear altogether any time soon, but it can shrink, perhaps dramatically.¶ ¶ If this round of retrenchment is done badly, any future renewal will also be more difficult and costly. Partners and allies may learn to get by without the United States, perhaps through making some sort of arrangement with China, Iran or other nations that seem on the ascent. The U.S. defense industry will atrophy; parts may disappear, making it hard to expand the military if faced with an emergency. Developing the infrastructure and, more importantly, the leaders to rebuild the military would take time—perhaps more than was available. Domestic political support for global engagement may be impossible to revive. The intense politicization of national security policy that has emerged over the past decade may hobble or even prevent strategic renewal. ¶ The core issue is not whether America can come back after the current retrenchment and drawdown. The question is whether it will or should. Some national security experts believe that a permanent retrenchment would be a good thing. Andrew Bacevich, for instance, argues that global leadership has corroded the United States. In his book “American Empire,” he writes, "Like it or not, America today is Rome, committed irreversibly to the maintenance and, where feasible, expansion of an empire." Writing in the American Conservative, Christopher Layne argued, "America is increasingly unable to play the hegemon's assigned role." For thinkers of this sort, retrenchment is renewal.¶ Ultimately, they may be right. Perhaps it would be better for the United States to abandon global leadership and return to the less demanding role of a regional power. But Americans should debate the costs and risks of permanent retrenchment and, if they opt for it, do so with their eyes wide open. The worst possible course would be to undertake misguided retrenchment based on flawed assumptions and then find that the strategic environment and the domestic political setting has shifted to the point that renewal is impossible. Deliberately deciding to abandon global power is one thing. Doing so by accident while chasing the chimera of global influence on the cheap is altogether different.

#### US tech advantage is unsustainable

Freedberg 12 [Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, Expert in US military dealings specifically in Afghanistan and Iraq.Holds bachelor's degree, summa cum laude, from Harvard University and a master's from Cambridge University in European History. <http://breakingdefense.com/2012/12/21/the-end-of-advantage-enemies-may-catch-up-with-us-technology/>, December 21, 2012]

Even in the dark days of the 1950s, when the Soviet Union had a booming economy, the world’s most potent military, and a Sputnik-sized lead in the space race, Americans could always count on superior weapons to offset the enemy’s superior numbers. Better technology hardly makes for certain victory against determined and clever foes — consider Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan — but it has been something the US has been able to count on, and has taken for granted, at every level of conflict from grand strategy to squad tactics. By 2030, however, for the first time since World War II, when American propeller planes were outflown by Me-262 jets and Sherman tanks were outgunned by Panthers, US troops might have to face an enemy who has better weapons.¶ In the deliberately bland words of the new Army Capstone Concept, officially published yesterday, “Technology investments by potential adversaries make calculated overmatch against U.S. forces a serious threat.”¶ The idea that militarily relevant technology, from missiles to GPS guidance, is proliferating ever more rapidly around the globe is not a new one. Nor is anyone predicting that the United States will be technologically backwards in 2030. But leading thinkers are increasingly concerned that, in a few key areas, potential adversaries, especially China, will erode America’s technological advantage, catch up, or even surpass us.¶ “There’re going to be a lot of factors that go into determining who has the military-technical advantage in 2030. I suspect it’ll still be us, but there are no guarantees,” said Andrew Krepinevich head of the influential Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, speaking to Breaking Defense after a talk on strategy he gave Tuesday. “We still have the world’s best universities,” he said — though more and more of their students not only come from abroad but go back there after graduation — and “we have a dynamic, entrepreneurial culture that’s constantly inventing and reinventing.”¶ “Just because somebody steals your blue prints on how to build an F-35 doesn’t mean they can build it,” said Krepinevich, let alone operate it with tactical skill.¶ Nevertheless, he went on, advantages America has counted on since the end of the Cold War are at least going to diminish. In particular, Krepinevich told Breaking Defense, “I think we’re losing the dominant position we had in precision guidance.”¶ CSBA has been warning policymakers about a threat it calls “G-RAMM”: guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles using imitations of US precision-guidance technology. Such gadgetry was costly and cutting-edge in 1991, when American smart bombs wowed the world, but it’s becoming cheaply and easily available today. There are similar concerns about unmanned air vehicles, since China, Iran, and even the Iranian-backed militia Hezbollah are now experimenting with their own reconnaissance UAVs. Drones to spot targets and smart weapons to strike them have been the eyes and fists of America’s post-Cold War military machine. If adversaries can copy that combination, then the big, static airbases, seaports, and FOBs (Forward Operating Bases) that have underpinned US power projection for decades become horrifically vulnerable. Advanced radars and surface-to-air missiles could threaten our stealth aircraft, once seen as invisible silver bullets. Shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles, while unavailing against stealth fighters, could cripple the transport planes and helicopters essential to military mobility. Hackers and jammers could cut the control links to our drones. In one Army wargame this summer, an air- and sea-borne intervention against a well-armed enemy resulted in almost 500 (simulated) US and allied casualties in the first week.¶ Krepinevich, CSBA, and company argue that the counter to hostile drones and precision-guided weapons is directed energy: lasers. Anti-missile lasers can shoot down incoming projectiles at the speed of light, and they get infinite free reloads as long as you have electrical power, compared to current anti-missile missiles like the Patriot that are little faster than the weapons they are trying to intercept, significantly more expensive, and only get one shot. But lasers are far from a battle-ready weapon — and sophisticated foes may well find ways to counter them.¶

### Hegemony Low – Rising powers

#### Chinese economic rise- causes hegemonic instability

Shor 12, Francis. Professor at Wayne State University¶ "Declining US Hegemony and Rising Chinese Power: A Formula for Conﬂict?" PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY, 2012. Web. 15 July 2013. <http://ehis.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=b30f66e7-0f92-4fda-809a-367cbd3ff3d8%40sessionmgr113&vid=2&hid=115>.¶ MA

A defining historical feature of the decline of specific empires in the world ¶ capitalist system has been the conflict surrounding the emergence of a successor. The United States and Germany engaged in a protracted struggle in the ¶ first half of the twentieth century to determine which country would replace ¶ Great Britain as the dominant hegemon. After Germany’s second defeat in a ¶ world war in 1945, the US and the USSR contended for global hegemony ¶ even though the US was the pre-eminent power in economic and military ¶ terms throughout the four decades of the Cold War. Since the demise of the ¶ Soviet Union, the US has attempted to use its unrivaled military power as a ¶ weapon to retain an eroding hegemony. However, given extensive internal and ¶ external contradictions, the US Empire faces global competition and realignment, especially, but not exclusively, as a consequence of the rise of Chinese ¶ power.1¶ In this article I will focus on those sites of US/China conflict in the present period and project, albeit tentatively, where such conflict may lead in ¶ the future.¶ While it may be that global capital has, to a certain extent, delinked itself ¶ from the nation-state, in the case of the United States, in particular, the state ¶ and state apparatus, especially in the form of military neo-imperialism, still ¶ perform essential geostrategic functions.2¶ A fully realized deterritorialized and ¶ decentered global system, whether envisioned by Hardt and Negri on the left ¶ or Thomas Friedman on the right, does not yet exist. Indeed, the “dialectical ¶ relation between territorial and capitalist logics of power,” which David Harvey (2005) identifies as the defining characteristic of the “new imperialism,” ¶ still persists. That persistence of territorial logic, described by Chalmers Johnson (2004) as an “empire of bases,” i.e., military neo-imperialism, more than a ¶ predetermined inter-imperialist rivalry or an emergent transnational capitalist ¶ class, underscores the growing geopolitical conflict between the US and China. ¶ Nonetheless, it is necessary to account for both elements in Harvey’s dialectic ¶ in order to demarcate those sites of US/Chinese competition and conflict.¶ While the United States no longer dominates the global economy as it did ¶ during the first two decades after WWII, it still is the leading economic power ¶ in the world. However, over the last few decades China, with all its internal ¶ contradictions, has made enormous leaps until it now occupies the number ¶ two spot. In fact, the IMF recently projected that the Chinese economy would ¶ become the world’s largest in 2016. In manufacturing China has displaced the ¶ US in so many areas, including becoming the number one producer of steel ¶ and exporter of four-fifths of all of the textile products in the world and two thirds of the world’s copy machines, DVD players, and microwaves ovens. Yet, ¶ a significant portion of this manufacturing is still owned by foreign companies, ¶ including US firms like General Motors (Gulick 2011:17).¶ On the other hand, China is also the largest holder of US foreign reserves, ¶ e.g. treasury bonds. This may be one of the reasons mitigating full-blown conflict with the US now since China has such a large stake in the US economy, ¶ both as a holder of bonds and as the leading exporter of goods to the US. Nonetheless, “the US has blocked several large scale Chinese investments and buyouts of oil companies, technology firms, and other enterprises” (Petras 2010a). ¶ In effect, there are still clear nation-centric responses to China’s rising economic power, especially as an expression of the US governing elite’s ideological commitment to national security.

#### U.S. hegemony unsustainable- lack of global popularity

**Liu 12**, Debin. studies at Zhejiang University "Withering Hegemony of US and Evolving De-centered Globalism: A Theoretical Account." Journal of Political Studies, Winter 2012. Web. 15 July 2013. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1330860867>.¶ MA

In academia the decline of US hegemony is equally debated to China's rise. History is the witness that even the vast and mighty Empires like Persian Empire, Roman Empire, Ottoman Empire, British Empire and Soviet Empire ultimately shattered to a number of independent states and couldn't stay forever as the most powerful actor in World politics. United States rose to the status of 'Superpower' in the aftermath of World War II and 'Hyper power' after the demise of Soviet Union. The era of Post Cold War is replete with 'American Unilateralism' and poor role played by international regimes who failed to check upon American unrestrained misadventure ranging from Vietnam, Afghan war (2002) and Iraq war (2003). These overextended commitments not only damaged US interests to the great extent but ignited Anti-Americanism all over the world. Rising Anti-Americanism across globe paved way for another powerful actor in international arena equivalent to United States. Another significant reason of rising powers to come up is logical balance of power against a unrestrained hyper-power to bring international order in a situation where major stake holder of international system can involve in global decision making to make world better and peaceful place to live in. Recent studies have proved America's relative decline and dwindling down American popularity even in Western Europe and rise of China may change the global order. It means that the power is gradually shifting from West to East which will ultimately change global order if not fully but partially.

#### China leadership perception high now- cause hegemonic instability

Liu 12, Debin. studies at Zhejiang University "Withering Hegemony of US and Evolving De-centered Globalism: A Theoretical Account." Journal of Political Studies, Winter 2012. Web. 15 July 2013. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1330860867>.¶ MA

Celebrated author Joseph S Nye who pioneered the theory of soft power talks about the power transition. He describes power transition as shift of power among states which means power is changing from West to East. He calls this phenomenon of power transition as return of Asia. Especially after the 2008 world financial crisis peoples started thinking that perhaps this is the end of the American era. President Medvedev of Russia in 2008 stated that this is the beginning of the end of United States power (Nye, 2010).¶ There are many indicators which reflect that a new world order is emerging in which China would be playing the role of leadership with other powerful states. China is astonishingly rapid in economic boom and militarily. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that China's share of world GDP (15 percent) will be nearing with the U.S. share (18 percent) by 2014.Historically if we take stock of United States share at the end of World War II it was nearly 50 percent whereas China's share of world GDP was only 2 percent in 1980 and 6 percent as in 1995 which has miraculously boomed now. There are good chances that China would overtake the United States as the World's largest economy (measured by market exchange rates) probably this decade or so. Famous economist Arvind Subramanian states the United States was the world's leading manufacturing power in 1960s. Today, it has become essentially a rentier economy, while China is the world's leading manufacturing nation. A recently reported study in the Financial Times informs that 58% of total income in America now comes from dividends and interest payments about China that as among the rising powers China becomes wealthier and the defense spending in China will further expand. The Economist recently projected that China's defense spending is going to be equal of the United States by 2025. In the upcoming era Beijing will play an active role as "responsible stakeholder" in an international order built by the United States (Layne, 2010).¶ Fareed Zakaria the author of Post American World 2008, in his recent article published in Washington Post made it clear upon Mitt Romney the Republican presidential Candidate that "This book is not about the decline of America but rather about the rise of everyone else," He said that I am optimistic about American prosperity and power that even in the forthcoming era it would enjoy the status of powerful country in the world but the days of American Unipolarity which America lived after demise of Soviet Union are gone. In post cold war era, about a quarter century United States dominated the world without any powerful economic and political competitors. American ideas, models and Washington consensus received wisdom everywhere but the time has drastically changed.¶ ln1990, China represented 2 percent of global gross domestic product which has quadrupled to 8 percent and is continuously rising. Estimates show that China's economy will become the world's largest between 2016 and 2018.China is making headway not economically but militarily too. China's defense spending may be surpassing America's by 2025.China's 4,300 naval ships have escorted through the Gulf of Aden since 2008.A glistening headquarter of African union was inaugurated in Addis Ababa in January 2012.The $200 million complex was financed by China and during inauguration the member of Politburo delivered a an amount of $94 million. Now this world is going to be very different from America-centric world where nothing could happen without the consent of United States. President Obama has been successful in preserving the United States influence in the world by recognizing new forces in international arena. He has recognized the role of new rising powers by replacing old Western club with G20 (group of 20) which is now central decision making forum regarding world economic affairs. His vision of multilateral Organizations, alliance structure and international legitimacy is getting bearing positive results. It was China and Russia's cooperation that clamped tougher sanction against Iran over nuclear issue otherwise America alone couldn't do this legitimately (Zakaria, 2012). President Obama in his April speech at Strasbourg admitted that "we're not always going to be right . . . other people may have good ideas . . . in order for us to work collectively, all parties have to compromise, and that includes us." Or, as Time puts it, "America is one of many nationsU(Drenzer,2009).¶ Jacques Martin the author of "When China Rules the World" appreciates smart rise of China and argues persuasively that China would take over as the world's dominant power and then China would play a gumptious role to enhance its power and Beijing would make the rules on its own terms. China's tremendous growth rate is the indicator that the economy is likely to grow without bumps. China having long history of a nation refuses to follow Western electoral style. China's restrictive currency rules have made it World's leading creditor on the contrary US sinks deeper into debt. United States as a result of War on terror has sacrificed the thousands of soldiers in lraq and Afghanistan and the Chinese are making money in both countries without losing a single drop of blood (Faison, 2009). Misadventure in Afghanistan and lraq without a rational policy to handle it America has lost all its image and prestige in these prolonged wars. As a result American popularity in allied states and other has sustained a severe blow. Recent research by Pew Research Centre shows dwindling down American popularity couple with anti-Americanism which is the primary cause of declined US hegemony in contemporary times.¶ The above graph shows the study by 'Pew research centre' (http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2011/09/Post-9-11-US-image-final.pdf) which shows a survey across 18 countries which view increasingly replacing US. Brown line shows that China has already or eventually will replace US as a global leader, whereas yellow line shows that China will never replace United States V k e , 201 1). In the light of above argument it can be easily deducted that United States hegemony is in gradual and constant decline and other great powers are on the rise and within and decade or two the world would undergo a power transformation in which china would be a dominant actor equivalent to US . Power is slowly shifting from West to East and a new world order is impending with the characteristics of de-centered globalism.

#### US leadership declining- unable to handle global issues and rising powers

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The literature is brimming with accounts of American decline, changing geo­¶ political dynamics and the resulting changes in global order.1¶ For those espousing ¶ the declinist thesis, the debate over the US response centres on how it can best ¶ preserve its influence in international politics; this inevitably brings out questions ¶ over the future of global order.2¶ Specifically, if US power wanes, will the current ¶ order built around US leadership change—and, if so, how?¶ To complicate matters, America’s decline coincides with the rise of new powers ¶ that are not traditional US allies, the implication being that the world­views and ¶ priorities of the main powers in the future will not be so compatible as in the ¶ current neo­liberal order.3¶ This complicates the options of the United States in its ¶ search for a place in an evolving multilateral order. There are questions over how ¶ far the United States can control the evolution of a new order that includes rising ¶ powers. Some believe that by involving new powers in the current structures and ¶ making them responsible stakeholders, the US can bind those new powers into ¶ the current architecture, thus securing its own influence.4¶ This is known as the ¶ socialization hypothesis. It is questionable whether this will really preserve US ¶ influence or rather, on the contrary, diminish it, as the US will have to share ¶ power in a reformed order and thus will be restricted in its ability to act unilaterally. Nevertheless, there are no proposals for trying to contain the rise of new ¶ powers, as this is seen as futile and/or unlikely to be supported by other allies.5¶ What will the United States do? Is it likely to accept a diminished role for ¶ itself in order to preserve global order? There are limited incentives to do this; ¶ hitherto, the US has supported global order mainly because it has served American¶ interests, not for its own sake.6¶ The US sits at the core of the current system, with ¶ a principal role in governance institutions.7¶ Giving this up through reform would ¶ mean accepting both a diminished voice within the system and a diminished ¶ capacity to act unilaterally. This will be a difficult pill for American policy­makers ¶ (as well as voters) to swallow. However, the US cannot deal with global issues ¶ like nuclear proliferation, terrorism and financial governance without cooperating ¶ with others, especially rising powers. So it faces a double dilemma: how can it ¶ preserve its unique position in the system and at the same time obtain cooperation ¶ from emerging powers in solving global problems that affect its interests? Is this ¶ even possible? If global order in its current form cannot be preserved, how can the ¶ US better secure its interests in an evolving multilateral order?¶ I make two arguments in this article. One is that the United States has not ¶ yet decided on a grand strategy for how to manage its decline. This is largely ¶ because of its long­standing position as a leader of the ‘free world’ during the ¶ Cold War, and then as unrivalled hegemon in the first decade of the post­Cold ¶ War geopolitical landscape; also because US decline will happen over a period ¶ of time,8¶ and therefore some decisions on grand strategy may be delayed accord­¶ ingly.9¶ The second argument is that currently the US is dealing with its ‘relative ¶ decline’ by fostering the use of informal institutions rather than mounting an ¶ aggressive drive to reform the current institutional structure to accommodate ¶ rising powers, as suggested by the socialization hypothesis. If this policy continues ¶ in the future, it might result in a new global order that looks less like the current ¶ formalized rules­based liberal order and more like the early nineteenth­century ¶ Congress of Vienna.¶ The article develops these arguments by examining US negotiating behavior ¶ in relation to both rising powers and minor powers in the system. The emphasis ¶ is on how informal diplomacy is becoming ever more important than formalized institutions. I concentrate on security, financial governance and development ¶ issues, where contestation of the new order is taking place among the established ¶ and rising powers.¶ The first part of the article outlines how the United States views its role in ¶ the international system, what effect this has had on its foreign policy in general, ¶ and how the rise of new powers upsets the US leadership role. The second, third ¶ and fourth parts examine how the US is responding to the rise of new powers ¶ in different areas of governance. The concluding section discusses what these ¶ responses are likely to produce for the future of global order.

#### No grand strategy- causes leadership decline

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This predominant position in global institutions, and the exceptionalist and ¶ exemptionalist attitude of the US foreign policy community, make it difficult for ¶ the US to adjust to the changing geopolitical environment. The US is accustomed ¶ to being the ‘leader of the free world’ and so far has faced little opposition. There ¶ have been frictions with traditional US allies in the past, but these never led to the ¶ kinds of confrontation that would limit US freedom of action at home or abroad. ¶ In addition, traditional US allies such as the EU and Japan had similar values and levels of development, and profited greatly from the US­led liberal order.16 They ¶ had few incentives to change that order, and valued their relationship with the ¶ US too much to challenge its core interests, even in cases of disagreement. This ¶ further legitimized the US­led order and helped the US maintain its leadership ¶ position. However, rising powers are different. They do not share western values ¶ as traditional US allies have done.17 They have no attachment to the US and feel ¶ that they are kept at a distance from the current order to avoid disrupting it.18 This ¶ calls into question the core idea behind the ‘socialization hypothesis’, according ¶ to which rising powers will become responsible stakeholders if they are given ¶ more responsibility and voice in global decision­making structures. The implication is that these countries will become more like America in their behaviour ¶ simply because they are given a voice. This is, however, a limited view from a ¶ western perspective of the causes of rising powers’ behaviour, and research so far ¶ has not confirmed that increased access to decision­making will increase stake­¶ holder ‘responsibility’19—especially the kind of responsibility that suits US inter­¶ ests. Therefore, simply including these powers in the current order, as suggested ¶ by the ‘socialization’ hypothesis, may inadvertently result in a reduction of US ¶ power. These powers clash with both the exceptionalist and exemptionalist US ¶ position. Not all of them are liberal democracies and their political and economic ¶ systems are not similar to those of the US; nor will they be easily persuaded to ¶ refrain from limiting US freedom of action by exercising their own vetoes or ¶ trying to impose scrutiny of US domestic policies in international agreements.20¶ Therefore, the US may have little incentive to properly ‘socialize’ these powers ¶ into the current system of governance. Even proponents of this thesis admit that ¶ it will limit US power and freedom of action.21 In addition, there are reasons to ¶ believe that attempts at socialization have so far only emboldened these powers ¶ to ask for more concessions, for example in reform of the IMF.22 Although many ¶ agree that this is a better result than trying to contain the rise of new powers, it is ¶ doubtful that the US foreign policy community will see this reduction of American ¶ power in a positive light, given its long­standing exceptionalist heritage.23 This ¶ reluctance is compounded by some further factors. First, although relative US ¶ decline is well documented, and even accepted in certain quarters, including by ¶ President Obama himself, it remains contested in the academic literature,24 and ¶ it is especially difficult to acknowledge in public discourse; when Obama tried to make light of American exceptionalism he was heavily criticized.25 Second, the ¶ process of power transition will take a long time; at present, the US is unrivalled ¶ militarily and remains the largest economy in the world.26 This means that despite ¶ relative decline, the pressure for the US to make adjustments in its predominant ¶ position in international institutions to accommodate new powers is not yet ¶ particularly acute. This has allowed different administrations either to disregard ¶ pressures for adjustment or to prevaricate and thus delay a strategic response. The ¶ changes in administration and the need for attention to other pressing issues, such ¶ as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have also delayed a considered long­term ¶ response to the issues of rising powers and the evolution of global governance.¶ Although the United States has had a keen eye on the rise of China since the ¶ end of the Cold War, the rise of new powers more generally and the effects on ¶ governance are a more recent concern. There was little attention to the rise of ¶ new powers (apart from China) and global governance during the administration of George W. Bush, the main preoccupations being combating terrorism and ¶ spreading democracy.27 The Bush presidency was highly exceptionalist on the ¶ issues of democracy and human rights and highly exemptionalist on everything ¶ else. This was aptly demonstrated by its strongly unilateralist stance on issues such ¶ as the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol and its disregard for the NPT review conference in 2005.28 Working cooperatively for governance objectives was quite low ¶ on the priority list after the UN failed to authorize the Iraq war.29 The preoccupation with the ‘war on terror’ relegated global governance objectives to a lesser ¶ strategic significance, which led in turn to an absence of strategic direction on ¶ managing the rise of new powers. Some attention was given to China, with the ¶ term ‘responsible stakeholder’ being coined for the first time during the Bush ¶ administration,30 but there was little consideration of other rising powers.¶ However, after the financial crisis and the election of Obama in 2008, US ¶ foreign policy gave greater weight to both governance and the rise of new powers. ¶ Obama seemed to accept the socialization hypothesis, espousing multilateralism ¶ and reaching out to China and other rising powers for help in resolving global ¶ problems.31 The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) stated that ‘new and ¶ emerging powers who seek greater voice and representation will need to accept ¶ greater responsibilities for meeting global challenges’.32 However, it seems his ¶ administration quickly became disillusioned with this approach and as a result became both more defensive and more assertive towards new powers.33 This seems ¶ to indicate either that there is no ‘grand strategy’ or that, if there is one, it is not ¶ yet highly developed.¶ Despite the lack of an obvious grand strategy, we can still discern certain patterns ¶ in the US engagement of rising powers (and smaller players) in the governance of ¶ important issues such as security, global finance and development, from which ¶ we can deduce a potential evolution of global order

#### U.S. unilateral approach to proliferation undermines global image

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The Bush administration’s approach to non­proliferation targeted the structures of the NPT and UNSC as inadequate to ensure the security of the United ¶ States after 9/11. The 2002 NSS asserted that the current structures were not fit for ¶ purpose because they targeted threats originating from states rather than non­state ¶ actors.53 To address this problem the US unilaterally reinterpreted the meaning of ¶ ‘imminent threat’ and ‘pre­emptive defence’ to enable it to deal with the terrorist threat in its Afghanistan and Iraq wars. This unilateralist interpretation originated ¶ in the belief that the US could not count on existing multilateral mechanisms, ¶ which would constrain its ability to pursue its security objectives.54 It no doubt ¶ alienated many US allies and made other countries cautious, thus undermining ¶ multilateral security cooperation.¶ President Obama also agrees that current governance institutions are not fit ¶ for purpose, but his solution is to overhaul these institutions to reflect present­¶ day realities rather than to act in isolation.55 The terms in which his proposed ¶ solutions are presented are therefore very different, with the emphasis on multilateral cooperation and the integration of emerging powers. The resulting policies, ¶ however, do not differ much from those of the Bush era, posing questions about ¶ the commitment of the US to work multilaterally and to integrate emerging ¶ powers in current structures. One important deviation from the Bush era is that ¶ the Obama administration has made some progress towards showing goodwill ¶ on disarmament, concluding the New START Treaty with Russia in 2011.56 This ¶ implies some renewed commitment to the NPT, and indeed the 2010 review ¶ conference was more successful than that of 2005. These are integrative moves ¶ towards the non­nuclear states of the NPT, most of which are not major or ¶ emerging powers.¶ Despite these tokens of multilateralism, the US has yet to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,57 which is considered one of the major pillars of disarmament. Nor has the Obama administration taken serious steps to redress the harm ¶ done to the NPT from the deal with India. This agreement remains in force and ¶ the Obama administration has done little to try to bring India under the NPT ¶ umbrella. In addition, the administration has stepped up its sanctions efforts ¶ against Iran, both domestic and international. In 2010 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1929, strengthening sanctions against Iran, which was followed by many US ¶ allies taking further sanctions against the Iranian energy sector.58 Obama has not ¶ ruled out military action against Iran as a last resort.59 These sanctions brought ¶ Iran to the negotiating table, where the US presented it with demands that it cease ¶ its programme without offering concrete proposals for lifting sanctions.60 Thus ¶ we see a much more integrative strategy towards emerging powers like India and ¶ a more distributive/mixed strategy towards lesser powers like Iran. According to ¶ some, these double standards not only weaken the legitimacy of the regime, but ¶ also weaken the commitment to it of countries that are not US allies. China, for example, has ‘used its position on the U.N. Security Council to delay or weaken ¶ sanctions, while choosing to loosely or selectively enforce them’.61¶ In terms of security cooperation, then, the US has taken only halting steps ¶ towards integrating emerging powers, and these seem to be more specific to India ¶ than directed to rising powers overall. This approach may be seen as aiming to ¶ split the BRICS’ unity, but it undermines the Obama administration’s rhetorical ¶ commitment to multilateralism. The rather heavy­handed and largely distributive ¶ approach towards minor powers adds to long­held perceptions that the US applies ¶ double standards,62 and that it is holding on to its hegemony and refusing to be ¶ more substantially multilateralist, despite claims to the contrary.

### Hegemony Low – Leaks

#### Security leaks compromise U.S. leadership. Snowden proves.

Peter Brookes June 27, 2013 (Peter Brookes is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense. “Snowden Flap Bares Hapless U.S.” Heritage, June 27, 2013 <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2013/6/snowden-flap-bares-hapless-us>)

You can’t help but feel that the Russian Bear and Chinese Dragon are enjoying the chance to tweak ol’ Uncle Sam’s nose over the Edward “I’ve got lots of super-secret laptops” Snowden affair.¶ Their unwillingness to extradite the slippery systems administrator-cum-spy is just the latest example of the waning of American global power and influence courtesy of Team Obama.¶ This isn’t good news.¶ Take Russia. The Kremlin is telling us that the fugitive is in no-man’s land in Moscow’s international airport. They claim their hands are tied and they just can’t do anything about it.¶ When asked about l’affaire Snowden during a visit to Finland yesterday, Vladimir Putin compared him to WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange.¶ “Ask yourself a question: Should people like that be extradited so that they put them in prison, or not?” he said. “In any case, I would prefer not to deal with such issues. It’s like shearing a piglet: a lot of squealing and little wool.”¶ Of course, say it were a Russian fugitive, would Moscow just let him/her sit in the transit lounge, sipping vodkas and nibbling caviar? Of course not. The Russian authorities wouldn’t think twice about storming the place.¶ In addition to dissing Washington, Moscow doesn’t mind dragging this sorry situation out, either. The longer this story makes headlines, the weaker America looks in the world’s eyes.¶ Yes, perception is reality.¶ It’s also payback for disagreements between Moscow and Washington. The Kremlin is none too happy with criticism over Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian auditor who died in a Moscow prison in 2009 after revealing corruption.¶ Russia is also displeased with America’s stance on Syria, where the Kremlin is supporting the Bashar Assad regime and the White House is (cautiously) backing some elements of the rebel force. The Putin-Obama meeting on Syria at the G-8 was dis-astrous.¶ Even though Team Obama backed off on missile defense in Europe that Putin & Co. have long hated and offered up another arms control treaty, the relationship has gone from Obama’s hoped-for “reset” to our collective “regret.”¶ Then there’s China.¶ Snowden showed up last month in Hong Kong after disappearing from his job in Hawaii. Though Hong Kong is self-governing until it reverts fully to Chinese control, Beijing calls the shots there, especially on foreign and security policy.¶ While Zhongnanhai (China’s version of the Kremlin) knew the White House would be furious with China for refusing to extradite Snowden, they likely figured the United States would get over the snub in time due to the relationship’s importance to both sides.¶ It didn’t help that Snowden told a Hong Kong newspaper that the National Security Agency was spying on China.¶ The revelation probably helped Beijing decide to let the rogue contractor slip out of Hong Kong and become someone else’s problem — no doubt after they got their hands on any secrets he hadn’t yet revealed.¶ That this latest Washington scandal might sap America’s international “mojo” also benefits China.¶ Beijing is already calling for a “new big power relationship” (read: equal relationship) with the United States and is displeased with American “meddling” in its territorial disputes in the East and South China seas.¶ The big question, naturally, is: With perceptions of our plummeting power quite plausible, who might be the next to take pleasure in challenging our interests?¶ -Peter Brookes is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense.

#### Recent leaks hamstrings the U.S. over China

John R. Bolton June 18, 2013 (John R. Bolton, a diplomat and a lawyer, has spent many years in public service. From August 2005 to December 2006, he served as the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations. From 2001 to 2005, he was under secretary of state for arms control and international security. At AEI, Ambassador Bolton's area of research is U.S. foreign and national security policy. “Edward Snowden’s leaks are a grave threat to US national security” American Enterprise Institute, June 18, 2013 <http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/intelligence/edward-snowdens-leaks-are-a-grave-threat-to-us-national-security/>)

Edward Snowden's revelations regarding highly sensitive US techniques for gathering foreign-intelligence continue roiling Washington. And because Snowden combined elements of truth swirled together with paranoid speculation, outright lies and pure hype, reviving a rational discussion has been hard.¶ Snowden's sympathizers and anti-American activists have so far largely controlled his story line. But that is changing, and with it, the likely tenor of the debate over whether Snowden is a hero or a traitor.¶ Snowden initially violated his oath to safeguard the national security secrets entrusted to him by revealing National Security Agency (NSA) programs arguably affecting the privacy of US citizens. The second wave of leaks, however, involved purported American cyber-intelligence activities globally and against China. Snowden claimed there were more than 61,000 US hacking operations globally, with hundreds of them directed at China and Hong Kong, and implied the existence of numerous other activities to surveil and counter Beijing's growing cyber-warfare capabilities.¶ Publicizing America's alleged intelligence-collection programs against China may not be identical to Philip Agee revealing the identities of US clandestine operatives, thereby endangering their lives, but it is close. We do not yet know whether Snowden jeopardized US agents, but vital sources and methods of intelligence gathering and operations are clearly at risk. In cyber terms, this is akin to Benedict Arnold scheming to betray West Point's defenses to the British, thereby allowing them to seize a key American fortification, splitting the colonies geographically at a critical point during the American Revolution.¶ The political implications are grave. Snowden has given Beijing something it couldn't achieve on its own: moral equivalence. Now, China can portray itself as a victim, besieged by America, and simply trying to defend itself. Snowden's initial leaks on NSA programs also caused substantial political harm, above and beyond the intelligence damage. Several European governments which co-operated with the US are now predictably running for the tall grass, endangering the continuity of existing programs and damaging prospects for future co-operation. As with the Bradley Manning/WikiLeaks exposure of thousands of classified State Department and Pentagon cables, Europeans want to know why Washington can't protect sensitive information.¶ But Beijing does not deserve moral equivalence, given the intensity of its cyber-attacks against America. The key point is that China struck first, developing a pronounced asymmetric advantage. Militarily, US combat arms are far more vulnerable to attacks on their command-and-control information technology systems than are Beijing's more primitive capabilities. That may change as China's military becomes more sophisticated, but for now, offensive cyber capabilities are a preferred Chinese strategy.¶ Economically, cyber warfare is even more one-sided. As economist Irwin Stelzer recently said (paywall):¶ "America has lots of intellectual property that is worth stealing, China has very little."¶ By inaccurately elevating Beijing to moral equivalence with Washington, Snowden obscured this critical distinction, giving China political shelter.¶ But what Americans should understand most importantly is what the China leaks reveal about Snowden. If he is lying about these programs, as in some of his earlier assertions about NSA's eavesdropping, that tells us something important about his character. And if he is telling the truth, revealing sensitive information about American efforts to protect itself against the world's greatest cyber-warfare power, that tells us even more about his character.¶ NSA activities against China do not even arguably violate the privacy of US citizens, which is Snowden's supposedly highminded motive for initially breaking his word, dishonorably and deceitfully. In fact, Snowden's unilateral decision to leak endangers the national security of 300 million other Americans. He didn't ask their views or their permission, and he has no democratic legitimacy whatever.¶ The NSA's programs, at least, were approved by all three branches of our government, two elected by the people and the third populated by the first two. The Founders only gave us three branches, and while far from perfect, they are at least ultimately accountable to America's real sovereigns: its citizens. Snowden is accountable only to his own self-importance.¶ Moreover, the China leaks highlight gaps and inconsistencies in Snowden's "legend" (as invented identities are sometimes called). Before he made his run for China, was he acting alone, as he claims, or was he acting partly as a vehicle for others in the intelligence community or in Congress, disgruntled and out to settle scores? Snowden denies previous ties to China's government or being Beijing's agent: is this true or not? Or is he not now, both overtly and covertly, trying to bribe Beijing's authorities to secure asylum in China, contrary to his earlier smug comments about facing the consequences of his actions in America?¶ Unfortunately, Snowden clearly has more information to reveal, causing more damage to the United States and its allies. But we know enough already to conclude that Snowden has betrayed his country and the trust his countrymen placed in him in sensitive positions of confidence in our intelligence community.¶ So, make no mistake: any American politician who now calls Snowden a hero is not fit to be entrusted with America's national security

#### Whistle-blowers create a challenge to U.S. Hegemony, exposes contradictions and espionage.

Global Times 7/3/13 (Global times, “Snowden’s fate a sign of US hegemony,” 7/3/13, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/793371.shtml#.UeSoW42siSo>)

Edward Snowden, a whistle-blower from the US National Security Agency, applied to 21 countries for political asylum on July 1, but encountered negative responses. Snowden withdrew his Russia asylum bid after Russian President Vladimir Putin dictated terms for his stay. The fate of the whistleblower has become a symbol testing US hegemony. ¶ Snowden's exposure has discredited the US. His latest revelations that the US has been spying on the EU mission in New York and its embassy in Washington have caused explosive consequences and strong reactions from EU members like France and Germany. ¶ These immoral actions will further deprive the US of its power to mess with world affairs under the guise of moral values.¶ Snowden has exposed US hypocrisy, its random violations of citizens' privacy and arrogant cyber espionage in other countries. US soft power has failed to prevent these negative influences spreading across the world. Non-US media refrained from launching harsh criticism against the US, but the storm caused by Snowden's leaks has made the global public well aware of what's going on. ¶ Snowden's latest step has displayed US hegemony to the world. He submitted 21 applications for political asylum, then the US projected its power - the countries involved either cowered or delayed for time.¶ Two of the world's most famous Internet liberalists are now hunted by the US. This kind of confrontation is unconventional and represents a risk to the image of a strong US. ¶ Washington hasn't issued any apology to the world. The criticism of the EU against US' espionage activities was also simply dismissed.¶ Fairness and justice is common goal of the world. They are also required in international relations. The morals Washington has displayed to the international community don't match the country's role as world leader. In many cases, the US destroyed the world order that it has helped to build.¶ How will the Snowden issue be wrapped up will give us some hints of the US' performance on the world stage. ¶ We probably shouldn't expect too much from a country that doesn't bother to offer an explanation to such a shocking scandal. ¶ The US is still holding on to an outdated understanding of national interests, based on which it has designed its Internet policy.¶ We believe Snowden will not be the last liberal fighter against Washington. The sudden appearance of such a fight actually comes from accumulation of events of our times. ¶ The Internet is changing the world. We don't yet have a full understanding of what will occur.¶

### Hegemony Low – multipolarity inevitable

#### Multipolarity inevitable – hegemony unsustainable

Kempe 12 (Frederick Kempe, columnist for Reuters, “America’s second chance at global leadership”, Reuters, an international news agency, 11/29/12, http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/2012/12/11/americas-second-chance-at-global-leadership//HZ)

Read between the lines of the U.S. intelligence community’s quadrennial global trends report, a document released this week that has significant influence on White House thinking, and the message to President Obama is clear.¶ First, the United States is at a far more crucial juncture of human history than most Americans realize – reminiscent of 1815, 1918, 1945 and 1989. Second, the United States has something that is unprecedented among the world’s great powers, a second chance to shape the international economic and political system.¶ Read more deeply, and you’ll find a stark warning for the president within the National Intelligence Council’s 140-page “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds” report. The world may suffer severe consequences – ranging from economic slowdown and environmental catastrophe to violent conflict and global anarchy – if the U.S. fails to act, escape the fiscal cliff, restore its political effectiveness, revive its economic competitiveness, and engage China and a host of other rising actors.¶ The NIC lays out the stakes clearly for the U.S.:¶ How the U.S. evolves over the next 15-20 years – a big uncertainty – and whether the U.S. will be able to work with new partners to reinvent the international system will be among the most important variables in the future shape of the global order. Although the United States’ (and the West’s) relative decline vis-à-vis the rising states is inevitable, its future role in the international system is much harder to project: the degree to which the U.S. continues to dominate the international system could vary widely.¶ The challenge for U.S. leaders is that their margin of error is much smaller than it was after World War II. Then, America’s share of global GDP was 50% – more than twice what it is today. A mixture of post-war devastation and American economic and military dominance empowered the U.S. to construct, with friends and allies, a global institutional architecture that included the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a host of others.¶ Today, the relative decline of U.S. political and economic power, an ongoing euro zone crisis that saps key allies’ energies and confidence, and the rise of China weaken American leverage. According to the NIC report, by 2030, Asia will surpass North America and Europe“in terms of global power.” The factors are a combination of economic size, population, military spending and technological investment. The NIC says China will pass U.S. GDP in the 2020’s.¶ Though dampened, America’s ability to lead remains significant through 2030 due to its unique economic, social and military assets and the lack of any single or group of powers willing to supplant its global role.¶ Beyond that, many of the trends outlined by the NIC report may be uniquely favorable to U.S. prospects, including new energy extraction and manufacturing technologies that could in the best case help underpin average economic growth for the U.S. by as much as 2.7 percent per year through 2030.¶ The NIC also focuses on technology-driven “individual empowerment” as the first of four megatrends that will reduce poverty and double the size of the global middle class through 2030. The report calls it a “tectonic shift” that means “for the first time, a majority of the world’s population will not be impoverished.” This is not a guarantee of a move toward greater democracy or western values, but middle class populations make greater demands for accountable, responsible, transparent governance. Individual empowerment, however, has a darker side that means individuals and small groups will have greater access to lethal and disruptive technologies, “enabling them to perpetrate large-scale violence – a capability formerly the monopoly of states.”¶ The NIC, which serves as the intelligence community’s center for medium and long-term analysis, does not have a mandate to recommend policy from its findings. That is left to organizations like the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based think tank and public policy group. (Disclosure: I am president of the council and, in its non-government capacity, it has convened many of the global workshops that contributed to the NIC report).¶ The Atlantic Council’s report – “Envisioning 2030: US Strategy for a Post-Western World,” proposes an approach that starts with President Obama recognizing the magnitude of the moment and the likelihood that his actions now will have consequences that will be felt for generations.¶ President Obama has been right to focus on “nation-building at home.” U.S. economic and innovative strength is the foundation for any global leadership role. However, even a revitalized U.S. economy won’t be enough to secure the future.¶ The U.S., with less absolute power, must act more creatively and collaboratively. What one already sees in the Arab Awakening in the Middle East is that national power will compete with new, multifaceted and amorphous networks – enabled by technology and instant communication.¶ At the same time, the U.S. must safeguard its longest standing alliance, NATO, and its most important strategic asset, Europe, by helping its allies manage the euro zone crisis while promoting a transatlantic free trade, investment and economic cooperation agreement.¶ The Obama administration must also deepen U.S.-Chinese cooperation, the most important single factor shaping the international system. A broad array of issues are at stake, such as multilateral institutions, the global financial system, the nuclear future, cyber security, climate change and global resource scarcity.¶ The Obama administration also has an immediate need to address instability in the greater Middle East, from North Africa to Pakistan, where potential threats include nuclear-armed regional powers, failed nuclear states and terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.¶ Perhaps the most powerful message to President Obama from the NIC report is the following: Getting re-elected was the easy part. How he manages this juncture in human history, a much more difficult task, will determine his legacy.

## Unsustainable

### Hegemony Unsustainable 1nc

#### U.S. power and influence are set to decline markedly—at best will be a powerful state among many others

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “The Global Power Shift from West to East,” THE NATIONAL INTERST, May/June 2012, p. 21-22.

Such protestations, however, cannot forestall real-world developments that collectively are challenging the post- 1945 international order, often called Pax Americana, in which the United States employed its overwhelming power to shape and direct global events. That era of American dominance is drawing to a close as the country’s relative power declines, along with its ability to manage global economics and security. This does not mean the United States will go the way of Great Britain during the first half of the twentieth century. As Harvard’s Stephen Walt wrote in this magazine last year, it is more accurate to say the “American Era” is nearing its end. For now, and for some time to come, the United States will remain primus inter pares—the strongest of the major world powers—though it is uncertain whether it can maintain that position over the next twenty years. Regardless, America’s power and influence over the international political system will diminish markedly from what it was at the apogee of Pax Americana. That was the Old Order, forged through the momentous events of World War I, the Great Depression and World War II. Now that Old Order of nearly seven decades’ duration is fading from the scene. It is natural that U.S. leaders would want to deny it—or feel they must finesse it when talking to the American people. But the real questions for America and its leaders are: What will replace the Old Order? How can Washington protect its interests in the new global era? And how much international disruption will attend the transition from the old to the new?

#### U.S. will decline—rise of China, economic decline, emergence of new powers

Stephen M. Walt, Harvard University, “What I Told the Navy This Year,” FOREIGN POLICY, 6—10—11, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/10/what\_i\_told\_the\_navy\_this\_year, accessed 7-2-12.

This situation was highly unusual, to say the least. It is rare that any single power-let alone one with only 5 percent of the world's population -- is able to create and maintain a particular political and security order in almost every corner of the world. It was never going to last forever, of course, and three key trends are now combining to bring that era of dominance to an end. The first trend is the rise of China, which discarded the communist system that had constrained its considerable potential and has now experienced three decades of explosive growth. China's military power is growing steadily, and as I and other realists have noted, this trend will almost certainly lead to serious security competition in Asia, as China seeks to limit the U.S. role and as Washington strives to maintain it. The second trend is the self-inflicted damage to the U.S. economy, a consequence of the Bush administration's profligacy and the financial crisis of 2007. The United States faces a mountain of debt, the near-certainty of persistent federal deficits, and a dysfunctional political system that cannot seem to make hard choices. This situation does not mean the United States is about to fall from the ranks of the great powers, but the contrast with earlier periods -- and especially the immediate aftermath of World War II -- is stunning. Just look at our tepid response to the Arab spring and compare that with the Marshall Plan, and you get some idea of our diminished clout. The third trend is the emergence of several influential regional powers, who have managed to reform their own economies, gain greater confidence and independence, and (in some cases) throw off their previous deference to Washington. States such as Turkey, India, and Brazil are not about to become true global powers, but each has become more influential in its own neighborhood, is able to chart its own foreign policy course, and won't be inclined to defer to Washington's wishes. This is especially true for those states -- most notably Turkey -- where the U.S. image is now decidely negative. China's rise may eventually give many states diplomatic options, further complicating America's ability to run a Washington-centered world order.

### Hegemony Unsustainable 2nc

#### U.S. is in decline--our elites refuse to acknowledge it

Andrew J. Bacevich, Professor, History and International Relations, Boston University, “The ‘American Century’ Has Ended,” SALON, 11—14—11, www.salon.com/2011/11/14/the\_american\_century\_is\_over/, accessed 6-9-12.

All that said, the present moment is arguably one in which the international order is, in fact, undergoing a fundamental transformation. The “postwar world” brought into existence as a consequence of World War II is coming to an end. A major redistribution of global power is underway. Arrangements that once conferred immense prerogatives upon the United States, hugely benefiting the American people, are coming undone. In Washington, meanwhile, a hidebound governing class pretends that none of this is happening, stubbornly insisting that it’s still 1945 with the so-called American Century destined to continue for several centuries more (reflecting, of course, God’s express intentions). Here lies the most disturbing aspect of contemporary American politics, worse even than rampant dysfunction borne of petty partisanship or corruption expressed in the buying and selling of influence. Confronted with evidence of a radically changing environment, those holding (or aspiring to) positions of influence simply turn a blind eye, refusing even to begin to adjust to a new reality. The Big Change happening before our very eyes is political, economic and military. At least four converging vectors are involved. First, the Collapse of the Freedom Agenda: In the wake of 9/11, the administration of George W. Bush set out to remake the Greater Middle East. This was the ultimate strategic objective of Bush’s “global war on terror.” Intent on accomplishing across the Islamic world what he believed the United States had accomplished in Europe and the Pacific between 1941 and 1945, Bush sought to erect a new order conducive to U.S. interests — one that would permit unhindered access to oil and other resources, dry up the sources of violent Islamic radicalism, and (not incidentally) allow Israel a free hand in the region. Key to the success of this effort would be the U.S. military, which President Bush (and many ordinary Americans) believed to be unstoppable and invincible — able to beat anyone anywhere under any conditions. Alas, once implemented, the Freedom Agenda almost immediately foundered in Iraq. The Bush administration had expected Operation Iraqi Freedom to be a short, tidy war with a decisively triumphant outcome. In the event, it turned out to be a long, dirty (and very costly) war yielding, at best, exceedingly ambiguous results.

#### U.S. is in decline—rise of new powers, economic weakness

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and *Pax Americana,*”INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 2012, Wiley, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x/full, accessed 6-9-12.

Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, it now is evident that both the 1980s declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right after all. The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has underscored the reality of US decline, and only “denialists” can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of history. However, it is fair to say the Great Recession has both accelerated the causal forces driving these trends and magnified their impact. There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external driver of US decline is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the relative—and in some ways absolute—decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis confronting the United States, and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status.

#### And, defeats, economic problems, and rise of other powers ensure inevitable decline

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M, “Are Voters Looking for An Isolationist: A Timeley Debate,” NEW YORK TIMES, Room for Debate, 10—12—11, [www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/11/what-do-voters-want/a-timely-debate-of-the-us-role-in-the-world](http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/11/what-do-voters-want/a-timely-debate-of-the-us-role-in-the-world), accessed 10-15-11.

First, Iraq and Afghanistan have been for the U.S. what the Boer War was for Britain: costly defeats causing “imperial overstretch” and accelerating national decline. Second, the warnings of the 1980s “declinists” (so dubbed by their establishment critics) have been vindicated. Persistent budget, trade and balance of payments deficits -- and the hollowing-out of the U.S. manufacturing base -- have caused a termite-like weakening of U.S. economic power. Finally, leading forecasters agree that sometime this decade China’s gross domestic product will surpass the United States’. Global power is shifting from West to East, and the U.S.-dominated “unipolar” world is giving way to one of several more or less equal great powers. Establishment leaders haven’t gotten the memo. For example, in his foreign policy speech last Friday, Mitt Romney called for “a new American century,” reaffirmed U.S. global leadership and stated that “America is not destined to be one of several equal global powers.” Underscoring the foreign policy elite’s bipartisan outlook, in a September 2010 speech Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed “a new American moment” and reiterated the United States’ duty to lead the world. We are overdue for a fundamental foreign debate to correct this kind of ossified thinking. Although no one wants to contemplate U.S. decline, no great power has, or can, remain No. 1 forever. The U.S. is not exceptional in this regard. Whether the impetus comes from the Tea Party on the right or progressives on the left, or, however unlikely, a third-party presidential candidate, the foreign policy debate needs to move beyond epithets (“isolationism,” “protectionism”) and cliches about “American leadership” and come to grips with the big issue of our time: How should the U.S. adjust to the geopolitical and economic transformations that are reshaping the world in the early 21st century?

#### Decline inevitable—globalization, new powers, economic problems

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M Unviersity, “Bye Bye, Miss American Pie,” THE EUROPEAN, 3—28—11, <http://theeuropean-magazine.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana>, accessed 10-15-11.

The epoch of American hegemony is drawing to a close. Evidence of America’s relative decline is omnipresent. According to the Economist, China will surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy in 2019. The U.S. relative power decline will affect international politics in coming decades: the likelihood of great power security competitions – and even war – will increase; the current era of “globalization” will end; and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by a new international order that reflects the interests of China and the other emerging great powers. American primacy’s end is result of history’s big, impersonal forces compounded by the United States’ own self-defeating policies. Externally, the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so. U.S. decline reflects its own economic troubles. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U.S. recovers from the recession. After all, they say, the U.S. faced a larger debt/GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. But the post-war era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. Those days are gone forever. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U.S. will incur for at least a decade. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U.S. primacy. If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be unaffordable.

### Hegemony Unsustainable – Asia

#### Military multipolarity is inevitable—rise of China, other states

Robert J. Art, Professor, International Relations, Brandeis University, “Selective Engagement in an Era of Austerity,” AMERICA’S PATH: GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION, ed. R.Fontaine & K.M. Lord, Center for a New American Century, 5—12, p. 16.

Third, the United States is likely to retain its military dominance much longer than its economic dominance, given its overwhelming lead and the time it will take China or any other great power to build a military of global reach. Yet eventually, some form of military multipolarity will likely emerge, although no one can now say with any precision when that will occur. What is clear, however, is that the United States will face a tough challenge from China in maintaining maritime supremacy in East Asia. If China’s economy continues to grow rapidly and its leadership continues to channel some of those growing economic resources into military modernization, this will increasingly constrain what the United States can do in East Asia, cause it to divert even more defense resources to East Asia than is currently planned and, by diverting scarce defense resources there, affect the U.S. military presence elsewhere in the world.

#### Decline in Asia inevitable—rise of China

Stephen M. Walt, Professor, International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, “The End of the American Era,” THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 10—25—11, http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037, accessed 10-25-11.

THE PAST two decades have witnessed the emergence of new power centers in several key regions. The most obvious example is China, whose explosive economic growth is undoubtedly the most significant geopolitical development in decades. The United States has been the world’s largest economy since roughly 1900, but China is likely to overtake America in total economic output no later than 2025. Beijing’s military budget is rising by roughly 10 percent per year, and it is likely to convert even more of its wealth into military assets in the future. If China is like all previous great powers—including the United States—its definition of “vital” interests will grow as its power increases—and it will try to use its growing muscle to protect an expanding sphere of influence. Given its dependence on raw-material imports (especially energy) and export-led growth, prudent Chinese leaders will want to make sure that no one is in a position to deny them access to the resources and markets on which their future prosperity and political stability depend. This situation will encourage Beijing to challenge the current U.S. role in Asia. Such ambitions should not be hard for Americans to understand, given that the United States has sought to exclude outside powers from its own neighborhood ever since the Monroe Doctrine. By a similar logic, China is bound to feel uneasy if Washington maintains a network of Asian alliances and a sizable military presence in East Asia and the Indian Ocean. Over time, Beijing will try to convince other Asian states to abandon ties with America, and Washington will almost certainly resist these efforts. An intense security competition will follow.

### Hegemony Unsustainable – China

#### China will soon surpass the U.S. economically—multiple indicators prove, will expand its influence

Gideon Rachman, “American Decline: This Time It’s for Real,” FOREIGN POICY, January/February 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/think\_again\_american\_decline, accessed 6-9-12.

In the end, of course, the Soviet and Japanese threats to American supremacy proved chimerical. So Americans can be forgiven if they greet talk of a new challenge from China as just another case of the boy who cried wolf. But a frequently overlooked fact about that fable is that the boy was eventually proved right. The wolf did arrive -- and China is the wolf. The Chinese challenge to the United States is more serious for both economic and demographic reasons. The Soviet Union collapsed because its economic system was highly inefficient, a fatal flaw that was disguised for a long time because the USSR never attempted to compete on world markets. China, by contrast, has proved its economic prowess on the global stage. Its economy has been growing at 9 to 10 percent a year, on average, for roughly three decades. It is now the world's leading exporter and its biggest manufacturer, and it is sitting on more than $2.5 trillion of foreign reserves. Chinese goods compete all over the world. This is no Soviet-style economic basket case. Japan, of course, also experienced many years of rapid economic growth and is still an export powerhouse. But it was never a plausible candidate to be No. 1. The Japanese population is less than half that of the United States, which means that the average Japanese person would have to be more than twice as rich as the average American before Japan's economy surpassed America's. That was never going to happen. By contrast, China's population is more than four times that of the United States. The famous projection by Goldman Sachs that China's economy will be bigger than that of the United States by 2027 was made before the 2008 economic crash. At the current pace, China could be No. 1 well before then. China's economic prowess is already allowing Beijing to challenge American influence all over the world. The Chinese are the preferred partners of many African governments and the biggest trading partner of other emerging powers, such as Brazil and South Africa. China is also stepping in to buy the bonds of financially strapped members of the eurozone, such as Greece and Portugal. And China is only the largest part of a bigger story about the rise of new economic and political players. America's traditional allies in Europe -- Britain, France, Italy, even Germany -- are slipping down the economic ranks. New powers are on the rise: India, Brazil, Turkey. They each have their own foreign-policy preferences, which collectively constrain America's ability to shape the world. Think of how India and Brazil sided with China at the global climate-change talks. Or the votes by Turkey and Brazil against America at the United Nations on sanctions against Iran. That is just a taste of things to come.

#### China will rise—can overcome the internal barriers that their evidence identifies

Gideon Rachman, “American Decline: This Time It’s for Real,” FOREIGN POICY, January/February 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/think\_again\_american\_decline, accessed 6-9-12.

Don't count on it. It is certainly true that when Americans are worrying about national decline, they tend to overlook the weaknesses of their scariest-looking rival. The flaws in the Soviet and Japanese systems became obvious only in retrospect. Those who are confident that American hegemony will be extended long into the future point to the potential liabilities of the Chinese system. In a recent interview with the Times of London, former U.S. President George W. Bush suggested that China's internal problems mean that its economy will be unlikely to rival America's in the foreseeable future. "Do I still think America will remain the sole superpower?" he asked. "I do." But predictions of the imminent demise of the Chinese miracle have been a regular feature of Western analysis ever since it got rolling in the late 1970s. In 1989, the Communist Party seemed to be staggering after the Tiananmen Square massacre. In the 1990s, economy watchers regularly pointed to the parlous state of Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises. Yet the Chinese economy has kept growing, doubling in size roughly every seven years. Of course, it would be absurd to pretend that China does not face major challenges. In the short term, there is plenty of evidence that a property bubble is building in big cities like Shanghai, and inflation is on the rise. Over the long term, China has alarming political and economic transitions to navigate. The Communist Party is unlikely to be able to maintain its monopoly on political power forever. And the country's traditional dependence on exports and an undervalued currency are coming under increasing criticism from the United States and other international actors demanding a "rebalancing" of China's export-driven economy. The country also faces major demographic and environmental challenges: The population is aging rapidly as a result of the one-child policy, and China is threatened by water shortages and pollution. Yet even if you factor in considerable future economic and political turbulence, it would be a big mistake to assume that the Chinese challenge to U.S. power will simply disappear. Once countries get the hang of economic growth, it takes a great deal to throw them off course. The analogy to the rise of Germany from the mid-19th century onward is instructive. Germany went through two catastrophic military defeats, hyperinflation, the Great Depression, the collapse of democracy, and the destruction of its major cities and infrastructure by Allied bombs. And yet by the end of the 1950s, West Germany was once again one of the world's leading economies, albeit shorn of its imperial ambitions. In a nuclear age, China is unlikely to get sucked into a world war, so it will not face turbulence and disorder on remotely the scale Germany did in the 20th century. And whatever economic and political difficulties it does experience will not be enough to stop the country's rise to great-power status. Sheer size and economic momentum mean that the Chinese juggernaut will keep rolling forward, no matter what obstacles lie in its path.

#### China’s military is expanding—U.S. will be forced to retrench, other states will shift towards China

Gideon Rachman, “American Decline: This Time It’s for Real,” FOREIGN POICY, January/February 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/think\_again\_american\_decline, accessed 6-9-12.

Meanwhile, China's spending on its military continues to grow rapidly. The country will soon announce the construction of its first aircraft carrier and is aiming to build five or six in total. Perhaps more seriously, China's development of new missile and anti-satellite technology threatens the command of the sea and skies on which the United States bases its Pacific supremacy. In a nuclear age, the U.S. and Chinese militaries are unlikely to clash. A common Chinese view is that the United States will instead eventually find it can no longer afford its military position in the Pacific. U.S. allies in the region -- Japan, South Korea, and increasingly India -- may partner more with Washington to try to counter rising Chinese power. But if the United States has to scale back its presence in the Pacific for budgetary reasons, its allies will start to accommodate themselves to a rising China. Beijing's influence will expand, and the Asia-Pacific region -- the emerging center of the global economy -- will become China's backyard.

### Hegemony Unsustainable – Economy/Debt

#### U.S. is in economic decline—relative manufacturing and GDP, debt crisis, dollar devaluation

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing,” THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 1—27—12, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405, accessed 6-9-12.

The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, the United States is in economic decline and will face a serious fiscal crisis by the end of this decade. As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to “put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength.” The best indicators of U.S. decline are its GDP relative to potential competitors and its share of world manufacturing output. China’s manufacturing output has now edged past that of the United States and accounts for just over 18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, virtually all leading economic forecasters agree that, measured by market-exchange rates, China’s aggregate GDP will exceed that of the United States by the end of the current decade. Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe China already is the world’s number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expenditures—including on entitlements and defense—and raises taxes, it is headed for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, concerns about future inflation and America’s ability to repay its debts could imperil the U.S. dollar’s reserve-currency status. That currency status allows the United States to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means while enjoying entitlements at home and geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago.

#### Loss of dollar predominance will collapse American hegemony

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and *Pax Americana,*”INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 2012, Wiley, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x/full, accessed 6-9-12.

Because of the combined costs of federal government expenditures—on stimulus, defense, Iraq and Afghanistan, and entitlements—in 2009 the Congressional Budget Office forecast that the United States will run unsustainable annual budget deficits of $1 trillion or more until at least the end of this decade, and observed that, “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem” (CBO 2009:13). In a subsequent 2010 report, the CBO noted that if the United States stays on its current fiscal trajectory, the ratio of US government debt to GDP will be 100% by 2020 (CBO 2010). Economists regard a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio as critical indicator that a state will default on its financial obligations. In an even less sanguine 2011 analysis, the International Monetary Fund forecast that the United States will hit the 100% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2016 (IMF 2011). If these estimates are correct, over the next decade the growing US national debt—and the budget deficits that fuel it—could imperil the dollar by undermining foreign investors’ confidence in the United States’ ability to repay its debts and keep inflation in check. This is important because, for the foreseeable future, the United States will depend on capital inflows from abroad both to finance its deficit spending and private consumption and to maintain the dollar’s position as the international economic system’s reserve currency. America’s geopolitical preeminence hinges on the dollar’s reserve currency role. If the dollar loses that status, US hegemony will literally be unaffordable. The dollar’s reserve currency status has, in effect, been a very special kind of “credit card.” It is special because the United States does not have to earn the money to pay its bills. Rather, when the bills come due, the United States borrows funds from abroad and/or prints money to pay them. The United States can get away with this and live beyond its means, spending with little restraint on maintaining its military dominance, preserving costly domestic entitlements, and indulging in conspicuous private consumption, as long as foreigners are willing to lend it money (primarily by purchasing Treasury bonds). Without the use of the “credit card” provided by the dollar’s reserve currency status, the United States would have to pay for its extravagant external and internal ambitions by raising taxes and interest rates, and by consuming less and saving more; or, tightening its belt and dramatically reducing its military and domestic expenditures. In other words, the United States would have to learn to live within its means.9 As a leading expert on international economic affairs observed just before the Great Recession kicked in, the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance” (Kirshner 2008).

#### Debt and dollar crises will inevitably sap American economic power

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and *Pax Americana,*”INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 2012, Wiley, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x/full, accessed 6-9-12.

China’s rise is one powerful indicator of America’s relative decline. The United States’ mounting economic and fiscal problems—evidenced in summer 2011 by the debt ceiling debacle and Standard & Poors’ downgrading of US Treasury bonds—are another. There are two closely interconnected aspects of the United States’ domestic difficulties that merit special attention: the spiraling US national debt and deepening doubts about the dollar’s future role as the international economy’s reserve currency. Between now and 2025, the looming debt and dollar crises almost certainly will compel the United States to retrench strategically, and to begin scaling back its overseas military commitments. The causes of the looming US fiscal crisis are complex. For understanding, a good starting point is the late political scientist Arnold Wolfers’ observation that modern great powers must be both national security states and welfare states (Wolfers 1952). States must provide both guns—the military capabilities needed to defend and advance their external interests—and butter, ensuring prosperity and supplying needed public goods (education, health care, pensions). Since World War II, the United States has pretty much been able to avoid making difficult “guns or butter” decisions precisely because of its hegemonic role in the international economy. The dollar’s role as the international system’s reserve currency allows the United States to live beyond its means in ways that other nations cannot. As long as others believe that the United States will repay its debts, and that uncontrollable inflation will not dilute the dollar’s value, the United States can finance its external ambitions (“guns”) and domestic social and economic programs (“butter”) by borrowing money from foreigners. As Figure 4 shows, this is what the United States has had to do since the early 1980s when it started running a chronic current account deficit. As Figure 5 illustrates, the majority of US government debt is owed to foreign, not domestic, investors, and China is the United States government’s largest creditor. Following the Great Recession, it has become increasingly apparent that unless dramatic measures to reign-in federal spending are implemented, by the end of this decade there will be serious questions about the United States’ ability to repay its debts and control inflation.8 The causes of mounting US indebtedness are many. One is the Great Recession, which caused the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve to inject a massive amount of dollars into the economy, in the form of stimulus spending, bail-outs, and “quantitative easing,” to avert a replay of the Great Depression of the 1930s. A longer-term cause is the mounting costs of entitlement programs like Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid—costs which will escalate because of the aging of the “Baby Boomer” generation. Another factor is the cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been financed by borrowing from abroad rather than raising taxes to pay for them. These wars have been expensive. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel laureate in economics, and his coauthor Linda Bilmess have calculated that the ultimate direct and indirect costs of the Iraq war will amount to $3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmiss 2008). No similar study has as yet been done of the Afghanistan war’s costs. However, the United States currently is expending about $110–120 billion annually to fight there, and fiscal considerations played a major role in the Obama administration’s decision to begin drawing down US forces in Afghanistan (Woodward 2010; Cooper 2011).

#### Big, crippling budget cuts are inevitable—will be needed to reassure markets, creditor nations

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and *Pax Americana,*”INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 2012, Wiley, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x/full, accessed 6-9-12.

Although doubts about the dollar’s long-term health predated the Great Recession, the events of 2007–2009 have amplified them in two key respects (Helleiner 2008; Kirshner 2008). First, the other big players in the international economy now are either geopolitical rivals like China or ambiguous “allies” like Europe, which has its own ambitions and no longer requires US protection from the now-vanished Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has vast holdings of American assets (more than $2 trillion), is worried that America’s fiscal incontinence will leave Beijing holding the bag with huge amounts of depreciated dollars. China’s vote of no confidence in the dollar’s future is reflected in its calls to create a new reserve currency to replace the dollar, the renminbi’s gradual “internationalization,” and in the lectures China’s leaders regularly deliver telling Washington to get its fiscal house in order. Alarm bells about the dollar’s uncertain status now are ringing. In April 2011, Standard & Poor’s warned that in the coming years there is a one-in-three chance that the United States’ triple A credit rating could be reduced if Washington fails to solve the fiscal crisis—and in August 2011 S& P did downgrade the US credit rating to AA. In June 2011, the IMF said that unless the United States enacts a credible plan to reign in its annual deficits and accumulating national debt, it could face a sovereign risk crisis in the next several years. In a May 2011 report, the World Bank declared that the dollar probably will lose its status as the primary reserve currency by 2025 (World Bank 2011). In the coming years, the United States will have to defend the dollar by reassuring foreign lenders (read: China) both that there will be no runaway inflation and that it can pay its debts. This will require some combination of budget cuts, entitlements reductions, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Because exclusive reliance on the last two options could choke off growth, there will be strong pressure to slash the federal budget in order to hold down taxes and interest rates. It will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense expenditures (and entitlements), because, as Figure 6 shows, that is where the money is.

#### Defense spending cuts are very likely

Robert J. Art, Professor, International Relations, Brandeis University, “Selective Engagement in an Era of Austerity,” AMERICA’S PATH: GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION, ed. R.Fontaine & K.M. Lord, Center for a New American Century, 5—12, p. 15-16.

The United States will, for at least the next decade or two, remain the world’s only superpower when both military and economic dimensions are taken into account. Its position will be diminished, however, compared with its position during the unipolar era for a number of reasons, of which three are particularly important. First, America’s current serious fiscal situation, in the making since 2002, will constrain the resources that the country can devote to its foreign policy and military power.1 The 2008-2009 financial crisis magnified America’s underlying fiscal problems. According to the best research on financial crises, the United States will not begin to recover fully from this crisis until at least 2014 or 2015, if history is an accurate guide.2 Even then, the structural imbalance between revenues and spending will not be solved without significant budget cuts. Defense spending will be under continuous budgetary pressure because it accounts for over half of discretionary (that is, nonentitlement) spending, 19 percent of the federal budget and 4.7 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). Such pressure is especially likely because the cuts made to the Department of Defense’s budget for the past two fiscal years amounted to only 2.4 percent in real (inflation-adjusted) terms and are projected to remain constant (keeping up with inflation). The touted $487 billion projected cut in defense spending over a 10-year period is actually a cut from a budget proposed by the Pentagon in February 2011 that projected real increases in the defense budget and was never approved by Congress.3 Thus, given the fact that defense spending has not taken a significant hit, it is highly likely that more severe cuts are in the cards.

#### Cannot maintain total primacy—domestic fiscal realities dictate defense cuts

Richard K. Betts, Professor, War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, “American Strategy: Grand vs. Grandiose,” AMERICA’S PATH: GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION, ed. R.Fontaine & K.M. Lord, Center for a New American Century, 5—12, p. 34.

Today, with the American economy still struggling and no reliable solution to unsustainable expansion of national debt yet in sight, strategic solvency requires significantly reducing the resources allocated to external purposes. The gap between revenues and expenditures cannot be closed by even huge cuts in the defense budget, but it also cannot be closed by modest cuts in domestic spending or modest hikes in taxes. Any resolution is likely to include ample doses of all three painful changes, and when the size of proposed trims in health spending or of increased taxes are argued in comparison to the size of cuts in defense, it will be surprising if defense gets away with keeping as much as 90 percent of its current funding. Even a sensible compromise between the polarized visions of the two parties – a combination of substantial domestic spending cuts and tax increases – would leave a gap that requires cuts in defense spending. The alternatives preferred by the extreme wings of either party would require even larger defense cuts in a truly serious effort to tame the deficit.

#### Great Recession has severely undermined American power--decreased cohesiveness

Andrew J. Bacevich, Professor, History and International Relations, Boston University, “The ‘American Century’ Has Ended,” SALON, 11—14—11, www.salon.com/2011/11/14/the\_american\_century\_is\_over/, accessed 6-9-12.

Second, the Great Recession: In the history of the American political economy, the bursting of speculative bubbles forms a recurring theme. Wall Street shenanigans that leave the plain folk footing the bill are an oft-told tale. Recessions of one size or another occur at least once a decade. Yet the economic downturn that began in 2008 stands apart, distinguished by its severity, duration and resistance to even the most vigorous (or extravagant) remedial action. In this sense, rather than resembling any of the garden-variety economic slumps or panics of the past half-century, the Great Recession of our own day recalls the Great Depression of the 1930s. Instead of being a transitory phenomenon, it seemingly signifies something transformational. The Great Recession may well have inaugurated a new era — its length indeterminate but likely to stretch for many years — of low growth, high unemployment and shrinking opportunity. As incomes stagnate and more and more youngsters complete their education only to find no jobs waiting, members of the middle class are beginning to realize that the myth of America as a classless society is just that. In truth, the game is rigged to benefit the few at the expense of the many — and in recent years, the fixing has become ever more shamelessly blatant. This realization is rattling American politics. In just a handful of years, confidence in the Washington establishment has declined precipitously. Congress has become a laughingstock. The high hopes raised by President Obama’s election have long since dissipated, leaving disappointment and cynicism in their wake. One result, on both the far right and the far left, has been to stoke the long-banked fires of American radicalism. The energy in American politics today lies with the Tea Party Movement and Occupy Wall Street, both expressing a deep-seated antipathy toward the old way of doing things. Populism is making one of its periodic appearances on the American scene. Where this will lead remains, at present, unclear. But ours has long been a political system based on expectations of ever-increasing material abundance, promising more for everyone. Whether that system can successfully deal with the challenges of managing scarcity and distributing sacrifice ranks as an open question. This is especially true when those among us who have been making out like bandits profess so little willingness to share in any sacrifices that may be required.

#### U.S. is in economic decline—financialization, offshoring, wealth disparities

Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor Emeritus, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT ,”America’s Decline is Real – And Increasingly Self-Inflicted,” TOMDISPATCH, 2—14—12, http://www.alternet.org/world/154133/noam\_chomsky:\_america's\_decline\_is\_real\_--\_and\_increasingly\_self-inflicted/, accessed 6-9-12.

Despite such victories, American decline continued. By 1970, U.S. share of world wealth had dropped to about 25%, roughly where it remains, still colossal but far below the end of World War II. By then, the industrial world was “tripolar”: US-based North America, German-based Europe, and East Asia, already the most dynamic industrial region, at the time Japan-based, but by now including the former Japanese colonies Taiwan and South Korea, and more recently China. At about that time, American decline entered a new phase: conscious self-inflicted decline. From the 1970s, there has been a significant change in the U.S. economy, as planners, private and state, shifted it toward financialization and the offshoring of production, driven in part by the declining rate of profit in domestic manufacturing. These decisions initiated a vicious cycle in which wealth became highly concentrated (dramatically so in the top 0.1% of the population), yielding concentration of political power, hence legislation to carry the cycle further: taxation and other fiscal policies, deregulation, changes in the rules of corporate governance allowing huge gains for executives, and so on. Meanwhile, for the majority, real wages largely stagnated, and people were able to get by only by sharply increased workloads (far beyond Europe), unsustainable debt, and repeated bubbles since the Reagan years, creating paper wealth that inevitably disappeared when they burst (and the perpetrators were bailed out by the taxpayer). In parallel, the political system has been increasingly shredded as both parties are driven deeper into corporate pockets with the escalating cost of elections, the Republicans to the level of farce, the Democrats (now largely the former “moderate Republicans”) not far behind. A recent study by the Economic Policy Institute, which has been the major source of reputable data on these developments for years, is entitled Failure by Design. The phrase “by design” is accurate. Other choices were certainly possible. And as the study points out, the “failure” is class-based. There is no failure for the designers. Far from it. Rather, the policies are a failure for the large majority, the 99% in the imagery of the Occupy movements -- and for the country, which has declined and will continue to do so under these policies. One factor is the offshoring of manufacturing. As the solar panel example mentioned earlier illustrates, manufacturing capacity provides the basis and stimulus for innovation leading to higher stages of sophistication in production, design, and invention. That, too, is being outsourced, not a problem for the “money mandarins” who increasingly design policy, but a serious problem for working people and the middle classes, and a real disaster for the most oppressed, African Americans, who have never escaped the legacy of slavery and its ugly aftermath, and whose meager wealth virtually disappeared after the collapse of the housing bubble in 2008, setting off the most recent financial crisis, the worst so far.

#### Debt threatens leadership—constrains military spending

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “The Global Power Shift from West to East,” THE NATIONAL INTERST, May/June 2012, p. 28.

Leaving aside the fate of the dollar, however, it is clear the United States must address its financial challenge and restore the nation’s fiscal health in order to reassure foreign lenders that their investments remain sound. This will require some combination of budget cuts, entitlement reductions, tax increases and interest-rate hikes. That, in turn, will surely curtail the amount of spending available for defense and national security—further eroding America’s ability to play its traditional, post–World War II global role.

### Hegemony Unsustainable – Middle East

#### U.S. influence in Mideast is low—aftermath of Arab Spring

Eurasia Group, TOP RISKS: 2012, 1—3—12, p. 4.

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the United States finds itself with dramatically reduced regional influence. The demise of Hosni Mubarak, Washington’s main Arab ally, tensions with Israel, Riyadh’s increasing skepticism about American intentions, and a firm desire to avoid reengagement in Iraq make a big difference. The US is not about to exit the region, but declining US leverage creates a gap in external political engagement, economic support, and security provision at a time of remarkable geopolitical volatility. No major player from outside the region will step in to fill this vacuum. NATO’s intervention in Libya is not a precedent; it’s the end of an era.

#### U.S. influence in the Mideast is low—Arab Spring, American response, prove

Andrew J. Bacevich, Professor, History and International Relations, Boston University, “The ‘American Century’ Has Ended,” SALON, 11—14—11, www.salon.com/2011/11/14/the\_american\_century\_is\_over/, accessed 6-9-12.

Third, the Arab Spring: As with the floundering American economy, so with Middle Eastern politics: predicting the future is a proposition fraught with risk. Yet without pretending to forecast outcomes — Will Tunisia, Egypt and Libya embrace democracy? Can Islamic movements coexist with secularized modernity? — this much can be safely said: the ongoing Arab upheaval is sweeping from that region of the world the last vestiges of Western imperialism. Europeans created the modern Middle East with a single purpose in mind: to serve European interests. With the waning of European power in the wake of World War II, the United States — gingerly at first, but by the 1980s without noticeable inhibition — stepped in to fill the void. What had previously been largely a British sphere now became largely an American one, with the ever-accelerating tempo of U.S. military activism testifying to that fact. Although Washington abjured the overt colonialism once practiced in London, its policies did not differ materially from those that Europeans had pursued. The idea was to keep a lid on, exclude mischief-makers, and at the same time extract from the Middle East whatever it had on offer. The preferred American MO was to align with authoritarian regimes, offering arms, security guarantees and other blandishments in return for promises of behavior consistent with Washington’s preferences. Concern for the wellbeing of peoples living in the region (Israelis excepted) never figured as more than an afterthought. What events of the past year have made evident is this: that lid is now off and there is little the United States (or anyone else) can do to reinstall it. A great exercise in Arab self-determination has begun. Arabs (and, arguably, non-Arabs in the broader Muslim world as well) will decide their own future in their own way. What they decide may be wise or foolish. Regardless, the United States and other Western nations will have little alternative but to accept the outcome and deal with the consequences, whatever they happen to be. A Washington inhabited by people certain that decisions made in the White House determine the course of history will insist otherwise, of course. Democrats credit Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech with inspiring Arabs to throw off their chains. Even more laughably, Republicans credit George W. Bush’s “liberation” of Iraq for installing democracy in the region and supposedly moving Tunisians, Egyptians and others to follow suit. To put it mildly, evidence to support such claims simply does not exist. One might as well attribute the Arab uprising to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Those expecting Egyptians to erect statues of Obama or Bush in Cairo’s Tahrir Square are likely to have a long wait.

#### Mideast retrenchment inevitable—multiple factors

Patrick J. Buchanan, "With Osama Dead, Why Should U.S. Forces Stay in the Middle East," MIAMI HERALD, 5--8--11, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/05/08/2205072/with-osama-dead-why-should-us.html>

With his order to effect the execution of Osama bin Laden by Navy SEALs 40 miles from Islamabad, without asking permission of the government, Barack Obama made a bold and courageous decision. Its success and the accolades he has received have given him credibility as commander in chief that he never had before. The law professor, it turns out, is a gunslinger. Should the president now decide on a major withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in July, or side with his generals and make a token pullout, either way, the country will accept his decision. Yet, as one looks to the Maghreb and Middle East, to the Gulf and Pakistan, events of this historic year point to an inexorable retreat of American power and presence. Consider Pakistan. Today, that nation is red-faced that its military and intelligence services lied or did not know Osama was living in a mansion a mile from their West Point. It is humiliated that U.S. commandos flew in by chopper at night, killed Osama in his compound and made off with his body, computers and cellphones. Relations are close to the breaking point. Mobs are burning U.S. flags. Angry congressmen are talking of cutting off aid to Pakistan for disloyalty and duplicity in hiding bin Laden. Pakistanis are enraged Americans would trample on their sovereignty. Even before Sunday’s killing of Osama, Pakistan’s prime minister had reportedly told Hamid Karzai in Kabul to let the Americans leave on schedule in 2014, and let Pakistan and China help him cut his deal with the Taliban. In the long run, this is likely to happen. U.S. and NATO forces leave, the Taliban returns, and Pakistan moves into the orbit of China, which has far more cash and more of a long-term interest in South Asia than a busted United States on the far side of the world. The “Great Game” will go on in Afghanistan, but with Iran, Russia, China, Pakistan and India. In the other two critical Islamic nations in the region, Turkey and Egypt, we see a similar unraveling of ties to Washington. Turkey has been going its own way since she refused George W. Bush permission to use Turkish bases to invade Iraq. Ankara has become less secular and more Islamic and begun to highlight her identity as a Middle Eastern nation. She has repaired relations with neighbors America regards as rogues: Iran and Syria. And she has become the champion of the Gaza Palestinians. Since Hosni Mubarak’s fall, Egypt has pursued a similar course. Cairo has allowed Iranian warships to transit Suez and is about to reestablish ties to Tehran. She has brokered an agreement uniting Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, and is about to reopen the border crossing between Egypt and Gaza. Israeli anger and U.S.alarm are politely ignored. Though their population is anti-American, neither Turkey nor Egypt is openly hostile. Yet both pursue policies that clash with U.S. policy. And this new distance from Washington is being met with the approval of Turks and Egyptians. All the uprisings of the Arab Spring have had in common a desire of these peoples to be rid of American hegemony. Indeed, taking inventory after four months of Arab revolts, it is difficult not to declare America a net loser. Our ally of 30 years, Mubarak, was overthrown. The new government is moving away from us. Our ally in Tunisia was ousted. Our unpopular and ruthless ally in Yemen is still fighting for survival. The brutality shown by our friend, Bahrain’s King Khalifa, against peaceful Shiite demonstrators probably means eventual loss of basing rights for the U.S. Fifth Fleet. We are to begin pulling troops out of Afghanistan this summer and complete withdrawal in 2014. We are down from 170,000 troops in Iraq to 50,000. All are to be gone by year’s end. Americans have had their fill of nation-building. We cannot afford any more decade-long wars where the benefits to Americans have to be endlessly explained. Why is America’s footprint shrinking in that part of the world? First, Americans have never been less popular there, and one demand of every revolution is for a new government, independent of the United States, that will defend the national sovereignty. Second, we are broke. We can no longer afford the bases, the wars or the aid. Third, the true vital interest of the United States in the Mideast is that these Islamic countries not become base camps of terror, especially nuclear terror, targeted against the United States. That end is surely better served by packing and departing than by staying and fighting.

#### Regional decline inevitable—Iraq-Iran alliance, Afghanistan, civil wars… China will rise

Leon Hadar, Cato Institute, "Barack Gorbachev: Adjusting to the Global Reality," HUFFINGTON POST, 6--27--11, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=13245>

In fact, both the neoconservative narrative, which traces the start of the Arab Spring to the U.S. "liberation" of Iraq and the ensuing Freedom Agenda, and the liberal internationalist story-line that envisions "success" in Afghanistan and the partnering the United States with the dramatic change in the Middle East, reflect a lot of wishful thinking. Like an aging film star that has lost her sex-appeal a long time ago, American leaders and pundits are finding it difficult to admit that U.S. ability to determine political outcomes in the Middle East has been reduced in a very dramatic way. In reality, after all the sacrifice of so much precious life and treasure in Mesopotamia and in Af-Pak, including two costly military surges, and the rest of the useless military and diplomatic hyper-activism in the Broader Middle East (like in Libya and Israel/Palestine), Iraq is expected to become a political and economic satellite of Iran while the corrupt pro-American government in Afghanistan will probably fall into the hands of the Taliban sooner or later. The rest of the region is likely to experience a series of civil wars between ethnic groups, tribes and religious sects. And there won't be any peace in the Holy Land in the near future. The global player that is going to ride high after the dust settles in the Middle East and U.S. troops return home sometime in this decade will be China. Years of pre-occupation with the Middle East and the investment of economic and military resources to try to control and remake have diverted American attention from East Asia, a region of the world where core geo-strategic and geo-economic interests are at stake, while providing the Chinese with an opportunity to grow their economy, military power and diplomatic influence not only in East Asia but also in South and West Asia. The Chinese, unlike the Americans, have been so successful in readjusting to the changing global realities, that when the Americans wars in the Middle East will end, it is China and not the U.S. that will emerge as the main strategic winner.

#### Decline in Mideast inevitable—Arab spring proves

Stephen M. Walt, Professor, International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, “The End of the American Era,” THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 10—25—11, http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037, accessed 10-25-11.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the greater Middle East, which has been the main focus of U.S. strategy since the USSR broke apart. Not only did the Arab Spring catch Washington by surprise, but the U.S. response further revealed its diminished capacity to shape events in its favor. After briefly trying to shore up the Mubarak regime, the Obama administration realigned itself with the forces challenging the existing regional order. The president gave a typically eloquent speech endorsing change, but nobody in the region paid much attention. Indeed, with the partial exception of Libya, U.S. influence over the entire process has been modest at best. Obama was unable to stop Saudi Arabia from sending troops to Bahrain—where Riyadh helped to quell demands for reform—or to convince Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to step down. U.S. leverage in the post-Mubarak political process in Egypt and the simmering conflict in Yemen is equally ephemeral. One gets a vivid sense of America’s altered circumstances by comparing the U.S. response to the Arab Spring to its actions in the early years of the Cold War. In 1948, the Marshall Plan allocated roughly $13 billion in direct grants to restarting Europe’s economy, an amount equal to approximately 5 percent of total U.S. GDP. The equivalent amount today would be some $700 billion, and there is no way that Washington could devote even a tenth of that amount to helping Egypt, Tunisia, Libya or others. Nor does one need to go all the way back to 1948. The United States forgave $7 billion of Egypt’s foreign debt after the 1991 Gulf War; in 2011, all it could offer Cairo’s new government was $1 billion worth of loan guarantees (not actual loans) and $1 billion in debt forgiveness.

### Hegemony Unsustainable – Military

#### U.S. military lead is eroding—declining domestic investments, other nations are becoming more powerful—threatens overall leadership

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “The Global Power Shift from West to East,” THE NATIONAL INTERST, May/June 2012, p. 22-23.

Since the Cold War’s end, America’s military superiority has functioned as an entry barrier designed to prevent emerging powers from challenging the United States where its interests are paramount. But the country’s ability to maintain this barrier faces resistance at both ends. First, the deepening financial crisis will compel retrenchment, and the United States will be increasingly less able to invest in its military. Second, as ascending powers such as China become wealthier, their military expenditures will expand. The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. Thus, over the next decade or so a feedback loop will be at work, whereby internal constraints on U.S. global activity will help fuel a shift in the distribution of power, and this in turn will magnify the effects of America’s fiscal and strategic overstretch. With interests throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Caucasus—not to mention the role of guarding the world’s sea-lanes and protecting U.S. citizens from Islamist terrorists—a strategically overextended United States inevitably will need to retrench. Further, there is a critical linkage between a great power’s military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige, soft power and agenda-setting capacity, on the other. As the hard-power foundations of Pax Americana erode, so too will the U.S. capacity to shape the international order through influence, example and largesse. This is particularly true of America in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession. At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States possessed the material capacity to furnish the international system with abundant financial assistance designed to maintain economic and political stability. Now, this capacity is much diminished.

#### Poor economy means that U.S. military decline is inevitable

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and *Pax Americana,*”INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 2012, Wiley, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x/full, accessed 6-9-12.

Following the Cold War’s end, the United States used its second unipolar moment to consolidate the Pax Americana by expanding both its geopolitical and ideological ambitions. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, however, the economic foundation of the Pax Americana has crumbled, and its ideational and institutional pillars have been weakened. Although the United States remains preeminent militarily, the rise of new great powers like China, coupled with US fiscal and economic constraints, means that over the next decade or two the United States’ military dominance will be challenged. The decline of American power means the end of US dominance in world politics and a transition to a new constellation of world power. Without the “hard” power (military and economic) upon which it was built, the Pax Americana is doomed to wither in the early twenty-first century. Indeed, because of China’s great-power emergence, and the United States’ own domestic economic weaknesses, it already is withering.

#### Decline inevitable—limits of military power, failure in Iraq and Afghanistan

Stephen M. Walt, Professor, International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, “The End of the American Era,” THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 10—25—11, http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037, accessed 10-25-11.

Of course, the twin debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan only served to accelerate the waning of American dominance and underscore the limits of U.S. power. The Iraq War alone will carry a price tag of more than $3 trillion once all the costs are counted, and the end result is likely to be an unstable quasi democracy that is openly hostile to Israel and at least partly aligned with Iran. Indeed, Tehran has been the main beneficiary of this ill-conceived adventure, which is surely not what the Bush administration had in mind when it dragged the country to war.¶ The long Afghan campaign is even more likely to end badly, even if U.S. leaders eventually try to spin it as some sort of victory. The Obama administration finally got Osama bin Laden, but the long and costly attempt to eliminate the Taliban and build a Western-style state in Afghanistan has failed. At this point, the only interesting question is whether the United States will get out quickly or get out slowly. In either scenario, Kabul’s fate will ultimately be determined by the Afghans once the United States and its dwindling set of allies leave. And if failure in Afghanistan weren’t enough, U.S. involvement in Central Asia has undermined relations with nuclear-armed Pakistan and reinforced virulent anti-Americanism in that troubled country. If victory is defined as achieving your main objectives and ending a war with your security and prosperity enhanced, then both of these conflicts must be counted as expensive defeats. But the Iraq and Afghan wars were not simply costly self-inflicted wounds; they were also eloquent demonstrations of the limits of military power. There was never much doubt that the United States could topple relatively weak and/or unpopular governments—as it has in Panama, Afghanistan, Iraq and, most recently, Libya—but the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that unmatched power-projection capabilities were of little use in constructing effective political orders once the offending leadership was removed. In places where local identities remain strong and foreign interference is not welcome for long, even a global superpower like the United States has trouble obtaining desirable political results.

#### Military power will wane—future spending constraints

Gideon Rachman, “American Decline: This Time It’s for Real,” FOREIGN POICY, January/February 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/think\_again\_american\_decline, accessed 6-9-12.

As for the U.S. military, the lesson of the Iraq and Afghan wars is that America's martial prowess is less useful than former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and others imagined. U.S. troops, planes, and missiles can overthrow a government on the other side of the world in weeks, but pacifying and stabilizing a conquered country is another matter. Years after apparent victory, America is still bogged down by an apparently endless insurgency in Afghanistan. Not only are Americans losing their appetite for foreign adventures, but the U.S. military budget is clearly going to come under pressure in this new age of austerity. The present paralysis in Washington offers little hope that the United States will deal with its budgetary problems swiftly or efficiently. The U.S. government's continuing reliance on foreign lending makes the country vulnerable, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's humbling 2009 request to the Chinese to keep buying U.S. Treasury bills revealed. America is funding its military supremacy through deficit spending, meaning the war in Afghanistan is effectively being paid for with a Chinese credit card. Little wonder that Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has identified the burgeoning national debt as the single largest threat to U.S. national security.

#### Defense cuts are coming—strong budget pressures make them inevitable

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and *Pax Americana,*”INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 2012, Wiley, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x/full, accessed 6-9-12.

With US defense spending currently at such high levels, domestic political pressures to make steep cuts in defense spending are bound to increase. As the Cornell international political economist Jonathan Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of US defense expenditures is “more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difficult, and adjustment more difficult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending” (Kirshner 2008:431). In the spring of 2011, the Obama administration proposed to cut US defense spending by $400 million over eleven years. But that is a drop in the bucket, and cuts of a much larger magnitude almost certainly will be needed.10 Big defense cuts mean that during the next ten to fifteen years, the United States will be compelled to scale back its overseas military commitments. This will have two consequences. First, as the United States spends less on defense, China (and other new great powers) will be able to close the military power gap with the United States. Second, the United States’ ability to act as a regional stabilizer and a guardian of the global commons will diminish. In this respect, America’s fiscal crisis and the dollar’s uncertain future are important drivers of American decline.

#### Military has been decimated—overstretch

Lawrence Korb, senior fellow, Center for American Progress, “Our Decimated Military,” DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF IDEAS n. 22, Fall 2011, http://www.democracyjournal.org/22/our-decimated-military.php, accessed 6-20-12.

Despite claims by the Bush campaign in the 2000 presidential election that U.S. armed forces were suffering readiness problems as a result of the reductions in defense spending under President Clinton, our military was in excellent shape, a point that General Hugh Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, constantly made. The quality of the new recruits as measured by education and aptitude was at an all-time high, and overall retention rates for both officers and enlisted were excellent. The United States’ reaction to 9/11, however, created long-term problems both in our domestic policy and our international affairs. The “Global War on Terror” declared in the aftermath of the attacks led to regime-change missions in two Muslim countries, efforts that have carried a large cost in lives, financial stability, and America’s standing in the world. In an attempt to defeat the purportedly existential threat of Al Qaeda, the United States paid an overwhelming cost: tens of thousands of American troops killed or wounded, trillions of dollars spent on the wars at levels not seen in the United States since World War II (running up a massive federal deficit to boot), civil liberties imperiled at home, and our reputation and influence in the world depressed to new lows. In addition, civilian and military leaders overstretched and abused the active and reserve components of the All Volunteer Force, especially the Army and Marines, because they lacked the political courage to activate the selective service system to fight these long wars. For example, in the spring of 2007, the Army had 20 of its 44 active combat brigades on the ground in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Of these 20 brigades, nine were already on second tours, seven were serving a third tour, and two were on a fourth deployment of at least 12 months. None of them had demobilized for a full two years between deployments—the time period regarded as optimal for recovery from combat—and four had one year or less at home between combat tours. The Reserve component was also severely overstretched. By early 2007, about 600,000 reservists had been mobilized and about 420,000, or 80 percent of the Guard and Reserve, had been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, with an average of 18 months per mobilization. The abuse of the Total Force’s Army component has had severe repercussions. From 2005 through 2008, the Army could not achieve its goal of ensuring that 90 percent of its new enlistees were so-called Tier I recruits (those with high school diplomas and who scored at least average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test). The Army compounded the problem by issuing 80,000 of what it called moral waivers between 2005 and 2008. These waivers allowed individuals with criminal convictions and even felonies to enlist. Finally, repeated tours to combat zones without sufficient dwell time, or time between deployments, also took a toll on the individual men and women serving and their families. Close to 500,000 soldiers have developed mental problems, and divorce and suicide rates have skyrocketed.

### Hegemony Unsustainable – Regional Powers

#### U.S. is in decline—rise of other powers

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing,” THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 1—27—12, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405, accessed 6-9-12.

The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important regional powers such as Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil will assume more prominent roles in international politics. Thus, the post-Cold War “unipolar moment,” when the United States commanded the global stage as the “sole remaining superpower,” will be replaced by a multipolar international system. The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By the middle or end of the next decade, China will be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefers—and, perhaps, to provide the international economy with a new reserve currency.

#### Decline inevitable--rise of other states, economy, globalization

Richard Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations, "What Follows American Dominion?" FINANCIAL TIMES, 4--16--08, LN.

The unipolar era, a time of un-precedented American dominion, is over. It lasted some two decades, little more than a moment in historical terms. Why did it end? One explanation is history. States get better at generating and piecing together the human, financial and technological resources that lead to productivity and prosperity. The same holds for companies and other organisations. The rise of new powers cannot be stopped. The result is an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally. It is not that the US has grown weaker, but that many other entities have grown much stronger. A second reason unipolarity has ended is US policy. By both what it has done and what it has failed to do, the US has accelerated the emergence of new power centres and has weakened its own position relative to them. US energy policy (or the lack thereof) is one driving force behind the end of unipolarity. Since the first oil shocks of the 1970s, US oil consumption has grown by some 20 per cent and, more important, US imports of petroleum products have more than doubled in volume and nearly doubled as a percentage of consumption. This growth in demand for foreign oil has helped drive up the world price from just over $20 a barrel to more than $100 a barrel. The result is an enormous transfer of wealth and leverage to those states with energy reserves. US economic policy has played a role as well. President George W. Bush has fought costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, allowed discretionary spending to increase by 8 per cent a year and cut taxes. The US fiscal position declined from a surplus of more than $100bn in 2001 to an estimated deficit of about $250bn in 2007. The ballooning current account deficit is now more than 6 per cent of gross domestic product. This places downward pressure on the dollar, stimulates inflation and contributes to the accumulation of wealth and power elsewhere in the world. Poor regulation of the US mortgage market and the credit crisis it spawned have exacerbated these problems. Iraq has also contributed to the dilution of American primacy. The conflict has proved to be an expensive war of choice - militarily, economically and diplomatically, as well as in human terms. Years ago, the historian Paul Kennedy outlined his thesis about "imperial overstretch", which posited that the US would eventually decline by overreaching, just as other great powers had. Prof Kennedy's theory turned out to apply most immediately to the Soviet Union, but the US - for all its corrective mechanisms and dynamism - has not proved to be immune. Finally, unipolarity's end is not simply the result of the rise of other states and organisations or of the failures and follies of US policy. It is also a consequence of globalisation. Globalisation has increased the volume, velocity and importance of cross-border flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, goods and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real) and weapons. Many of these flows take place outside the control of governments and without their knowledge. As a result, globalisation dilutes the influence of big powers, including the US. These same flows often strengthen non-state actors, such as energy exporters (who are experiencing a dramatic increase in wealth), terrorists (who use the internet to recruit and train, the international banking system to move resources and the global transport system to move people), rogue states (which can exploit black and grey -markets) and Fortune 500 companies (which quickly move personnel and investments). Being the strongest state no longer means having a near-monopoly on power. It is easier than ever before for individuals and groups to accumulate and project substantial power. All of this raises a critical question: if unipolarity is gone, what will take its place? Some predict a return to the bipolarity that characterised international relations during the cold war. This is unlikely. China's military strength does not approximate that of the US; more important, its focus will remain on economic growth, a choice that leads it to seek economic integration and avoid conflict. Russia may be more inclined towards re-creating a bipolar world, but it too has a stake in co-operation and, in any event, lacks the capacity to challenge the US. Still others predict the emergence of a modern multipolar world, one in which China, Europe, India, Japan and Russia join the US as dominant influences. This view ignores how the world has changed. There are literally dozens of meaningful power centres, including regional powers, international organisations, companies, media outlets, religious movements, terrorist organisations, drug cartels and non-governmental organisations. Today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated, power. The successor to unipolarity is neither bipolarity or multipolarity. It is non-polarity.

### Hegemony Unsustainable – A2 Aging Crisis / Demography

#### New partisanship trumps any demographic advantage

Daniel W. Drezner, Professor, International Politics, Tufts University, FOREIGN POLICY v. 90 n. 4, July/August 2011, LN.

A more serious problem is that by focusing on renewing the United States' domestic strength, the Obama administration has introduced more partisan politics into the equation. There is still some truth to the aphorism that politics stops at the water's edge. But if the administration argues that the key to U.S. foreign policy is the domestic economy, then it increases the likelihood of domestic discord. Based on the tenor of the debates about the rising levels of U.S. debt, the possibility that the president can hammer out a grand bargain over fiscal and tax policies is looking increasingly remote. These difficulties reinforce the argument, made by the political scientists Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz, that demographic and political shifts within the United States (including the right's rejection of multilateralism and the left's rejection of power projection) are making it harder and harder to build support for a grand strategy based on liberal internationalist principles.

#### Decline inevitable—rise of new regional powers

Stephen M. Walt, Professor, International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, “The End of the American Era,” THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 10—25—11, http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037, accessed 10-25-11.

The security arrangements that defined the American Era are also being undermined by the rise of several key regional powers, most notably India, Turkey and Brazil. Each of these states has achieved impressive economic growth over the past decade, and each has become more willing to chart its own course independent of Washington’s wishes. None of them are on the verge of becoming true global powers—Brazil’s GDP is still less than one-sixth that of the United States, and India and Turkey’s economies are even smaller—but each has become increasingly influential within its own region. This gradual diffusion of power is also seen in the recent expansion of the G-8 into the so-called G-20, a tacit recognition that the global institutions created after World War II are increasingly obsolete and in need of reform. Each of these new regional powers is a democracy, which means that its leaders pay close attention to public opinion. As a result, the United States can no longer rely on cozy relations with privileged elites or military juntas. When only 10–15 percent of Turkish citizens have a “favorable” view of America, it becomes easier to understand why Ankara refused to let Washington use its territory to attack Iraq in 2003 and why Turkey has curtailed its previously close ties with Israel despite repeated U.S. efforts to heal the rift. Anti-Americanism is less prevalent in Brazil and India, but their democratically elected leaders are hardly deferential to Washington either. The rise of new powers is bringing the short-lived “unipolar moment” to an end, and the result will be either a bipolar Sino-American rivalry or a multipolar system containing several unequal great powers. The United States is likely to remain the strongest, but its overall lead has shrunk—and it is shrinking further still.

### Heg Low – Economy 2nc

#### Economic power decline inevitable--fiscal crisis, inflation, loss of dollar as reserve currency

Christopher Layne, Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony--Myth or Reality?" INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 34 n. 1, Summer 2009, p. 167-169.

The publications reviewed in this essay examine whether the United States is in (or is headed for) relative decline.74 Brooks and Wohlforth purport to deny the possibility that America is in relative decline, but a growing number of analysts disagree.75 The long-term impact of the current economic crisis largely will determine who is right (and to be fair, Brooks and Wohlforth wrote their book before its effects became evident). Yet, even before the meltdown, longterm structural weaknesses that have been accumulating for more than three decades were causing U.S. economic power to wane.76 The warning signs with respect to U.S. decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency, both of which are linked to the fear that after recovery, the United States will face a serious inflationary threat.77 Optimists contend that once the United States recovers, fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. The postwar era, however, was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945, however, which is why many economists believe that even in the best case, it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps.78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy), and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current account deficit, the entitlements overhang, and the cost of two ongoing wars, there is reason to worry about the United States’ longterm fiscal stability.80 The CBO states, “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem.”81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right, it spells trouble ahead for the dollar. As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown, the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance.”82 The dollar’s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U.S. dominance, and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis. 83 First, the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous “allies” (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Because of these two factors, as Eric Helleiner notes, if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future, there is a “risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum” away from it.84 To defend the dollar, in coming years the United States will be under increasing pressure to prevent runaway inflation through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes.85 Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. For several reasons, it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense expenditures. First, discretionary nondefense spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays.86 Second, there are obvious “guns or butter” choices. As Kirshner points out, with U.S. defense spending at such high absolute levels, domestic political pressure to make steep cuts in defense spending is likely to increase greatly.87 If this analysis is correct, the United States may be compelled to retract its overseas military commitments.88

#### U.S. is losing its tech and knowledge lead--fueled by rapid diffusion

Robert A. Pape, Professor, Political Science, University of Chicago, "Empire Falls," NATIONAL INTEREST, Jan/Feb 2009, ASP.

True, the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world, with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. However, the ability to diffuse new technology--to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced applications--has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe, and with it the ultimate sources of state power--productive capacities. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. In past eras--the "age of iron" and the "age of steel"--leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades.( n4) As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book, The Post-American World, technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today, and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America's power compared to other countries. For instance, although the United States remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis, this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. Whereas in 2000, the United States had three times the computer sales, five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China, in 2008, the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate.( n5) The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter--it means that China, with more than four times the U.S. population, can create many more knowledge workers in the future.

### Hegemony Unsustainable – A2 Bandwagoning

#### Countries won’t bandwagon with the U.S.—will pursue their own policies

Charles A. Kupchan, Professor, International Affairs, Georgetown University, “The Decline of the West: Why America Must Prepare for the End of Dominance,” THE ATLANTIC, 3—20—12, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/the-decline-of-the-west-why-america-must-prepare-for-the-end-of-dominance/254779/, accessed 6-9-12.

Kagan is ready to gloss over the consequences of the West's diminishing clout because he thinks that most emerging nations will cast their lot with the United States rather than challenge American hegemony. "Only the growth of China's economy," he writes, "can be said to have implications for American power in the future." Kagan is confident that the rise of others--including Brazil, India, and Turkey--"is either irrelevant to America's strategic position or of benefit to it." But Washington simply can't expect emerging powers other than China to line up on its side. History suggests that a more equal distribution of power will produce fluid alignments, not fixed alliances. During the late 19th century, for example, the onset of a multi­polar Europe produced a continually shifting network of pacts. Large and small powers alike jockeyed for advantage in an uncertain environment. Only after imperial Germany's military buildup threatened to overturn the equilibrium did Europe's nations group into the competing alliances that ultimately faced off in World War I. As the 21st century unfolds, China is more likely than other emerging nations to threaten U.S. interests. But unless or until the rest of the world is forced to choose sides, most developing countries will keep their options open, not obediently follow America's lead. Already, rising powers are showing that they'll chart their own courses. Turkey for decades oriented its statecraft westward, focusing almost exclusively on its ties to the United States and Europe. Now, Ankara looks primarily east and south, seeking to extend its sway throughout the Middle East. Its secular bent has given way to Islamist leanings; its traditionally close connection with Israel is on the rocks; and its relations with Washington, although steadier of late, have never recovered from the rift over the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. India is supposedly America's newest strategic partner. Relations have certainly improved since the 2005 agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, and the two nations see eye to eye on checking China's regional intentions. But on many other fronts, Washington and New Delhi are miles apart. India frets, for instance, that the U.S. will give Pakistan too much sway in Afghanistan. On the most pressing national security issue of the day--Iran's nuclear program--India is more of a hindrance than a help, defying Washington's effort to isolate Iran through tighter economic sanctions. And the two democracies have long been at loggerheads over trade and market access. Nations such as Turkey and India, which Kagan argues will be either geopolitically irrelevant or solid American supporters, are already pushing back against Washington. And they are doing so while the United States still wields a pronounced preponderance of power. Imagine how things will look when the playing field has truly leveled out.

#### Pushback is growing among rising states, former allies—limits our strength

Charles A. Kupchan, Professor, International Affairs, Georgetown University, “The Decline of the West: Why America Must Prepare for the End of Dominance,” THE ATLANTIC, 3—20—12, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/the-decline-of-the-west-why-america-must-prepare-for-the-end-of-dominance/254779/, accessed 6-9-12.

But today's global landscape is new. By presuming that current circumstances are comparable with the Cold War, Kagan underestimates the centrifugal forces thwarting American influence. Bipolarity no longer constrains how far nations--even those aligned with Washington--will stray from the fold. And the United States no longer wields the economic influence that it once did. Its transition from creditor to debtor nation and from budget surpluses to massive deficits explains why it has been watching from the sidelines as its partners in Europe flirt with financial meltdown. The G-7, a grouping of like-minded democracies, used to oversee the global economy. Now that role is played by the G-20, a much more unwieldy group in which Washington has considerably less influence. And it is hardly business as usual when foreign countries lay claim to nearly 50 percent of publicly held U.S. government debt, with an emerging rival--China--holding about one-quarter of the American treasuries owned by foreigners. Yes, U.S. leadership has always faced resistance, but the pushback grows in proportion to the diffusion of global power. China may prove to be America's most formidable competitor, but other emerging nations will also be finding their own orbits, not automatically aligning themselves with Washington. America's most reliable partners in the years ahead will remain its traditional allies, Europe and Japan. That's why it spells trouble for the United States that these allies are on the losing end of the ongoing redistribution of global power.

#### Economically rising nations will pursue their own interests, may not align with the U.S.

Charles A. Kupchan, Professor, International Affairs, Georgetown University, “The Decline of the West: Why America Must Prepare for the End of Dominance,” THE ATLANTIC, 3—20—12, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/the-decline-of-the-west-why-america-must-prepare-for-the-end-of-dominance/254779/, accessed 6-9-12.

Despite his faith that rising powers (save China) will be America's friends, Kagan at least recognizes that their ascent could come at America's expense. Will not the "increasing economic clout" of emerging powers, he asks, "cut into American power and influence?" He offers a few reasons not to worry, none of which satisfies. For starters, he claims that the growing wealth of developing nations need not diminish U.S. sway because "there is no simple correlation between economic growth and international influence." He continues, "Just because a nation is an attractive investment opportunity does not mean it is a rising great power." True enough. But one of the past's most indelible patterns is that rising nations eventually expect their influence to be commensurate with their power. The proposition that countries such as India and Brazil will sit quietly in the global shadows as they become economic titans flies in the face of history. Other than modern-day Germany and Japan--both of which have punched well below their weight due to constraints imposed on them after World War II--a country's geopolitical aspirations generally rise in step with its economic strength. During the 1890s, for instance, the United States tapped its industrial might to launch a blue-water navy, rapidly turning itself from an international lightweight into a world-class power. China is now in the midst of fashioning geopolitical aspirations that match its economic strength--as are other emerging powers. India is pouring resources into its navy; its fleet expansion includes 20 new warships and two aircraft carriers.

### Hegemony Unsustainable – A2 Globalization

#### Globalization won’t benefit the U.S.—returns produced are zero-sum

Gideon Rachman, “American Decline: This Time It’s for Real,” FOREIGN POICY, January/February 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/think\_again\_american\_decline, accessed 6-9-12.

"Globalization Is Not a Zero-Sum Game." Don't be too sure. Successive U.S. presidents, from the first Bush to Obama, have explicitly welcomed China's rise. Just before his first visit to China, Obama summarized the traditional approach when he said, "Power does not need to be a zero-sum game, and nations need not fear the success of another.… We welcome China's efforts to play a greater role on the world stage." But whatever they say in formal speeches, America's leaders are clearly beginning to have their doubts, and rightly so. It is a central tenet of modern economics that trade is mutually beneficial for both partners, a win-win rather than a zero-sum. But that implies the rules of the game aren't rigged. Speaking before the 2010 World Economic Forum, Larry Summers, then Obama's chief economic advisor, remarked pointedly that the normal rules about the mutual benefits of trade do not necessarily apply when one trading partner is practicing mercantilist or protectionist policies. The U.S. government clearly thinks that China's undervaluation of its currency is a form of protectionism that has led to global economic imbalances and job losses in the United States. Leading economists, such as New York Times columnist Paul Krugman and the Peterson Institute's C. Fred Bergsten, have taken a similar line, arguing that tariffs or other retaliatory measures would be a legitimate response. So much for the win-win world. And when it comes to the broader geopolitical picture, the world of the future looks even more like a zero-sum game, despite the gauzy rhetoric of globalization that comforted the last generation of American politicians. For the United States has been acting as if the mutual interests created by globalization have repealed one of the oldest laws of international politics: the notion that rising players eventually clash with established powers. In fact, rivalry between a rising China and a weakened America is now apparent across a whole range of issues, from territorial disputes in Asia to human rights. It is mercifully unlikely that the United States and China would ever actually go to war, but that is because both sides have nuclear weapons, not because globalization has magically dissolved their differences. At the G-20 summit in November, the U.S. drive to deal with "global economic imbalances" was essentially thwarted by China's obdurate refusal to change its currency policy. The 2009 climate-change talks in Copenhagen ended in disarray after another U.S.-China standoff. Growing Chinese economic and military clout clearly poses a long-term threat to American hegemony in the Pacific. The Chinese reluctantly agreed to a new package of U.N. sanctions on Iran, but the cost of securing Chinese agreement was a weak deal that is unlikely to derail the Iranian nuclear program. Both sides have taken part in the talks with North Korea, but a barely submerged rivalry prevents truly effective Sino-American cooperation. China does not like Kim Jong Il's regime, but it is also very wary of a reunified Korea on its borders, particularly if the new Korea still played host to U.S. troops. China is also competing fiercely for access to resources, in particular oil, which is driving up global prices. American leaders are right to reject zero-sum logic in public. To do anything else would needlessly antagonize the Chinese. But that shouldn't obscure this unavoidable fact: As economic and political power moves from West to East, new international rivalries are inevitably emerging. The United States still has formidable strengths. Its economy will eventually recover. Its military has a global presence and a technological edge that no other country can yet match. But America will never again experience the global dominance it enjoyed in the 17 years between the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the financial crisis of 2008. Those days are over.

#### Globalization is not benefiting the U.S.—is not driving democratization or making states like China more amenable to American interests

Gideon Rachman, “American Decline: This Time It’s for Real,” FOREIGN POICY, January/February 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/think\_again\_american\_decline, accessed 6-9-12.

"Globalization Is Bending the World the Way of the West." Not really. One reason why the United States was relaxed about China's rise in the years after the end of the Cold War was the deeply ingrained belief that globalization was spreading Western values. Some even thought that globalization and Americanization were virtually synonymous. Pundit Fareed Zakaria was prescient when he wrote that the "rise of the rest" (i.e., non-American powers) would be one of the major features of a "post-American world." But even Zakaria argued that this trend was essentially beneficial to the United States: "The power shift … is good for America, if approached properly. The world is going America's way. Countries are becoming more open, market-friendly, and democratic." Both George W. Bush and Bill Clinton took a similar view that globalization and free trade would serve as a vehicle for the export of American values. In 1999, two years before China's accession to the World Trade Organization, Bush argued, "Economic freedom creates habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy.… Trade freely with China, and time is on our side." There were two important misunderstandings buried in this theorizing. The first was that economic growth would inevitably -- and fairly swiftly -- lead to democratization. The second was that new democracies would inevitably be more friendly and helpful toward the United States. Neither assumption is working out. In 1989, after the Tiananmen Square massacre, few Western analysts would have believed that 20 years later China would still be a one-party state -- and that its economy would also still be growing at phenomenal rates. The common (and comforting) Western assumption was that China would have to choose between political liberalization and economic failure. Surely a tightly controlled one-party state could not succeed in the era of cell phones and the World Wide Web? As Clinton put it during a visit to China in 1998, "In this global information age, when economic success is built on ideas, personal freedom is … essential to the greatness of any modern nation." In fact, China managed to combine censorship and one-party rule with continuing economic success over the following decade. The confrontation between the Chinese government and Google in 2010 was instructive. Google, that icon of the digital era, threatened to withdraw from China in protest at censorship, but it eventually backed down in return for token concessions. It is now entirely conceivable that when China becomes the world's largest economy -- let us say in 2027 -- it will still be a one-party state run by the Communist Party. And even if China does democratize, there is absolutely no guarantee that this will make life easier for the United States, let alone prolong America's global hegemony. The idea that democracies are liable to agree on the big global issues is now being undermined on a regular basis. India does not agree with the United States on climate change or the Doha round of trade talks. Brazil does not agree with the United States on how to handle Venezuela or Iran. A more democratic Turkey is today also a more Islamist Turkey, which is now refusing to take the American line on either Israel or Iran. In a similar vein, a more democratic China might also be a more prickly China, if the popularity of nationalist books and Internet sites in the Middle Kingdom is any guide.

### Hegemony Unsustainable – A2 Lock-In / Ikenberry

#### Lock-in strategy fails--three reasons

#### a) irrevocable loss of cred

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and *Pax Americana,*”INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 2012, Wiley, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x/full, accessed 6-9-12.

First, there is a critical linkage between a great power’s military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige and soft power, on the other. The ebbing of the United States’ hegemony raises the question of whether it has the authority to take the lead in reforming the post-1945 international order. The Pax Americana projected the United States’ liberal ideology abroad, and asserted its universality as the only model for political, economic, and social development. Today, however, the American model of free market, liberal democracy—which came to be known in the 1990s as the Washington consensus—is being challenged by an alternative model, the Beijing consensus (Halper 2010). Moreover, the Great Recession discredited America’s liberal model. Consequently, it is questionable whether the United States retains the credibility and legitimacy to spearhead the revamping of the international order. As Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf says, “The collapse of the western financial system, while China’s flourishes, marks a humiliating end to the ‘unipolar moment.’ As western policy makers struggle, their credibility lies broken. Who still trusts the teachers?” (Wolf 2009).

#### b) lack of resources to rebuild the system

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and *Pax Americana,*”INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 2012, Wiley, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x/full, accessed 6-9-12.

The second reason a US lock-in strategy is unlikely to succeed is because the United States does not have the necessary economic clout to revitalize the international order. Ikenberry defines the task of securing lock-in as “renewing and rebuilding the architecture of global governance and cooperation to allow the United States to marshal resources and tackle problems along a wide an shifting spectrum of possibilities” (Ikenberry 2011:353) To do this, the United States will need to take the lead in providing public goods: security, economic leadership, and a nation building program of virtually global dimension to combat the “socioeconomic backwardness and failure that generate regional and international instability and conflict” (Ikenberry 2011:354, 359). At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States had the material capacity to furnish the international system with public goods. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, however, a financially strapped United States increasingly will be unable to be a big time provider of public goods to the international order.12

#### c) Chinese resistance

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and *Pax Americana,*”INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 2012, Wiley, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x/full, accessed 6-9-12.

The third reason the post-World War II international order cannot be locked in is the rise of China (and other emerging great and regional powers). The lock-in argument is marred by a glaring weakness: if they perceive that the United States is declining, the incentive for China and other emerging powers is to wait a decade or two and reshape the international system themselves in a way that reflects their own interests, norms, and values (Jacques 2009). China and the United States have fundamental differences on what the rules of international order should be on such key issues as sovereignty, non-interference in states’ internal affairs, and the “responsibility to protect.” While China has integrated itself in the liberal order to propel its economic growth, it is converting wealth into hard power to challenge American geopolitical dominance. And although China is working “within the system” to transform the post-1945 international order, it also is laying the foundations—through embryonic institutions like the BRICs and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—for constructing an alternative world order that, over the next twenty years or so, could displace the Pax Americana. As Martin Jacques has observed, China is operating “both within and outside the existing international system while at the same time, in effect, sponsoring a new China-centric international system which will exist alongside the present system and probably slowly begin to usurp it” (Jacques 2009:362). Great power politics is about power. Rules and institutions do not exist in vacuum. Rather, they reflect the distribution of power in the international system. In international politics, who rules makes the rules. The post-World War II international order is an American order that privileges the United States’ interests. Even the discourse of “liberal order” cannot conceal this fact. This is why the notion that China can be constrained by integrating into the post-1945 international order lacks credulity. For US scholars and policymakers alike, China’s successful integration hinges on Beijing’s willingness to accept the Pax Americana’s institutions, rules, and norms. In other words, China must accept playing second fiddle to the United States. Revealingly, Ikenberry makes clear this expectation when he says that the deal the United States should propose to China is for Washington “to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia” (Ikenberry 2011:356). It is easy to see why the United States would want to cut such a deal but it is hard to see what’s in it for China. American hegemony is waning and China is ascending, and there is zero reason for China to accept this bargain because it aims to be the hegemon in its own region. The unfolding Sino-American rivalry in East Asia can be seen as an example of Dodge City syndrome (in American Western movies, one gunslinger says to the other: “This town ain’t big enough for both of us”) or as a geopolitical example of Newtonian physics (two hegemons cannot occupy the same region at the same time). From either perspective, the dangers should be obvious: unless the United States is willing to accept China’s ascendancy in East (and Southeast) Asia, Washington and Beijing are on a collision course.

### Hegemony Unsustainable – A2 Multilateral Institutions

#### Multilateral institutions won't bolster heg--reforms are being driven by our rivals, will diffuse power

Christopher Layne, Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony--Myth or Reality?" INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 34 n. 1, Summer 2009, p. 166.

American hegemony and international institutions. Brooks and Wohlforth, and Zakaria, believe that international institutions can help perpetuate U.S. dominance. By strengthening these institutions, the United States can “lock in” the hegemonic order that it built after World War II and thereby ensure that it persists after unipolarity ends.71 Brooks and Wohlforth also maintain that unipolarity affords the United States a twenty-year window of opportunity to recast the international system in ways that will bolster the legitimacy of its power and advance its security interests.72 Ironically, however, it is in the very arena of international institutions where a truly post-American world may be taking shape, and where multipolarization’s effects are first being felt. Although a consensus exists that international institutions need to be overhauled, pressures for reform are pushing in the opposite direction than the one prescribed by Brooks and Wohlforth, because the impetus for change is coming from China and the other emerging powers. This became evident during the lead-up to the April 2009 London meeting of the Group of 20, when China and other rising powers argued that international institutions need to be revamped to give them a greater voice, and also that the international privileges enjoyed by the United States and Europe need to be rolled back. These developments highlight a weakness in the institutional “lock in” and “twenty years’ opportunity” arguments: if they perceive that the United States is in decline, rising powers such as China need to wait only a decade or two to reshape the international system themselves. Moreover, because of the perception that the United States’ hard power is declining, and because of the hit its soft power has taken as a result of the meltdown, there is a real question about whether the U.S. hegemon retains the credibility and legitimacy to take the lead in institutional reform.73

### Hegemony Unsustainable – A2 No One Will Catch Up (Wohlforth)

#### Rise of other powers make decline inevitable

Andrew J. Bacevich, Professor, International Relations, Boston University, "Shaping a New World Order," LOS ANGELES TIMES, 8--17--11, LN.

Chief among the problems facing the United States today is this: too many obligations piled high without the wherewithal to meet them. Among those obligations are the varied and sundry commitments implied by the phrase "American global leadership." If ever there were an opportune moment for reassessing the assumptions embedded in that phrase, it's now. With too few Americans taking notice, history has entered a new era. The "unipolar moment" created by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has passed. To refer to the United States today as the world's "sole superpower" makes about as much sense as General Motors bragging that it's the world's No.1 car company: Nostalgia ill-befits an enterprise beset with competitors breathing down its neck. Similarly, to call Barack Obama the "most powerful man in the world" is akin to curtsying before Elizabeth II as "Queen of Great Britain, Ireland and British Dominions beyond the Seas": Although a nice title, it confers little by way of actual authority. A new global order is rapidly emerging. In that order, the United States will no doubt remain a very important player. Yet alongside the U.S. will be several others: China preeminently among them, but with Russia, India, Turkey, Japan, South Korea and Brazil also demanding to be reckoned with. (Whether Europe, currently wallowing in disarray, can muster the will and wallet to play in this company qualifies as an unknown.) Nothing Washington can do will prevent this geopolitical transformation. Politicians may insist that the United States still stands apart — always and forever a "triple-A nation" — but their declarations will have as much effect as King Canute ordering the waves to stop. Indeed, to indulge further in the fiction of American omnipotence — persisting in our penchant for fighting distant wars of dubious purpose, for example — will accelerate the process, with relative decline becoming absolute decline. For Americans, husbanding power rather than squandering it is the order of the day. That said, there is much that the United States can and ought to do to ensure that this emerging multipolar world ends up being more or less stable, and more or less decent, and therefore more or less congenial to the well-being of the American people. Multipolarity implies complications. A little more than a century ago, mismanagement by the last multipolar order produced a world war, followed by the Depression and then another world war worse than the first. Avoiding a repetition of those serial catastrophes defines the overarching strategic imperative of our age. In that regard, spending hundreds of billions vainly attempting to pacify Afghanistan is unlikely to help much. Far more useful (if hardly less challenging) might be the following: • Negotiating "boundaries" — constraints, for example, on the use of force — that will limit great power prerogatives (including our own) in the 21st century. • Establishing norms governing the competition for increasingly scarce natural resources. • Reducing armaments and curbing the international arms trade, thereby restricting the availability of the hardware that sustains wars once they begin. • Focusing increased diplomatic attention on trouble spots that threaten to put great powers on a collision course, among them Taiwan, Kashmir, Korea's 38th parallel and, of course, the Palestinian territories. Sadly, little evidence exists to suggest that anyone in Washington possesses the creative imagination to take on such tasks. Crisis response — managing ongoing wars and reacting to the twists and turns of the Arab Spring, for example — absorbs the energy and attention of the Obama administration. Meanwhile, shoveling money into the maw of the military-industrial complex seems the top Republican priority. As with fiscal issues, so too with statecraft: Washington has become an intellectual dead zone.

#### Decline inevitable—multiple factors prove, including rise of other powers

Alfred McCoy, Professor, History, University of Wisconsin, "How America Will Collapse," SALON, 12--6--10, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2010/12/06/america\_collapse\_2025/index.html,

Available economic, educational, and military data indicate that, when it comes to U.S. global power, negative trends will aggregate rapidly by 2020 and are likely to reach a critical mass no later than 2030. The American Century, proclaimed so triumphantly at the start of World War II, will be tattered and fading by 2025, its eighth decade, and could be history by 2030. Significantly, in 2008, the U.S. National Intelligence Council admitted for the first time that America's global power was indeed on a declining trajectory. In one of its periodic futuristic reports, Global Trends 2025, the Council cited "the transfer of global wealth and economic power now under way, roughly from West to East" and "without precedent in modern history," as the primary factor in the decline of the "United States' relative strength -- even in the military realm." Like many in Washington, however, the Council’s analysts anticipated a very long, very soft landing for American global preeminence, and harbored the hope that somehow the U.S. would long "retain unique military capabilities… to project military power globally" for decades to come. No such luck. Under current projections, the United States will find itself in second place behind China (already the world's second largest economy) in economic output around 2026, and behind India by 2050. Similarly, Chinese innovation is on a trajectory toward world leadership in applied science and military technology sometime between 2020 and 2030, just as America's current supply of brilliant scientists and engineers retires, without adequate replacement by an ill-educated younger generation. By 2020, according to current plans, the Pentagon will throw a military Hail Mary pass for a dying empire. It will launch a lethal triple canopy of advanced aerospace robotics that represents Washington's last best hope of retaining global power despite its waning economic influence. By that year, however, China's global network of communications satellites, backed by the world's most powerful supercomputers, will also be fully operational, providing Beijing with an independent platform for the weaponization of space and a powerful communications system for missile- or cyber-strikes into every quadrant of the globe. Wrapped in imperial hubris, like Whitehall or Quai d'Orsay before it, the White House still seems to imagine that American decline will be gradual, gentle, and partial. In his State of the Union address last January, President Obama offered the reassurance that "I do not accept second place for the United States of America." A few days later, Vice President Biden ridiculed the very idea that "we are destined to fulfill [historian Paul] Kennedy's prophecy that we are going to be a great nation that has failed because we lost control of our economy and overextended." Similarly, writing in the November issue of the establishment journal Foreign Affairs, neo-liberal foreign policy guru Joseph Nye waved away talk of China's economic and military rise, dismissing "misleading metaphors of organic decline" and denying that any deterioration in U.S. global power was underway. Ordinary Americans, watching their jobs head overseas, have a more realistic view than their cosseted leaders. An opinion poll in August 2010 found that 65 percent of Americans believed the country was now "in a state of decline." Already, Australia and Turkey, traditional U.S. military allies, are using their American-manufactured weapons for joint air and naval maneuvers with China. Already, America's closest economic partners are backing away from Washington's opposition to China's rigged currency rates. As the president flew back from his Asian tour last month, a gloomy New York Times headline summed the moment up this way: "Obama's Economic View Is Rejected on World Stage, China, Britain and Germany Challenge U.S., Trade Talks With Seoul Fail, Too." Viewed historically, the question is not whether the United States will lose its unchallenged global power, but just how precipitous and wrenching the decline will be. In place of Washington's wishful thinking, let’s use the National Intelligence Council's own futuristic methodology to suggest four realistic scenarios for how, whether with a bang or a whimper, U.S. global power could reach its end in the 2020s (along with four accompanying assessments of just where we are today). The future scenarios include: economic decline, oil shock, military misadventure, and World War III. While these are hardly the only possibilities when it comes to American decline or even collapse, they offer a window into an onrushing future.

## Hegemony Bad – Defense

### Hegemony Defense 1nc

#### Hegemony is unsustainable – credibility gap, credit downgrade, and the rise of China make collapse inevitable

Clemons 2011 [Steve, Washington editor at large for The Atlantic and editor in chief of Atlantic LIVE, “America Next: End of the World As We Knew It”, August 12, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/america-next-end-of-the-world-as-we-knew-it/243503/]

In nature, when a piece of ice larger than Rhode Island breaks off of Antarctica, one sees tangibly the very different world that global warming is shaping. In the case of the United States -- which has been indisputably the reigning global superpower for six decades -- there are signs -- ranging from the tumult in the Middle East to a humiliating war in Afghanistan to a downgrade of US sovereign debt -- that America is at a key inflection point in its history and that the US network of global control (aka, "empire") is disintegrating. Chalmers Johnson, a scholar who authored Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire before 9/11, argued in the 1990s that the US had become blind to the global push-back to American dictates. With the USSR gone and China the fastest growing market economy, the moniker of "leader of the free world" carried with it diminishing privileges and power. Without the Soviet menace threatening the global order, the cost-benefit relationship between other nations and the US fundamentally changed. Other countries were no longer willing to pay the same political price to the US for protection that they once did, a price paid in terms of following American leadership in global institutions, respecting and relying on the US dollar as the global reserve currency, following trade and economic policies that were largely crafted by America's financial elite, and accepting the reality of the Pentagon's global sprawl. The world today sees a diminished America -- one whose military power seems over-extended and hemorrhaging in Afghanistan; whose economic leadership was in doubt when the US exported toxic financial products to the world through the sub-prime crisis and which now is officially crippled given the first ratings downgrade of American bonds; whose moral leadership remains tied in knots as long as Guantanamo remains open and the self-confidence Americans once had in their own systems of justice and government continues to decline. It's through this lens that the hopeful-sounding Arab Spring, the riots in London, the tumultuous financial markets, and the rise of China and a new crop of ascending powers like Brazil, India, Turkey, and South Africa need to be considered. The old order is crumbling; a new one is forming -- but between them is chaos, uncertainty and social and political friction.

#### Nuclear primacy solves any perceived loss of power

Campbell Craig (Professor of International Relations at the University of Southampton) 2009 Review of International Studies, “American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution,” 35, 27–44,

As Keir Lieber and Daryl Press have suggested, the US may be on the verge of acquiring a first-strike nuclear capability, which, combined with an effective system of anti-ballistic missile defence, could allow the US to destroy a rival’s nuclear capabilities and intercept any remaining retaliatory missiles before they hit American cities. While this possibility clearly reduces the likelihood of other states seeking to match American power with the aim of fighting and winning a nuclear war, and, if their argument becomes widely accepted, could lead American policy-makers to reject the logic of the nuclear revolution and consider pre-emptive nuclear strikes against large nuclear rivals, it clearly is less germane to the question of small-state deterrence.33 Lieber and Press contend that the US may have the capability to destroy the entire nuclear arsenal of another large nuclear state lest that state use it on America first for the purposes of winning a great war. That, as they say, would mean the end of Mutual Assured Destruction as it existed during the Cold War. However, Washington would have much less reason to use its new first-strike capability against a nation that cannot threaten to destroy the US, and has no ambition to defeat America in a war, but only possesses a second-strike minimum deterrent. Such an attack would turn much of the world against a US willing to use nuclear weapons and kill hundreds of thousands or millions in order to defeat a nation that did not threaten its survival. Perhaps more to the point, an attack like this would be tremendously risky. Even after a perfect first strike some retaliation might get through, which could mean the nuclear destruction of an American city or perhaps the city of an American ally. At the very least, survivors of the attacked state and their allies would seek to unleash destruction upon the US in other ways, including an unconventional delivery of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. An imperfect first strike, or, even worse, a failure of the US anti-missile system, would constitute a total disaster for the US: not only would it incur the world’s wrath and suffer the destruction of one or more of its cities, but such a failure would also expose America as both a brutal and vulnerable state, surely encouraging other states to acquire nuclear weapons or otherwise defy it. The US might have reason to launch a first strike against a large rival that deployed a major arsenal and appeared ready to attack America, as implausible as this scenario is. It would have little reason to do so against a small nation with a second-strike minimum deterrent arsenal. The nuclear revolution delivers a clear message to any large state considering major war with a powerful nuclear rival. The message is that such a war is likely to escalate to total nuclear exchange, and that in this event a large percentage of its citizenry will be killed or injured, its ability to govern what remains of the nation will be weakened or destroyed, and its power relative to other states that stayed out of the war will be radically diminished. It also delivers a message to any advanced small state eager to obtain security from the possible predation of large ones. The message is that if the small state possesses, or can quickly get its hands on, a few invulnerable and deliverable nuclear weapons, any large state contemplating invading it will have to weigh the benefits of invasion against a new kind of cost – not just a difficult or stalemated conventional war, such as the US faced in Vietnam and faces in Iraq, but the destruction of perhaps one, three, or five of its cities, and the death and injury of millions of its citizens. Unless it is able to obtain an absolutely fool-proof defence against any kind of nuclear retaliation, the choice that any large state is going to make when faced with this new circumstance is so likely to be peace that the small nuclear state can feel confident that it will be safe from conquest.34 The general relevance of these messages to American unipolar preponderance is clear. At the ‘great power’ level, rising states are unlikely to regard major war as a suitable means for overturning the international system and overthrowing American preponderance. The classic means of systemic change – hegemonic war – will not be an attractive option to any state hoping to survive, and the very existence of nuclear arsenals will make all states cautious about provoking conflict with nuclear rivals, especially the heavily armed US.35 Moreover, advanced smaller states know that they can provide for their own security, if they come to believe that it is endangered, not by embarking on large military build-ups or forming alliances with larger states, but by developing a small and invulnerable nuclear arsenal, or at least preparing the way to obtain such an arsenal quickly. This means that small states have a far greater ability to defend themselves from, and therefore be less afraid of, American predation today than comparable states facing dominant powers in previous eras.36 The main effects of the nuclear revolution, then, bolster the general claim of Power Preponderance that unipolarity is enduring. To support their claim, Brooks and Wohlforth specify three factors that dissuade would-be rivals to the US from balancing against it in traditional military terms: the effect of America’s relative geographical isolation from these potential rivals; the fact that American preponderance happened as a fait accompli about which no other nation could do anything; and the vast and growing ‘power gap’ between the US and all other rivals. The next section will describe each factor, and show how the nuclear revolution specifically reinforces each of them.

#### American withdrawal would be coupled with cooperation with new regional powers – this makes the transition smooth

Kupchan 2003 [Charles A., Political Science Quarterly, Summer, Vol. 118, Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier]

As this new century progresses, unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. As this transition proceeds, American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U.S. power, while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. The ultimate vision that should guide U.S. grand strategy is the construction of a concert-like directorate of the major powers in North America, Europe, and East Asia. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism, a struggle that will require patience and steady cooperation among many different nations. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade, information, and values. Strong and vibrant regional centers, for reasons of both proximity and culture, often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. North America might, therefore, focus on Latin America; Europe on Russia, the Middle East, and Africa; and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Neither American leaders, long accustomed to calling the shots, nor leaders in Europe and East Asia, long accustomed to passing the buck, will find the transition an easy one. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. It will take a decade, if not two, for a new international system to evolve. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past.[\*]

#### Potential to redeploy solves all of their offense.

Walt 2005 [Stephen, prof of international relations @ Harvard U, February/March, http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.php]

The final option is offshore balancing, which has been America’s traditional grand strategy. In this strategy, the United States deploys its power abroad only when there are direct threats to vital American interests. Offshore balancing assumes that only a few areas of the globe are of strategic importance to the United States (that is, worth fighting and dying for). Specifically, the vital areas are the regions where there are substantial concentrations of power and wealth or critical natural resources: Europe, industrialized Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Offshore balancing further recognizes that the United States does not need to control these areas directly; it merely needs to ensure that they do not fall under the control of a hostile great power and especially not under the control of a so-called peer competitor. To prevent rival great powers from doing this, offshore balancing prefers to rely primarily on local actors to uphold the regional balance of power. Under this strategy, the United States would intervene with its own forces only when regional powers are unable to uphold the balance of power on their own. Most importantly, offshore balancing is not isolationist. The United States would still be actively engaged around the world, through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the WTO and through close ties with specific regional allies. But it would no longer keep large numbers of troops overseas solely for the purpose of “maintaining stability,” and it would not try to use American military power to impose democracy on other countries or disarm potential proliferators. Offshore balancing does not preclude using power for humanitarian ends—to halt or prevent genocide or mass murder—but the United States would do so only when it was confident it could prevent these horrors at an acceptable cost. (By limiting military commitments overseas, however, an offshore-balancing strategy would make it easier for the United States to intervene in cases of mass murder or genocide.) The United States would still be prepared to use force when it was directly threatened—as it was when the Taliban allowed al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan—and would be prepared to help other governments deal with terrorists that also threaten the United States. Over time, a strategy of offshore balancing would make it less likely that the United States would face the hatred of radicals like bin Laden, and would thus make it less likely that the United States would have to intervene in far-flung places where it is not welcome. Offshore balancing is the ideal grand strategy for an era of American primacy. It husbands the power upon which this primacy rests and minimizes the fear that this power provokes. By setting clear priorities and emphasizing reliance on regional allies, it reduces the danger of being drawn into unnecessary conflicts and encourages other states to do more for us. Equally important, it takes advantage of America’s favorable geopolitical position and exploits the tendency for regional powers to worry more about each other than about the United States. But it is not a passive strategy and does not preclude using the full range of America’s power to advance its core interests.

### A2 Thayer

#### Heg doesn’t solve war – US lacks influence to deescalate conflicts

Mastanduno 2009 [Michael, Professor of Government at Dartmouth, World Politics 61, No. 1, Ebsco]

During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic, military, and other capabilities.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. U.S. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms, after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed. The United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.

### A2 lashout

#### No lashout or power vacuum—retrenchement likely

Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Willians College and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Miami, "Resurrecting Retrenchment: The Grand Strategic Consequences of U.S. Decline," POLICY BRIEF, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 5--11, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/macdonald-parent-may-2011-is-%20brief.pdf

To date, there has been no comprehensive study of great power retrenchment and no study that defends retrenchment as a probable or practical policy. Using historical data on gross domestic product, we identify eighteen cases of "acute relative decline" since 1870. Acute relative decline happens when a great power loses an ordinal ranking in global share of economic production, and this shift endures for five or more years. A comparison of these periods yields the following findings: Retrenchment is the most common response to decline. Great powers suffering from acute decline, such as the United Kingdom, used retrenchment to shore up their fading power in eleven to fifteen of the eighteen cases that we studied (61–83 percent). The rate of decline is the most important factor for explaining and predicting the magnitude of retrenchment. The faster a state falls, the more drastic the retrenchment policy it is likely to employ. The rate of decline is also the most important factor for explaining and predicting the forms that retrenchment takes. The faster a state falls, the more likely it is to renounce risky commitments, increase reliance on other states, cut military spending, and avoid starting or escalating international disputes. In more detail, secondary findings include the following: Democracy does not appear to inhibit retrenchment. Declining states are approximately equally likely to retrench regardless of regime type. Wars are infrequent during ordinal transitions. War broke out close to the transition point in between one and four of the eighteen cases (6–22 percent). Retrenching states rebound with some regularity. Six of the fifteen retrenching states (40 percent) managed to recapture their former rank. No state that failed to retrench can boast similar results. Declining great powers cut their military personnel and budgets significantly faster than other great powers. Over a five-year period, the average nondeclining state increased military personnel 2.1 percent—as compared with a 0.8 percent decrease in declining states. Likewise, the average nondeclining state increased military spending 8.4 percent—compared with 2.2 percent among declining states. Swift declines cause greater alliance agreements. Over a five-year period, the average great power signs 1.75 new alliance agreements—great powers undergoing large declines sign an average of 3.6 such agreements. Declining great powers are less likely to enter or escalate disputes. Compared to average great powers, they are 26 percent less likely to initiate an interstate dispute, 25 percent less likely to be embroiled in a dispute, and markedly less likely to escalate those disputes to high levels. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS From the analysis above, three main implications follow for U.S. policy. First, we are likely to see retrenchment in U.S. foreign policy. With a declining share of relative power, the United States is ripe to shift burdens to allies, cut military expenditures, and stay out of international disputes. This will not be without risks and costs, but retrenchment is likely to be peaceful and is preferable to nonretrenchment. In short, U.S. policymakers should resist calls to maintain a sizable overseas posture because they fear that a more moderate policy might harm U.S. prestige or credibility with American allies. A humble foreign policy and more modest overseas presence can be as (if not more) effective in restoring U.S. credibility and reassuring allies. Second, any potential U.S.-Sino power transition is likely to be easier on the United States than pessimists have advertised. If the United States acts like a typical retrenching state, the future looks promising. Several regional allies—foremost India and Japan—appear capable of assuming responsibilities formerly shouldered by the United States, and a forward defense is no longer as valuable as it once was. There remains ample room for cuts in U.S. defense spending. And as China grows it will find, as the United States did, that increased relative power brings with it widening divisions at home and fewer friends overseas. In brief, policymakers should reject arguments that a reduction in U.S. overseas deployments will embolden a hostile and expansionist China. Sizable forward deployments in Asia are just as likely to trap the United States in unnecessary clashes as they are to deter potential aggression. Third, the United States must reconsider when, where, and how it will use its more modest resources in the future. A sensible policy of retrenchment must be properly prepared for—policymakers should not hastily slash budgets and renounce commitments. A gradual and controlled policy of reprioritizing goals, renouncing commitments, and shifting burdens will bring greater returns than an improvised or imposed retreat. To this end, policymakers need to engage in a frank and serious debate about the purposes of U.S. overseas assets. Our position is that the primary role of the U.S. military should be to deter and fight conventional wars against potential great power adversaries, rather than engage in limited operations against insurgents and other nonstate threats. This suggests that U.S. deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan should be pared down; that the United States should resist calls to involve itself in internal conflicts or civil wars, such as those in Libya and elsewhere in North Africa; and that the Asia-Pacific region should have strategic priority over Europe and the greater Middle East. Regardless of whether one accepts these particular proposals, the United States must make tough choices about which regions and threats should have claim to increasingly scarce resources. CONCLUSION Retrenchment is probable and pragmatic. Great powers may not be prudent, but they tend to become so when their power ebbs. Regardless of regime type, declining states routinely renounce risky commitments, redistribute alliance burdens, pare back military outlays, and avoid ensnarement in and escalation of costly conflicts. Husbanding resources is simply sensible. In the competitive game of power politics, states must unsentimentally realign means with ends or be punished for their profligacy. Attempts to maintain policies advanced when U.S. relative power was greater are outdated, unfounded, and imprudent. Retrenchment policies—greater burden sharing with allies, less military spending, and less involvement in militarized disputes—hold the most promise for arresting and reversing decline.

#### No lashout--peaceful decline through retrenchment, history proves

Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Willians College and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Miami, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 35 n. 4, Spring 2011, pp. 7-44.

These arguments have grim implications for contemporary international politics. With the rise of new powers, such as China, the international pecking order will be in increasing flux in the coming decades. 8 Yet, if the pessimists are correct, politicians and interests groups in the United States will be unwilling or unable to realign resources with overseas commitments. Perceptions of weakness and declining U.S. credibility will encourage policymakers to hold on to burdensome overseas commitments, despite their high costs in blood and treasure. 9 Policymakers in Washington will struggle to retire from profitless military engagements and restrain ballooning current accounts and budget deficits. 10 For some observers, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the ill-advised last gasps of a declining hegemon seeking to bolster its plummeting position. 11 In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so. 12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

#### Decline peaceful--empirically true, no incentive for China or U.S. to fight

Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Willians College and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Miami, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 35 n. 4, Spring 2011, pp. 7-44.

Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two.91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount [End Page 40] of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."92 Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, theUnited States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one's reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatensgrave harm toany state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, whichmay complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a "moderate" decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for eitherside to run risks by courting conflict are minimal.The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreignpolicy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul.97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in [End Page 42] Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict.98 Moreover, Washington's support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order.99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory.100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes.101 Conclusion This article has advanced three main arguments. First, retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers. Second and related, declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. [End Page 43] In the high-stakes world of great power politics, states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. Third, the rate of relative decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. The faster the rate of decline, the more likely states are to reform their militaries, increase reliance on allies, and refrain from using force in international disputes. Taken together, these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline. Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything, we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change.

### Ext – Primacy Solves

#### Military power prevents collapse

George Friedman (chief executive, founder of STRATFOR. Former pol sci prof, Dickinson College) 2009 The Next 100 Years, 13-31)

We are now in an America-centric age. To understand this age, we must understand the United States, not only because it is so powerful but because its culture will permeate the world and deﬁne it. Just as French culture and British culture were deﬁnitive during their times of power, so American culture, as young and barbaric as it is, will deﬁne the way the world thinks and lives. So studying the twenty- ﬁrst century means studying the United States. If there were only one argument I could make about the twenty- ﬁrst century, it would be that the European Age has ended and that the North American Age has begun, and that North America will be dominated by the United States for the next hundred years. The events of the twentyﬁrst century will pivot around the United States. That doesn’t guarantee that the United States is necessarily a just or moral regime. It certainly does not mean that America has yet developed a mature civilization. It does mean that in many ways the history of the United States will be the history of the twenty- ﬁrst century. There is a deep- seated belief in America that the United States is approaching the eve of its destruction. Read letters to the editor, peruse the Web, and listen to public discourse. Disastrous wars, uncontrolled deﬁcits, high gasoline prices, shootings at universities, corruption in business and government, and an endless litany of other shortcomings---all of them quite real---create a sense that the American dream has been shattered and that America is past its prime. If that doesn’t convince you, listen to Europeans. They will assure you that America’s best day is behind it. The odd thing is that all of this foreboding was present during the presidency of Richard Nixon, together with many of the same issues. There is a continual fear that American power and prosperity are illusory, and that disaster is just around the corner. The sense transcends ideology. Environmentalists and Christian conservatives are both delivering the same message. Unless we repent of our ways, we will pay the price---and it may be too late already. It’s interesting to note that the nation that believes in its manifest destiny has not only a sense of impending disaster but a nagging feeling that the country simply isn’t what it used to be. We have a deep sense of nostalgia for the 1950s as a “simpler” time. This is quite a strange belief. With the Korean War and McCarthy at one end, Little Rock in the middle, and Sputnik and Berlin at the other end, and the very real threat of nuclear war throughout, the 1950s was actually a time of intense anxiety and foreboding. A widely read book published in the 1950s was entitled The Age of Anxiety. In the 1950s, they looked back nostalgically at an earlier America, just as we look back nostalgically at the 1950s. American culture is the manic combination of exultant hubris and profound gloom. The net result is a sense of conﬁdence constantly undermined by the fear that we may be drowned by melting ice caps caused by global warming or smitten dead by a wrathful God for gay marriage, both outcomes being our personal responsibility. American mood swings make it hard to develop a real sense of the United States at the beginning of the twentyﬁrst century. But the fact is that the United States is stunningly powerful. It may be that it is heading for a catastrophe, but it is hard to see one when you look at the basic facts. Let’s consider some illuminating ﬁgures. Americans constitute about 4 percent of the world’s population but produce about 26 percent of all goods and services. In 2007 U.S. gross domestic product was about $14 trillion, compared to the world’s GDP of $54 trillion---about 26 percent of the world’s economic activity takes place in the United States. The next largest economy in the world is Japan’s, with a GDP of about $4.4 trillion---about a third the size of ours. The American economy is so huge that it is larger than the economies of the next four countries combined: Japan, Germany, China, and the United Kingdom. Many people point at the declining auto and steel industries, which a generation ago were the mainstays of the American economy, as examples of a current deindustrialization of the United States. Certainly, a lot of industry has moved overseas. That has left the United States with industrial production of only $2.8 trillion (in 2006): the largest in the world, more than twice the size of the next largest industrial power, Japan, and larger than Japan’s and China’s industries combined. There is talk of oil shortages, which certainly seem to exist and will undoubtedly increase. However, it is important to realize that the United States produced 8.3 million barrels of oil every day in 2006. Compare that with 9.7 million for Russia and 10.7 million for Saudi Arabia. U.S. oil production is 85 percent that of Saudi Arabia. The United States produces more oil than Iran, Kuwait, or the United Arab Emirates. Imports of oil into the country are vast, but given its industrial production, that’s understandable. Comparing natural gas production in 2006, Russia was in ﬁrst place with 22.4 trillion cubic feet and the United States was second with 18.7 trillion cubic feet. U.S. natural gas production is greater than that of the next ﬁve producers combined. In other words, although there is great concern that the United States is wholly dependent on foreign energy, it is actually one of the world’s largest energy producers. Given the vast size of the American economy, it is interesting to note that the United States is still underpopulated by global standards. Measured in inhabitants per square kilometer, the world’s average population density is 49. Japan’s is 338, Germany’s is 230, and America’s is only 31. If we exclude Alaska, which is largely uninhabitable, U.S. population density rises to 34. Compared to Japan or Germany, or the rest of Europe, the United States is hugely underpopulated. Even when we simply compare population in proportion to arable land---land that is suitable for agriculture---America has five times as much land per person as Asia, almost twice as much as Europe, and three times as much as the global average. An economy consists of land, labor, and capital. In the case of the United States, these numbers show that the nation can still grow---it has plenty of room to increase all three. There are many answers to the question of why the U.S. economy is so powerful, but the simplest answer is military power. The United States completely dominates a continent that is invulnerable to invasion and occupation and in which its military overwhelms those of its neighbors. Virtually every other industrial power in the world has experienced devastating warfare in the twentieth century. The United States waged war, but America itself never experienced it. Military power and geographical reality created an economic reality. Other countries have lost time recovering from wars. The United States has not. It has actually grown because of them. Consider this simple fact that I’ll be returning to many times. The United States Navy controls all of the oceans of the world. Whether it’s a junk in the South China Sea, a dhow off the African coast, a tanker in the Persian Gulf, or a cabin cruiser in the Caribbean, every ship in the world moves under the eyes of American satellites in space and its movement is guaranteed---or denied---at will by the U.S. Navy. The combined naval force of the rest of the world doesn’t come close to equaling that of the U.S. Navy. This has never happened before in human history, even with Britain. There have been regionally dominant navies, but never one that was globallyand overwhelmingly dominant. This has meant that the United States could invade other countries---but never be invaded. It has meant that in the ﬁnal analysis the United States controls international trade. It has become the foundation of American security and American wealth. Control of the seas emerged after World War II, solidiﬁed during the ﬁnal phase of the European Age, and is now the ﬂip side of American economic power, the basis of its military power. Whatever passing problems exist for the United States, the most important factor in world affairs is the tremendous imbalance of economic, military, and political power. Any attempt to forecast the twenty- ﬁrst century that does not begin with the recognition of the extraordinary nature of American power is out of touch with reality. But I am making a broader, more unexpected claim, too: the United States is only at the beginning of its power. The twenty first century will be the American century.

### Ext – No Impact to decline

#### Heg is self-reinforcing and there’s no impact to decline.

Brooks and Wohlforth – 2 (Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, Both are Associate Professors in the Government Department at Dartmouth, “American Primacy in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs, July / August 2002)

PICK A MEASURE, ANY MEASURE TO UNDERSTAND just how dominant the United States is today, one needs to look at each of the standard components of national power in succession. In the military arena, the United States is poised to spend more on defense in 2003 than the next 15 -- 20 biggest spenders combined. The United States has overwhelming nuclear superiority, the world's dominant air force, the only truly blue-water navy, and a unique capability to project power around the globe. And its military advantage is even more apparent in quality than in quantity. The United States leads the world in exploiting the military applications of advanced communications and information technology and it has demonstrated an unrivaled ability to coordinate and process information about the battlefield and destroy targets from afar with extraordinary precision. Washington is not making it easy for others to catch up, moreover, given the massive gap in spending on military research and development (R&D), on which the United States spends three times more than the next six powers combined. Looked at another way, the United States currently spends more on military R&D than Germany or the United Kingdom spends on defense in total. No state in the modern history of international politics has come close to the military predominance these numbers suggest. And the United States purchases this preeminence with only 3.5 percent of its GDP. As historian Paul Kennedy notes, "being Number One at great cost is one thing; being the world's single superpower on the cheap is astonishing." America's economic dominance, meanwhile -- relative to either the next several richest powers or the rest of the world combined -- surpasses that of any great power in modern history, with the sole exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had temporarily laid waste every other major economy). The U.S. economy is currently twice as large as its closest rival, Japan. California's economy alone has risen to become the fifth largest in the world (using market exchange-rate estimates), ahead of France and just behind the United Kingdom. It is true that the long expansion of the 1990s has ebbed, but it would take an experience like Japan's in that decade -- that is, an extraordinarily deep and prolonged domestic recession juxtaposed with robust growth elsewhere -- for the United States just to fall back to the economic position it occupied in 1991. The odds against such relative decline are long, however, in part because the United States is the country in the best position to take advantage of globalization. Its status as the preferred destination for scientifically trained foreign workers solidified during the 1990s, and it is the most popular destination for foreign firms. In 1999 it attracted more than one-third of world inflows of foreign direct investment. U.S. military and economic dominance, finally, is rooted in the country's position as the world's leading technological power. Although measuring national R&D spending is increasingly difficult in an era in which so many economic activities cross borders, efforts to do so indicate America's continuing lead. Figures from the late 1990s showed that U.S. expenditures on R&D nearly equaled those of the next seven richest countries combined. Measuring the degree of American dominance in each category begins to place things in perspective. But what truly distinguishes the current international system is American dominance in **all of them simultaneously**. Previous leading states in the modern era were either great commercial and naval powers or great military powers on land, never both. The British Empire in its heyday and the United States during the Cold War, for example, each shared the world with other powers that matched or exceeded them in some areas. Following the Napoleonic Wars, the United Kingdom was clearly the world's leading commercial and naval power. But even at the height of the Pax Britannica, the United Kingdom was outspent, outmanned, and outgunned by both France and Russia. And its 24 percent share of GDP among the six leading powers in the early 1870s was matched by the United States, with Russia and Germany following close behind. Similarly, at the dawn of the Cold War the United States was clearly dominant economically as well as in air and naval capabilities. But the Soviet Union retained overall military parity, and thanks to geography and investment in land power it had a superior ability to seize territory in Eurasia. Today, in contrast, the United States has no rival in any critical dimension of power. There has never been a system of sovereign states that contained one state with this degree of dominance. The recent tendency to equate unipolarity with the ability to achieve desired outcomes single-handedly on all issues only reinforces this point; in no previous international system would it ever have occurred to anyone to apply such a yardstick. CAN IT LAST? MANY WHO ACKNOWLEDGE the extent of American power, however, regard it as necessarily self-negating. Other states traditionally band together to restrain potential hegemons, they say, and this time will be no different. As German political commentator Josef Joffe has put it, "the history books say that Mr. Big always invites his own demise. Nos. 2, 3, 4 will gang up on him, form countervailing alliances and plot his downfall. That happened to Napoleon, as it happened to Louis XIV and the mighty Hapsburgs, to Hitler and to Stalin. Power begets superior counterpower; it's the oldest rule of world politics." What such arguments fail to recognize are the features of America's post -- Cold War position that make it likely to buck the historical trend. Bounded by oceans to the east and west and weak, friendly powers to the north and south, the United States is both less vulnerable than previous aspiring hegemons and also less threatening to others. The main potential challengers to its unipolarity, meanwhile -- China, Russia, Japan, and Germany -- are in the opposite position. They cannot augment their military capabilities so as to balance the United States without simultaneously becoming an immediate threat to their neighbors. Politics, even international politics, is local. Although American power attracts a lot of attention globally, states are usually more concerned with their own neighborhoods than with the global equilibrium. Were any of the potential challengers to make a serious run at the United States, **regional balancing efforts would almost certainly** help **contain them**, as would the massive latent power capabilities of the United States, which could be mobilized as necessary to head off an emerging threat.

## Hegemony Bad – offense

### Hegemony bad 1nc

#### Heg doesn’t solve war – US lacks influence to deescalate conflicts

Mastanduno 2009 [Michael, Professor of Government at Dartmouth, World Politics 61, No. 1, Ebsco]

During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic, military, and other capabilities.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. U.S. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms, after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed. The United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.

#### hegemony is not sustainable

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and *Pax Americana,*”INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 2012, Wiley, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x/full, accessed 6-9-12.

Before the Great Recession’s foreshocks in fall 2007, most American security studies scholars believed that unipolarity—and perforce American hegemony—would be enduring features of international politics far into the future. However, in the Great Recession’s aftermath, it is apparent that much has changed since 2007. Predictions of continuing unipolarity have been superseded by premonitions of American decline and geopolitical transformation. The Great Recession has had a two-fold impact. First, it highlighted the shift of global wealth—and power—from West to East, a trend illustrated by China’s breathtakingly rapid rise to great power status. Second, it has raised doubts about the robustness of US primacy’s economic and financial underpinnings. This article argues that the unipolar moment is over, and the Pax Americana—the era of American ascendancy in international politics that began in 1945—is fast winding down. This article challenges the conventional wisdom among International Relations/Security Studies scholars on three counts. First, it shows that contrary to the claims of unipolar stability theorists, the distribution of power in the international system no longer is unipolar. Second, this article revisits the 1980s’ debate about American decline and demonstrates that the Great Recession has vindicated the so-called declinists of that decade. Finally, this article takes on the institutional lock-in argument, which holds that by strengthening the Pax Americana’s legacy institutions, the United States can perpetuate the essential elements of the international order it constructed following World War II even as the material foundations of American primacy erode.

#### Hegemony ensures U.S. involvement in overseas conflicts and nuclear war – withdrawal prevents automatic deployment to honor alliances.

Layne 2006 [Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “The Peace of Illusions” p 169]

Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America’s alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example a non—great power war on the Korean Peninsula—even if nuclear weapon were not involved—would be very costly. The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing strategy would extricate the United States from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments.

#### Three – regionalization

#### a. Decline spurs it, more stable than dominance

Leon T. Hadar, Cato Institute, "Welcome to the Post-Unipolar World: Great for the U.S. and for the Rest," HUFFINGTON POST, 7--8--10, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11967>

Moreover, in the context of the evolving international system under which America is gradually losing its post-Cold War unipolar status, trying to reset U.S. relationship with Russia as part of an overall policy to improve ties with other rising global players, like China, India, Brazil and Turkey makes a lot of sense. This is a cost-effective strategy that could help Washington win support from Russia for policies that actually strengthen U.S. national security and economic interests. At the same time, the fact that Georgia is also improving its ties with Iran and Turkey — and Russia — should not be considered a "loss" for Washington. By establishing close economic ties with Iran and Turkey, Georgia is helping facilitate economic cooperation in the region that could lead to diplomatic collaboration and provide for more stability in the Caucasus and the Middle East. Why should Washington be opposed to such a process that brings more economic prosperity and secure a regional stable balance of power? Georgia may or may not regain control of its lost territories, not unlike, say, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, etc., who seemed to have been able to cope with their territorial contraction. But the U.S. does not have the strategic interest or the moral obligation to change the new status quo, or for that matter, to invite Georgia to join NATO — remind me again why that organization still exists? — and commit American military power to provide that country with what would amount to disincentives for improving its relations with its close neighbors. In a way, the collapse of the American-controlled unipolar system — and before that, the end of the bipolar system of the Cold War — should help us recognize that international relations have ceased to be a zero-sum-game under which gains of other global powers become by definition a loss for America, and vice versa. It was inevitable that former members of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc like Ukraine, Poland, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia will try to stabilize their diplomatic and economic ties with Russia, while at the same time deterring powerful Russia by expanding cooperation with other players: Poland with Ukraine with Germany; Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia with Turkey and Iran, and all of these countries with the U.S and the European Union (EU). Similarly, Washington should welcome — not discourage — the growing diplomatic and economic role that Turkey is playing in the Middle East, which could help bring stability to Iraq (and allow for American military to start withdrawing from there), moderate the policies of Iran (and prevent a military conflict with the U.S.), encourage negotiations between Israel and Syria, and lead eventually to the creation of a more stable Middle East where Turkey, Iran, the Arabs states and Israel will be more secure and prosperous. It is not surprising those representatives of economic and bureaucratic interests in Washington, and some of America's client states that draw benefits from American interventionist policy, operate under the axiom that the U.S. should always be prepared to "do something" to "resolve" this or that conflict, here, there, and everywhere. That kind of never-ending American interventionism only discourages regional powers, counting on Washington to come to their aid, from actually taking steps to resolve those conflicts that end-up drawing-in other regional and global players, ensuring that America will never leave Japan and Korea (to help contain China), Iraq (to deter Iran), Afghanistan (to deal with Pakistan). And that is exactly what the pro-interventionists in Washington want when they suggested that America is the "indispensable power." In any case, the notion that American hegemony is a precondition for global peace and security and that Washington needs therefore to extend its military commitments in Europe, the Middle East, Caucus, East Asia and elsewhere is not very practical — America does not have the resources in order to play that ambitious role — and is not very helpful, considering the most recent U.S. experience in the Middle East. The U.S. should not retreat from the world. But by embracing a policy of "constructive disengagement" from some parts of the world, America could help itself and the rest of the world.

#### b. Solves terror, war, climate change

Krishnan Srinivasan, "International Conflict and Cooperation in the 21st Century," THE ROUND TABLE v. 98 n. 400, 2--09, pp. 37-47.

The new world order of the ﬁrst half of the present century will be one of peaceful mutual accommodation between the big powers located in the East and West, North and South. The priority for these powers will be for economic progress and regional order, with defence expenditure being used to build technological capacity for deterrence against the other big powers and as an enabler for their self-appointed but globally recognized role as regional enforcers. In this neo-Hobbesian world system, the lesser states will come to their own bilateral arrangements with the local regional hegemon upon whom they will be dependent not only for their security but for economic, technical and trading facilitation. Some of these lesser entities will enjoy economic prosperity, depending on their ability to maintain internal cohesion, to turn globalization to their advantage, and to control the socio-economic consequences of climate change, but they will not be able to mount a challenge to the hierarchical nature of international society. They will have far greater recourse to the United Nations than the major powers, who will prefer to apply unilateral methods with the connivance and consent of their peers. The debate between Westphalian national sovereignty and the right to intervene to breach the sovereignty of other states on the grounds of preventing threats to international peace and security will not be resolved. Political and economic inequality between nations will be drawn in ever sharper focus. Regional institutions will be dominated by the local big power. Reform of the United Nations will be incomplete and unappealing to the vast majority of member states. The world’s hegemonic powers will lose faith in the Security Council as an effective mechanism to deliberate issues of peace and security. World bodies will be used for discussion of global issues such as the environment and climate change, pandemic disease, energy and food supplies, and development, but resulting action will primarily devolve on the big powers in the affected regions. This will particularly be the case in the realm of peace and security in which only the regional hegemon will have the means, the will and the obligation, for the sake of its own status and security, to ensure resolution or retribution as each case may demand. Even in a globalized world, regional and local action will be the prime necessity and such action will be left to the power best equipped to understand the particular circumstances, select the appropriate remedy and execute the action required to administer it. Conﬂict will be contained and localized. There will be no menace of war on a world-wide scale and little fear of international terrorism. Private-enterprise terrorist actions will continue to manifest political, social and economic frustrations, but they will be parochial, ineffective and not state-sponsored. There will be far less invocation of human rights in international politics, since these will be identiﬁed with a western agenda and western civilization: there will be an equal recognition of community rights and societal values associated with Eastern and other traditions. Chinese artists, Indian entrepreneurs, Russian actors, Iranian chefs, South African song-writers and Brazilian designers will be household names; models on the fashion cat-walk and sporting teams from all major countries will be distinctly multi-racial, reﬂecting the immigration to, but also the purchasing power of, the new major powers. National populations will show evidence of mixed race more than ever before in history. Climate change will be an acknowledged global challenge and all countries, led by the regional hegemons, will undertake binding restraints on carbon emissions. The world will become acutely conscious of the essentiality of access to fresh water. The pace of technological innovation will accelerate at dizzying speed, further accentuating inequalities. There will be very rapid steps taken to develop alternative sources of energy in the face of dwindling and costly oil supplies. Western industrialized nations, to remain competitive, will vacate vast areas of traditional manufacturing in favour of new technologies and green engineering. The world will be a safer and stable place until one of the hegemons eventually develops an obvious ascendancy ﬁrst regionally, then continentally and ﬁnally globally over all the others.

#### c. warming causes Extinction

Ronnie Cummins and Will Allen, Organic Consumers Association, "Climate Catastrophe: Surviving the 21st Century," 2--14--10, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/02/14-6

The hour is late. Leading climate scientists such as James Hansen are literally shouting at the top of their lungs that the world needs to reduce emissions by 20-40% as soon as possible, and 80-90% by the year 2050, if we are to avoid climate chaos, crop failures, endless wars, melting of the polar icecaps, and a disastrous rise in ocean levels. Either we radically reduce CO2 and carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e, which includes all GHGs, not just CO2) pollutants (currently at 390 parts per million and rising 2 ppm per year) to 350 ppm, including agriculture-derived methane and nitrous oxide pollution, or else survival for the present and future generations is in jeopardy. As scientists warned at Copenhagen, business as usual and a corresponding 7-8.6 degree Fahrenheit rise in global temperatures means that the carrying capacity of the Earth in 2100 will be reduced to one billion people. Under this hellish scenario,billions will die of thirst, cold, heat, disease, war, and starvation

#### Four – transition

#### A. Vital to stability

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “The Global Power Shift from West to East,” THE NATIONAL INTERST, May/June 2012, p. 31.

During the next two decades, the United States will face some difficult choices between bad outcomes and worse ones. But such decisions could determine whether America will manage a graceful decline that conserves as much power and global stability as possible. A more ominous possibility is a precipitous power collapse that reduces U.S. global influence dramatically. In any event, Americans will have to adjust to the new order, accepting the loss of some elements of national life they had taken for granted. In an age of austerity, national resources will be limited, and competition for them will be intense. If the country wants to do more at home, it will have to do less abroad. It may have to choose between attempting to preserve American hegemony or repairing the U.S. economy and maintaining the country’s social safety net. The constellation of world power is changing, and U.S. grand strategy will have to change with it. American elites must come to grips with the fact that the West does not enjoy a predestined supremacy in international politics that is locked into the future for an indeterminate period of time. The Euro-Atlantic world had a long run of global dominance, but it is coming to an end. The future is more likely to be shaped by the East. At the same time, Pax Americana also is winding down. The United States can manage this relative decline effectively over the next couple of decades only if it first acknowledges the fundamental reality of decline. The problem is that many Americans, particularly among the elites, have embraced the notion of American exceptionalism with such fervor that they can’t discern the world transformation occurring before their eyes.

#### B. Key to multipolarity

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, THE PEACE OF ILLUSIONS: AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY FROM 1940 TO PRESENT, 2006, p. 158.

At the same time, it doubtless is true that it will take some time for others’ balancing efforts to realize their intended outcome. Although the United States, contrary’ to my 1993 prediction, probably will not he challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010, it is even more doubtful that U.S. hegemony will endure until the early 2030s. Is it worthwhile paying the price to hang onto unipolarity for, at best, another two decades? Given that American hegemony’ is destined to end sooner rather than later and that the costs of trying to “shape the international system” to America’s liking will rise (even as the benefits of doing so diminish), it would make more sense grand strategically for the United States to retrench and husband its resources for the long haul. The United States can do this by adopting an offshore balancing grand strategy.

#### C. Prevents extended deterrence breakdowns and nuclear war

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, THE PEACE OF ILLUSIONS: AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY FROM 1940 TO PRESENT, 2006, p. 169.

Proponents of U.S. hegemony like to say that America’s military commitments in Eurasia are an insurance policy against the purportedly damaging consequences of a Eurasian great power war by preventing it from happening in the first place or limiting its harmful effects if it does happen. This is a dubious analogy, because insurance policies neither prevent, nor limit, damage to policyholders. Rather, they compensate the policyholder for damage incurred. Even on its own terms, however, the insurance policy argument is not persuasive. Both Californians and Floridians know that some types of insurance are either unaffordable or unobtainable at any price. The chances of the “Big One”—a catastrophic earthquake on the San Andreas Fault—jolting Los Angeles or San Francisco, or a Force 5 hurricane making a direct hit on Miami, are small. But if either were to happen the consequences could be catastrophic, which is why insurance companies don’t want to offer earthquake and hurricane insurance. Prospective great power wars in Eurasia represent a similar dynamic: the risk of such a war breaking out may be low, but if it does it could be prohibitively expensive for the United States to be involved. Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America’s alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example, a non—great power war on the Korean Peninsula—even if nuclear weapons were not involved—would be very costly. The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the United States from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments.

#### American withdrawal would be coupled with cooperation with new regional powers – this makes the transition smooth

Kupchan 2003 [Charles A., Political Science Quarterly, Summer, Vol. 118, Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier]

As this new century progresses, unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. As this transition proceeds, American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U.S. power, while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. The ultimate vision that should guide U.S. grand strategy is the construction of a concert-like directorate of the major powers in North America, Europe, and East Asia. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism, a struggle that will require patience and steady cooperation among many different nations. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade, information, and values. Strong and vibrant regional centers, for reasons of both proximity and culture, often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. North America might, therefore, focus on Latin America; Europe on Russia, the Middle East, and Africa; and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Neither American leaders, long accustomed to calling the shots, nor leaders in Europe and East Asia, long accustomed to passing the buck, will find the transition an easy one. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. It will take a decade, if not two, for a new international system to evolve. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past.[\*]

#### Their impact is silly – U.S. engagement actually increases the likelihood of war in Asia and Europe – these areas can easily secure themselves.

Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press (doctoral candidates in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Harvey M. Sapolsky (Professor of Public Policy and Organization in the Department of Political Science at M.I.T. and Director of the M.I.T. Defense and Arms Control Studies (DACS) Program Spring 1997 “come home America – the strategy of restraint in the face of temptation” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4

The selective engagers’ strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the effect of U.S. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today’s world, disengagement will not cause great power war, and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. In some circumstances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers overstate America’s effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. presence, America’s major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model. The danger of spirals leading to war in East Asia is remote. Spirals happen when states, seeking security, frighten their neighbors. The risk of spirals is great when offense is easier than defense, because any country’s attempt to achieve security will give it an offensive capability against its neighbors. The neighbors’ attempts to eliminate the vulnerability give them fleeting offensive capabilities and tempt them to launch preventive war.71 But Asia, as discussed earlier, is blessed with inherent defensive advantages. Japan and Taiwan are islands, which makes them very difficult to invade. China has a long land border with Russia, but enjoys the protection of the East China Sea, which stands between it and Japan. The expanse of Siberia gives Russia, its ever- trusted ally, strategic depth. South Korea benefits from mountainous terrain which would channel an attacking force from the north. Offense is difficult in East Asia, so spirals should not be acute. In fact, no other region in which great powers interact offers more defensive advantage than East Asia. The prospect for spirals is greater in Europe, but continued U.S. engagement does not reduce that danger; rather, it exacerbates the risk. A West European military union, controlling more than 21 percent of the world’s GDP, may worry Russia. But NATO, with 44 percent of the world’s GDP, is far more threatening, especially if it expands eastward. The more NATO frightens Russia, the more likely it is that Russia will turn dangerously nationalist, redirect its economy toward the military, and try to re-absorb its old buffer states.72 But if the U.S. military were to withdraw from Europe, even Germany, Europe’s strongest advocate for NATO expansion, might become less enthusiastic, because it would be German rather than American troops standing guard on the new borders.

#### Potential to redeploy solves all of their offense.

Walt 2005 [Stephen, prof of international relations @ Harvard U, February/March, http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.php]

The final option is offshore balancing, which has been America’s traditional grand strategy. In this strategy, the United States deploys its power abroad only when there are direct threats to vital American interests. Offshore balancing assumes that only a few areas of the globe are of strategic importance to the United States (that is, worth fighting and dying for). Specifically, the vital areas are the regions where there are substantial concentrations of power and wealth or critical natural resources: Europe, industrialized Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Offshore balancing further recognizes that the United States does not need to control these areas directly; it merely needs to ensure that they do not fall under the control of a hostile great power and especially not under the control of a so-called peer competitor. To prevent rival great powers from doing this, offshore balancing prefers to rely primarily on local actors to uphold the regional balance of power. Under this strategy, the United States would intervene with its own forces only when regional powers are unable to uphold the balance of power on their own. Most importantly, offshore balancing is not isolationist. The United States would still be actively engaged around the world, through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the WTO and through close ties with specific regional allies. But it would no longer keep large numbers of troops overseas solely for the purpose of “maintaining stability,” and it would not try to use American military power to impose democracy on other countries or disarm potential proliferators. Offshore balancing does not preclude using power for humanitarian ends—to halt or prevent genocide or mass murder—but the United States would do so only when it was confident it could prevent these horrors at an acceptable cost. (By limiting military commitments overseas, however, an offshore-balancing strategy would make it easier for the United States to intervene in cases of mass murder or genocide.) The United States would still be prepared to use force when it was directly threatened—as it was when the Taliban allowed al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan—and would be prepared to help other governments deal with terrorists that also threaten the United States. Over time, a strategy of offshore balancing would make it less likely that the United States would face the hatred of radicals like bin Laden, and would thus make it less likely that the United States would have to intervene in far-flung places where it is not welcome. Offshore balancing is the ideal grand strategy for an era of American primacy. It husbands the power upon which this primacy rests and minimizes the fear that this power provokes. By setting clear priorities and emphasizing reliance on regional allies, it reduces the danger of being drawn into unnecessary conflicts and encourages other states to do more for us. Equally important, it takes advantage of America’s favorable geopolitical position and exploits the tendency for regional powers to worry more about each other than about the United States. But it is not a passive strategy and does not preclude using the full range of America’s power to advance its core interests.

### Ext – no sustainable

#### A rapid decline is inevitable—the fallout of the Great recession, enormous budget deficits, coming entitlement crash, and a decline in soft power ensure that the U.S. dominance strategy is doomed to fail in the short-term--that's Layne. Our evidence is newer, better qualified, and cites the most recent trends

#### Means all their offense is non unique—question is whether we can transition soon enough to avoid great power war

#### And, economic factors prove

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “The Global Power Shift from West to East,” THE NATIONAL INTERST, May/June 2012, p. 27-28.

Indeed, looking forward a decade, the two biggest domestic threats to U.S. power are the country’s bleak fiscal outlook and deepening doubts about the dollar’s future role as the international economy’s reserve currency. Economists regard a 100 percent debt-to-gdp ratio as a flashing warning light that a country is at risk of defaulting on its financial obligations. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (cbo) has warned that the U.S. debt-to-gdp ratio could exceed that level by 2020—and swell to 190 percent by 2035. Worse, the CBO recently warned of the possibility of a “sudden credit event” triggered by foreign investors’ loss of confidence in U.S. fiscal probity. In such an event, foreign investors could reduce their purchases of Treasury bonds, which would force the United States to borrow at higher interest rates. This, in turn, would drive up the national debt even more. America’s geopolitical preeminence hinges on the dollar’s role as reserve currency. If the dollar loses that status, U.S. primacy would be literally unaffordable. There are reasons to be concerned about the dollar’s fate over the next two decades. U.S. political gridlock casts doubt on the nation’s ability to address its fiscal woes; China is beginning to internationalize the renminbi, thus laying the foundation for it to challenge the dollar in the future; and history suggests that the dominant international currency is that of the nation with the largest economy. (In his piece on the global financial structure in this issue, Christopher Whalen offers a contending perspective, acknowledging the dangers posed to the dollar as reserve currency but suggesting such a change in the dollar’s status is remote in the current global environment.)

### Ext – Regionalism

#### U.S. decline is good because it spurs regional powers in places like the Middle East to abandon free riding on U.S. power and fend for themselves. These new states will engage in self-help initiatives that will build stable regional balances of power and will solve their own problems while the U.S. adopts an over-the-horizon balancing posture—this only happens in a world of decline—that’s Hadar

#### And, regionalization is good—these new structures and coalitions are vital to motivating staes to take collective action to solve terror, war, and climate change. This turns the aff, and solves the most certain extinction impact, from warming—that’s Srinivasa and Cummins

#### And, more ev—decline key to global energy diffusion

Michael Levi, Senior Fellow, Energy and Envirronment et al., "Globalizing the Energy Revolution," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, November/December 2010, ASP.

The success of other nations in clean energy does not imply U.S. failure. The United States can benefit greatly from clean-energy innovation around the world, so long as it also pursues its own robust efforts at home. Each major economy has its own natural advantages when it comes to energy technology innovation and development. An enlightened U.S. strategy should aim to create a global innovation environment that weaves together those distinct strengths in pursuit of common energygoals. Not everyone will like every part of the package. Some U.S. firms will chafe at efforts that might help competitors in the developing world. Some emerging economies will resist opening up their markets to those same U.S. firms. Only by enlarging clean-energy markets can everyone enjoy a bigger piece of the pie. The alternative is not a world in which the United States dominates the clean-energy field alone, or even one in which another country solves the United States' problems for it. It is more likely to be one in which the cost of clean energy does not drop as quickly as needed, particularly in the developing world, and in which massive markets for clean-energy technologies do not materialize. In that case, the United States and the world will both lose.

#### Terrorism leads to global nuke war

Dennis Ray Morgan, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea [Futures](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/science/journal/00163287), [Volume 41, Issue 10](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235805%232009%23999589989%231515128%23FLA%23&_cdi=5805&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000014438&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=209690&md5=7eaadd08919055b45011bba80bf06023), December 2009, Pages 683-693, World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question ‘‘Is Nuclear War Inevitable??’’ [10].4 In Section 1, Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian ‘‘dead hand’’ system, ‘‘where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,’’ it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States’’ [10]. Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal ‘‘Samson option’’ against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even ‘‘anti-Semitic’’ European cities [10]. In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well.

#### Prefer our evidence – their authors assume worst-case scenarions to justify US intervention

Edward Olsen, Professor, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, U.S. NATIONAL DEFENSE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE GRAND EXIST STRATEGY, 2002, p. 114-115.

As Ted Galen Carpenter suggested in 1992 during this formative phase of post-Cold War US defense policy re-evaluation, the United States was indeed ‘in search of enemies’.11 And – no surprise – it found what it wanted by redefining the global terms of reference of the former Cold War to emphasize the importance of stability, humanitarian intervention, multilateralism, remaining pockets of the Cold War (i.e. Korea), potential new Cold War opponents (i.e. China), shifting added emphasis to long standing transnational threats (such as drug trafficking, weapons proliferation, terrorism, and the environment) and inventing new threat categories of the high-tech variety. This was begun under President Bush and expanded under President Clinton where it became increasingly globalist by nature. By the end of the 1990s, ex-President Bust seemed relieved to be able to affirm that ‘We have plenty of enemies. Our enemies abound’. Importantly, he made these remarks to an intelligence community audeience, reassuring them that their jobs were still essential, on the occasion of the renaming of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) headquarters as the George Bush Center for Intelligence.12

### Ext – transition

#### NEXT, the transition debate

#### Sooner is better, for multiple reasons outlined in our Layne 12 and Layne 06 ev

#### A) preserves us power-- by conserving power now, we can succeed under multipolarity

#### B) waiting guarantees your scenarios-- emergent powers coupled with degraded american power means the us will fight the wars your evidence says we can avoid. Only a quick transition solves this.

#### And, maintaining heg creates their scenarios

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 31 n. 2, 2006, ASP.

The United States enjoys no privileged exemption from the fate of past hegemons. American primacists conflate balancing (a grand strategy pursued by individual states) with the attainment of balance in the international system (a more or less equal distribution of power among the great powers). That others' balancing efforts have not yet produced a balance of power does not mean they are not trying to offset U.S. hegemony, although these balancing efforts will require time to bear fruit. Thus, contrary to my 1993 prediction, the United States probably will not be challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010. Yet, it also is doubtful that U.S. hegemony will endure until 2030, as Wohlforth predicted in 1999. The key question facing American strategists, therefore, is: Should the United States cling to unipolarity for, at best, another two decades? Or should it abandon its hegemonic grand strategy for a less ambitious one of offshore balancing? There are two versions of offshore balancing from which the United States can choose: multilateral or unilateral. 125 As a multilateral offshore balancer, the United States would act both to "reassure its allies that it will use force with wisdom and restraint" and to "reduce the fear created by its superior power by giving other states a voice in the circumstances in which it will use force." 126 Multilateral offshore balancing is problematic for four reasons. First, it is internally inconsistent, because its twin goals of preserving U.S. primacy while persuading others that they need not fear U.S. power do not mesh. 127 Second, the idea that the United States should exercise its power in concert with others runs counter to the fundamental realities of international politics. 128 Third, even if the United States could reassure its allies that it will use [End Page 39]its power wisely, its ability to reassure potential adversaries such as China and Russia remains doubtful. Finally, multilateral offshore balancing can fairly be viewed as a backdoor strategy for preserving U.S. hegemony, rather than as a policy of restraint. 129 At bottom, multilateral offshore balancing does not address the United States' "hegemony problem," which is not caused by U.S. unilateralism. The real problem is that too often the United States acts unwisely (or, as in the case of Iraq, foolishly)—something it just as easily can do multilaterally as unilaterally. Although some analysts blame the George W. Bush administration for the United States' hegemony problem, the facts suggest otherwise. Concerns about unchecked U.S. power in a unipolar world first were voiced almost simultaneously with the Soviet Union's collapse. And it was during the Clinton administration that U.S. officials first acknowledged in so many words that America had a hegemony problem. The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. To reduce the fear of U.S. power, the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational, deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. 131 Thus, to reduce others' concerns about its power, the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). An America [End Page 40]that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America's next grand strategy.

#### Holding on only makes things risk—ensures rise of other powers is hostile

Chas W. Freeman, former Ambassador, career diplomat, "The United States, China, and the New Global Geometry," Middle East Policy Council, 11--10--10, http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/speeches/united-states-china-and-new-global-geometry?print

In the post-Cold War era of today, however, the United States has yet to outline any principles, articulate any vision, or formulate any strategy for the reform of international institutions and practices, fiscal and monetary adjustments, or the maintenance of a peaceful international environment. So far, America has cast itself as the military defender of vested interests in a crumbling status quo. It has not sought to craft a new strategic order or a more effective international system. For many reasons, some of the most important of which I have mentioned, I do not believe the current — mainly military — American response to change can either succeed or be sustained. In this context, it matters greatly whether the United States and China recognize the imperative to work together to rebuild mechanisms for global decision-making and to reforge a rule-bound global order. Both countries have a major stake in effective global governance, constraints on unilateral action, the coordination of policies to promote worldwide prosperity, and a stable and predictable international economic order. We will be greatly affected by the decisions that other key international actors make. Our actions and our interaction will influence how Europe, India, Japan, Russia, and many other countries and communities orient themselves not just with respect to us but with respect to each other. To one degree or another, whether we cooperate or contend with each other will help to shape the transitions underway in places as far apart as Afghanistan (where our interests clearly converge), Cuba (where the era of the Castro brothers is drawing to a close), or Korea (where sudden change could come at any time). It is in our mutual interest and that of the world that the United States and China cooperate, but this will not be easy for either of us. For Americans, it will require setting aside the vain effort to perpetuate the global military hegemony that the collapse of the Soviet Union conferred on us. This effort makes the global distribution of power into a zero-sum game, turning the rise of other powers, even in remote regions, into a perceived threat to American dominance that must be countered by additions to U.S. military power. The pursuit of such dominance sends a message of suspicion and hostility to newly wealthy and powerful countries like China. It inclines them to focus on how to frustrate and deter America rather than how to work with it. Dominance of this kind is also unaffordable. So the pursuit of it will sooner or later be abandoned. That will help. For China, cooperating with the United States will require a level of activism, imagination, and diplomatic leadership that contrasts with a Chinese foreign policy tradition of passivity, reticence, and risk aversion. It would help greatly if China could reduce its neighbors’ fears of its future power by settling its maritime boundary disputes as skillfully as it has settled its land frontiers in inner Asia. The United States is not a party to these maritime disputes but its relationships with allies and friends in the region mean that, in practice, it cannot avoid being implicated in them. Finally, for both Americans and Chinese, building a more cooperative relationship will require a measure of humility, rhetorical self-restraint, and caution that have not recently been much in evidence in either country’s foreign policies. This would facilitate mutually considerate strategic dialogue between us. Without such dialogue, we will be unable to respond effectively to the challenges of rapidly evolving global and regional environments. We owe it to ourselves and to our posterity to try harder to work together to advance the many strategic interests we have in common.

#### Grasping at dominance only risks massive wars and terrorism, inevitably fails

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, THE PEACE OF ILLUSIONS: AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY FROM 1940 TO PRESENT, 2006, p. 191-192.

Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing, and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to prolong it. At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America’s Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to multipolaritv. In this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America’s military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars. The events of 9/11 are another example of how hegemony makes the United States less secure than it would he if it followed an offshore balancing strategy. Terrorism, the RAND Corporation terrorism expert Bruce Hoff- man says, is “about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and use of power to achieve political change~.” If we step hack for a moment from our horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their political objectives.87 As Clausewitz observed, “War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object.”88 September 111 represented a violent counter reaction to America’s geopolitical—and cultural—hegemony. As the strategy expert Richard K. Betts presciently observed in a 1998 Foreign Affairs article: It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of an eternal assault on Islam. U.S. hegemony fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamentalism, which is a form of “blowback” against America’s preponderance and its world role.9°As long as the United States maintains its global hegemony—and its concomitant preeminence in regions like the Persian Gulf—it will he the target of politically motivated terrorist groups like al Qaeda. After 9/li, many foreign policy analysts and pundits asked the question, “Why do they hate us?” This question missed the key point. No doubt, there are Islamic fundamentalists who do “hate” the United States for cultural, religious, and ideological reasons. And even leaving aside American neoconservatives’ obvious relish for making it so, to some extent the war on terror inescapably has overtones of a “clash of civilizations.” Still, this isn’t—and should not be allowed to become a replay of the Crusades. Fundamentally 9/11 was about geopolitics, specifically about U.S. hegemony. The United States may be greatly reviled in some quarters of the Islamic world, but were the United States not so intimately involved in the affairs of the Middle East, it’s hardly likely that this detestation would have manifested itself in something like 9/11. As Michael Scheurer, who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, puts it, “One of the greatest dangers for Americans in deciding how to confront the Islamist threat lies in continuing to believe—at the urging of senior U.S. leaders—that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think, rather than for what we do.”91 It is American policies—to be precise, American hegemony—that make the United States a lightning rod for Muslim anger. Hegemony has proven to be an elusive goal for the great powers that have sought it. The European great powers that bid for hegemony did so because they were on a geopolitical treadmill. For them, it seemed as if security was attainable only by ~eliminating their great power rivals and achieving continental hegemony. And it is this fact that invested great power politics with its tragic quality, because the international system’s power-balancing dynamics doomed all such bids to failure. The United States, on the other hand, has never faced similar pressures to seek security through a hegemonic grand strategy, and, too often, instead of enhancing U.S. security as advertised, America’s hegemonic grand strategy has made the United States less secure. In the early twenty-first century, by threatening to embroil the United States in military showdowns with nuclear great powers and exposing the United States to terrorism, the pursuit of hegemony means that “over there” well may become over here. Objectively, the United States historically has enjoyed an extraordinarily high degree of immunity from external threat, a condition that has had nothing to do with whether it is hegemonic and everything to do with geography and its military capabilities. Consequently, the United States has, should it wish to use it, an exit ramp—offshore balancing—that would allow it to escape from the tragedy of great power politics that befalls those that seek hegemony. The failure of the United States to take this exit ramp constitutes the real tragedy of American diplomacy.

### Ext – redeploy solves

#### Multiple solutions fill-in for U.S. leadership – regional cooperation, spheres of influence, and balance of power arrangements.

Barbara Conry (foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute) 2/5/1997 "U.S. "Global Leadership": A Euphemism for World Policeman" CATO INSTITUTE http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=1126

A more critical issue is the evolution of the international system after U.S. hegemony. Washington can exert considerable influence (though not full control) over the development of that system. Although a number of different scenarios may be acceptable to the United States, Washington should make certain that any global system that succeeds American hegemony has two important characteristics. First, international power and responsibility must be decentralized; the transfer of U.S. global influence and responsibilities to another state, alliance, or global organization such as the United Nations should not be permitted. It is as unrealistic to base the international system on the illusion that some other country or international organization can effectively lead the world as it is to depend on U.S. global leadership. Second, the international system must include a means of checking aspiring hegemons. Regional Security Organizations Such a system could take several forms. One possibility is the strengthening of regional security organizations, such as the Western European Union. Regional security organizations are an effective way of keeping order among member states and can also take care of contingencies in their general areas. Had the European countries not been so dependent on NATO, for example, the WEU should have been able to subdue the crisis in the former Yugoslavia if the conflict had been perceived as a wider threat to Europe. Regional organizations could also serve as potential partners to the United States in the event of a serious threat to their mutual interests elsewhere in the world. Unfortunately, regional security organizations require a high degree of cohesion among member states and therefore are not possible in many parts of the world. The WEU is probably the only such organization that is viable in the near future, although effective regional security organizations encompassing some Latin American and Asian countries are not inconceivable. In much of the rest of the world, however, there is little evidence of the cohesion and common interest that would be a precondition for a functioning regional security organization. Spheres of Influence An alternative to regional security organizations is the creation of spheres of influence. The notion of spheres of influence has in the past carried a rather sinister connotation and could still be troublesome if a dominant regional power sought to subvert its neighbors, especially if it subsequently aspired to challenge other major powers. But as long as dominant powers restrict their activities to typical "great power" behavior--which would generally mean shoring up security and prestige but not expansionism--there is nothing inherently evil about spheres of influence. Several prominent foreign policy scholars have pointed out the feasibility of spheres of influence. Ronald Steel of the University of Southern California has written, Regional disturbances that do not threaten the world power balance should be dealt with by the major powers of the region, ideally with the endorsement of the international community. Instead of seeking an ephemeral global security, we should, as Charles William Maynes has argued in Foreign Policy, encourage a policy of "regional self-reliance [that] would recognize that certain powerful states in each area will inevitably play a special security role." In other words, we must accept the reality of the longstanding tradition of spheres of influence--a tradition that we scrupulously insist upon in the Western Hemisphere under our unilaterally imposed Monroe Doctrine. [61] Spheres of influence make sense because the world's major powers have an interest in, and usually the ability to maintain a degree of order in, their regions. There is always some risk that the leading power in a particular sphere of influence may abuse its position or develop expansionist ambitions. The decentralization of international power, however, should ensure that the United States, other major powers, or regional security organizations--acting alone or in concert--could check unacceptable behavior on the part of a dominant regional power. Balance of Power Yet another alternative is the establishment of regional balance-of-power arrangements, which may be appropriate in the Middle East, for example. There are serious obstacles to the creation of a viable regional security organization in that area--as demonstrated by the problems the Gulf Cooperation Council has faced--and there is no clear dominant power around which a sphere of influence is likely to develop. Instead, the locus of power tends to shift among the larger states. The United States has in the past sought to manipulate the balance of power by bolstering certain countries as a means of checking others. That risky strategy had disastrous consequences with respect to Iran and Iraq, and, given the unpopularity of the regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and those regimes' close identification with Washington, it may well backfire again. Allowing the balance of power in the region to evolve without U.S. interference would help shield the United States from the consequences of violent and sudden shifts in the balance but could still be expected to prevent a regional hegemon from rising. As University of Chicago political scientist Stephen M. Walt pointed out in The Origins of Alliances, Compared with the other hypotheses examined in this book, the general hypothesis that states choose allies in order to balance against the most serious threat was the clear winner. Its merits were shown in two important ways. First, balancing was far more common than bandwagoning, and bandwagoning was almost always confined to especially weak and isolated states. Second, the importance of ideological distinction declined as the level of threat increased; ideological solidarity was most powerful when security was high or when ideological factors and security considerations reinforced each other. [62] The tendency of states to balance against a prospective hegemon, instead of "bandwagoning," has been evident in the Middle East. As Walt observed, "Despite the fact that the Middle East lacks an established tradition of balance of power statecraft . . . , the advantages of seeking allies in order to balance against threats have obviously been apparent to the various actors in the Middle East. . . . the ascendancy of ambitious regional powers (such as Iraq under Nuri al-Said and Egypt under Nasser) consistently led other regional actors to join forces . . . to resist the attempt." [63] The strategic environment of the Middle East of the 1990s remains conducive to balancing, as an assortment of similarly sized powers--Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran--continue to share an interest in preventing the rise of any single power to primacy. The United States may have to tolerate a degree of instability as power shifts among those states, but American vital interests should be reasonably safe as long as power remains diffused throughout the region. If a hegemon were to arise, especially if it were clearly hostile to U.S. interests, the United States would still have the option of acting alone or joining forces with European and other powers to deal with that problem.

### Ext – multipolarity coming

#### Multipolarity is inevitable in a world of either American hegemony or withdrawal – engagement fosters a violent war-filled transition.

Layne 2006 [Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “The Peace of Illusions” p 190]

Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing, and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to prolong it. At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America’s Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. In this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America’s military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars.

## Adventurism turn

### Adventurism 1nc

#### Military power isn’t key to hegemony – multipolarity is inevitable as the US loses cultural hegemony. The plan’s boost of hard power only spurs adventurism, undermining overall American power

Allenby, 05 (Brad Allenby, Professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and the College of Law at Arizona State University. “High Technology Military Dominance: The Opiate of Modern Empire” November 2005. <http://www.cspo.org/ourlibrary/perspectives/Allenby_November2005.htm>)

The general public perception that national power is predominantly a matter of military capability has long been recognized as oversimplistic and naïve. While different conditions will result in specific and somewhat unpredictable responses from the nation-states involved, it is nonetheless possible to identify five foundational sources of modern hegemonic power: economic, scientific and technological, military, institutional, and cultural. Economic power, for example, propelled Japan into the first rank of powers despite its relative military weakness, while institutional weaknesses in its political structure have contributed significantly to its drift over the past decade. The European Union retains its dominant international position despite a relatively unimpressive economy and military in part because its institutions reflect a resilient and open social-democratic political framework and its culture is widely admired. China’s rise reflects an economic boom, and those who predict its demise do so in large part because of perceived institutional weaknesses. Even in the case of past empires, flexible governance structures and the institutions that knit together distances were as important as sheer military power (Roman roads and administration, for example, did as much to support the Empire as the Legions). In a world where the most advanced economies are characterized by increasing reliance on information networks, highly flexible economic and political institutions tending towards the flat and virtual rather than the hierarchical, and reduced dependence on direct control of resources, the key to obtaining and keeping hegemonic power increasingly is balanced among the five core constituents. This is arguably the key to the dominance of the United States, which until recently has been the one power that has appeared to be globally competent in all five categories: the largest single economy, a currently unmatched science and technology capability (and underlying academic infrastructure), a military that is far more advanced than any other in many ways, an institutional structure that is both relatively transparent and defined by law rather than relationship, and a cultural ascendancy that is reflected in the widespread idea of American exceptionalism, entrepreneurism, and corporate trademark dominance (especially in consumer culture: Coca-cola, McDonald’s, Disney). Although different commentators focus on different aspects of this hegemonic power structure – the French, for example, who do not fear the United States militarily because it is an ally, tend to emphasize American cultural domination, while the Chinese, who face projection of American power and particularly its blue water Navy as they look towards Taiwan, are much more concerned with its military aspect – it is the balance of high competence in all five dimensions that makes America truly formidable. Moreover, the essence of American power is more subtle than just the components in themselves, as the Japanese, Chinese, and European Union experience reveals. It is not enough to develop a better, more aggressive economy, as Japan in some ways did; or to challenge American exceptionalism and cultural appeal, as Europe increasingly does. To truly challenge America over time, it is necessary for the rising power to become competent in all five dimensions. To complicate matters, all five dimensions are not independent of each other; rather, success in each requires synergism among all. A challenger, then, need not reflect the same balance nor certainly the same choices as characterize the United States, but it does need to be able to successfully compete with the US in all five dimensions – and to integrate them effectively so they are mutually supporting as well. To take only one dimension, consider the daunting implications of trying to match the United States in science and technology (S&T). The American research and development budget, especially when contributions from private industry are included, dominates global R&D expenditures and ensures American supremacy in this critical area. But, worse yet from the perspective of those who would challenge America’s S&T capabilities, it is buttressed by institutional and cultural dimensions. The American higher educational system is not only the best in the world overall, but it draws intelligence from other societies around the world, much of which remains in the United States, either as intellectual property or as working, thinking, highly educated human beings. The American venture capital system, again the most highly developed in the world, supports this structure by ensuring that S&T advances are rapidly translated into entrepreneurial activity and thus economic power. The American culture, which tends to be technologically optimistic, underpins these systems (in contrast to, for example, the European Union which, through formulations such as the Precautionary Principle, expresses a greater skepticism of technology). A culture that seeks to match American supremacy in science and technology, therefore, cannot do so simply by increasing research spending, or trying to develop a few world-class technical institutes. It must create a network across its culture that understands excellence in this area as an emergent characteristic of excellence across all five dimensions – a much more difficult task. Understood from this systems perspective, it is tempting to err on the side of historical determinism and conclude that American hegemony is strong enough that it will dominate all others for the foreseeable future. This would be a mistake, and not just for the generic reasons that all determinisms are over-simplistic, and that history gives many examples of apparently dominant societies that, having outlived their optimistic and bold youth, have grown old and collapsed. It is perhaps true that an external frontal assault on American hegemony is unlikely to succeed, certainly in the short term. The European Union is increasingly favoring stability and order over messy and unpredictable technological evolution; Japan is too unidimensionally an economic power; and China is too early in its development along many of the relevant dimensions to be able to do so (as are India, Brazil, Russia and other potential challengers). But it is equally true that critical weakness can emerge internally. Consider American post 9/11 behavior and the Iraq invasion for what it says not only about American sophistication in understanding the real sources of its power and authority, but also the self-inflicted damage that may result in the absence of such understanding. Begin with the observation that America after World War II had a dominance that, although displayed in terms of the hard power supremacy of military and economic might, was primarily cultural: the United States attracted brains and capital, and, indeed, seemed to embody the mythic qualities of American exceptionalism because of its uniquely open, optimistic, entrepreneurial and mobile society. Depending on the language you want to use, it was the American brand – it was America as the “shining City on the Hill” – that knit together the dimensions of dominance. This was reflected in the numbers of students attracted to American universities, the number of non-native born entrepreneurs that created Silicon Valley and its Texas, Massachusetts and Oregon mimics, the success of American consumer goods and cultural exports (films, games, and the Marlboro Man), the continued attraction of the American experience for those prosecuted or discriminated against in other cultures. The real key to long-term American dominance, in other words, was mythic: mythic not in the sense of being imaginary, but in the sense of being a larger than life projection of American values and culture across the world. In this light, post 9/11 American policy can be seen as powerfully undermining long-term American power. Obviously, individual policy decisions affect the strength of the integrated hegemonic structure: the economic fragility caused by the Administration’s tax cuts are an example. But these need not threaten long term power trajectories. The response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, is potentially far more problematic. In particular, three components of subsequent policy have seriously degraded American power, and all for the same reason: they elevate technological projection of physical power and traditional security considerations above projection of cultural power. America is building a Maginot Line, and a very expensive one, in a world of cultural blitzkrieg. The first prong of Administration policy which is highly problematic is a domestic response which focuses on threat and fear rather than defiant openness. The serious curtailment of civil liberties and a personal sense of fear which has been cultivated by a series of policy initiatives (having colors to represent threat level assures that the public will remain fixated on the threat; coupling consumption with patriotism, while perhaps concordant with American proclivities, serves to integrate threat into core American activities) strike at the heart of the openness and optimism which have been among the most powerful components of American cultural power. While the American response may in part reflect the fact that Americans are unused to physical attack, it also reflects a shift from optimism to pessimism (from the world as America’s oyster or, more accurately, America’s market, to the rest of the world as Sartrean Other). The impacts of adopting this defensive posture are both practical – impediments to entry into the United States have significantly reduced the appeal of the U.S. for foreign students and scholars, for example – but, more importantly, mythic: the optimistic City on the Hill becomes just another gated community, another Fortress against the poor and alien. Creating a huge administrative bureaucracy that depends for its existence on continuing (and difficult to evaluate) threat ensures that this component of American policy will not be a temporary phenomenon, but rather a permanent degradation of American cultural power. Note that the importance of these policies is not in how the domestic audience responds; indeed, there is a robust debate internally on them. Rather, the importance is that it undermines the mythic component of American cultural dominance in cultures other than American. Nor is it necessary for the full deleterious impact that the United States actually sink below others in individual and creative freedom, only that American culture can be reduced by its critics to just another choice: no worse perhaps, but no better than, any other. The second is the Administration’s unilateralism and ill-disguised contempt for those who do not agree with its positions, combined with its evasion of moral responsibility. In the past, America has gained significant cultural power because it has not sought to impose its values; rather, it has simply displayed them and their attractiveness has drawn admiration, and immigration, from around the world. True cultural power is attractive, rather than imposed. The Administration’s approach, however, has resulted in America being widely perceived as arrogant, biased, and hypocritical, rather than powerful and appealing. Thus, for example, when Turkey and its public clearly wanted nothing to do with the Iraq war, perhaps not believing that the evidence of weapons of mass destruction was entirely conclusive, that nation was put under severe pressure by the Americans, leading many to conclude that America believed that democracy was a good idea so long as whatever came out of it was what the American Administration wanted. Similarly, widespread patterns of prisoner abuse were explained as mistakes of junior enlisted personnel, with no senior commander, and certainly not the Commander in Chief or the Secretary of Defense, taking responsibility. Regardless of the realpolitik rationale for torture, direct or through proxy, in a difficult period where information was clearly too scant for comfort, the policy and its clear tension with stated American beliefs reduces American exceptionalism to mere opportunism justified by hypocrisy backed by technologically enabled military power. Finally, of course, there is Iraq, which instantiates the Administration belief that military-technological power is the main component of modern hegemonic power (indeed, that is perhaps one reason those that crafted the policy so badly underestimated the Iraqi response to invasion and occupation; they were attuned to military, but not to cultural, phenomena). While various glosses have been put on that activity over time as initial justifications have proven inaccurate, the initial response of both the military and the Administration (“Mission Accomplished”) clearly illustrate a mindset focused on the ability of our technologically preeminent military to overcome less advanced forces. Iraq has failed because the political operatives managing the conflict have failed to understand that the sorts of wars America fights these days are cultural conflicts, not military conflicts (the parallels to VietNam in this regard are apparent), and that technological supremacy in the battlefield is almost besides the point. Unlike the constant resource conflicts in Africa, for example, recent American conflicts are not for conquest of territory or establishment of colonies, but to achieve ideological aims and defeat disfavored elites. And such aims necessarily involve sophistication in cultural matters. Indeed, especially to those who lack experience with the limits of military power, military prowess, embodied in incredibly potent technological capabilities, acts like a drug, leading to dysfunctionally oversimplistic policy choices. Just as countries rich in oil or other resources tend to squander their opportunities, especially in the absence of strong governance, countries rich in military-technological power may be seduced by it into misperceiving their true sources of power. Such seduction may be even more magnetic for a technologically optimistic nation which may be culturally inclined to seek technological solutions for all challenges. This does not mean that military action is never necessary, especially for a nation that has become a de facto enforcer of last resort (e.g., Bosnia). The military attack on Afghanistan, for example, was arguably justified because Afghanistan was a failed state creating an infrastructure for terrorists who had already struck the United States and, more subtly, because some sort of visceral response after 9/11 was probably a political necessity. Indeed, the use of military force in Afghanistan was broadly accepted internationally; it did not create anything like the destructive impact on the American myth that the bungled adventure in Iraq continues to generate. The United States retains its global hegemony for the time being. But American leaders across the board have failed to realize that the wellspring of that hegemony is cultural, the mythic. How mythic dominance may be defined, built, and strengthened is an interesting question, not yet fully answered – yet the United States clearly accomplished it for at last the last half of the twentieth century. What is interesting is that the United States had global dominance, a strong position against the fundamentalist Islamists, and blew it – because leaders failed to understand that the strength of the American position derived from cultural authority, not from military-technological supremacy. As a result of this serious miscalculation, it is highly likely that Iraq and the context of 9/11 responses that surrounded it, unless quickly reversed, will be seen as a critical point in the decline of American power precisely because it produced a sense of technologically enabled military success. For, ironically, it is that “success” that has proven catastrophic for the American brand, the real American boots on the ground. What saves the world from American hegemony is that its leaders, in failing to avoid the temptation of military adventurism, and in so fatally undermine the American culture’s most powerful claim: that it is the last best hope of humanity, the shining City on the Hill.

#### U.S. military aggression causes nuclear terrorism and accidental US-Russian nuclear war

Chomsky, 03 (Noam. Institute Professor emeritus of linguistics and philosophy at MIT. “Failed States.” Pages 14-16)

The probability of “apocalypse soon” cannot be realistically estimated, but it is surely too high for any sane person to contemplate with equanimity. While speculation is pointless, reaction to the “stark and dreadful and inescapable” choice Einstein and Russell described definitely is not. On the contrary, reaction is urgent, particularly in the United States, because of Washington’s primary role in accelerating the race to destruction by extending its historically unique military dominance. “The chances of an accidental, mistaken or unauthorized nuclear attack might be increasing,” warns former senator Sam Nunn, who has played a leading role in efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear war. “We are running an unnecessary risk of an Armageddon of our own making,” Nunn observes, as a result of policy choices that leave “America’s survival” dependent on “the accuracy of Russia’s warning systems and its command and control.” Nunn is referring to the sharp expansion of US military programs, which tilt the strategic balance in ways that make “Russia more likely to launch upon warning of an attack, without waiting to see if the warning is accurate.” The threat is enhanced by the fact that “the Russian early warning system is in serious disrepair and more likely to give a false warning of incoming missiles. US reliance on “the high-alert, hair-trigger nuclear posture… allows missiles to be launched within minutes,” forcing “our leaders to decide almost instantly whether to launch nuclear weapons once they have warning of an attack, robbing them of the time they may need to gather data, exchange information, gain perspective, discover an error and avoid a catastrophic mistake.” The risk extends beyond Russia – and also China if it pursues the same course. Strategic Bruce Blair observes that “the early warning and control problems plaguing Pakistan, India and other nuclear proliferators are even more acute.” Another serious concern, discussed in technical literature well before 9/11, is that nuclear weapons may sooner or later fall into the hands of terrorist groups, who might use these and other weapons of mass destruction with lethal effect. Those prospects are being advanced by Bush administration planners, who do not consider terrorism a high priority, as they regularly demonstrate. Their aggressive militarism has not only led Russia to expand significantly its offensive capacities, including more lethal nuclear weapons and delivery systems, but is also inducing the Russian military to transfer nuclear weapons constantly across Russia’s vast territory to counter mounting US threats. Washington planners are surely aware that Chechen rebels, who had already stolen radioactive materials from nuclear waste plants and power stations, have been casing “the railway system and special trains designed for shipping nuclear weapons across Russia.” Blair warns that “this perpetual motion [within Russia] creates a serious vulnerability, because transportation is the Achilles’ heel of nuclear weapons security,” ranking in danger right alongside maintaining strategic nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert. He estimates that every day “many hundreds of Russian nuclear weapons are moving around the countryside.” Theft of one nuclear bomb “could spell eventual disaster for an American city, [but this] is not the worst-case scenario stemming from nuclear gamesmanship.” More ominously, “the seizure of a ready-to-fire strategic long range nuclear missile or a group of missiles capable of delivering bombs to targets thousands of miles away could be apocalyptic for entire nations.” Another major threat is that terrorist hackers might break into military communication networks and transmit launch orders for missiles armed with hundreds of nuclear warheads – no fantasy, as the Pentagon learned a few years ago when serious defects were discovered in its safeguards, requiring new instructions for Trident submarine launch crews. Systems in other countries are much less reliable. All of this constitutes “an accident waiting to happen,” Blair writes; an accident that could be apocalyptic.

### Adventurism 2nc

#### Hegemony is good, but hard power is the wrong way to get there – a few reasons

#### A. Hard power isn’t key to hegemony – Allenby says there are five sources of modern hegemonic power of which military strength is the least important – cultural power comes first because it gives us the tools to build coalitions in a non-coercive manner.

#### B. Hard power is the worst kind of power – overwhelming military superiority removes any sort of check on American power, causing global interventionism – proven by Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

#### C. That kills hegemony – adventurism crushes American cultural and economic leverage and means nobody wants to align with us anymore. If they don’t extend a reason why hard power specifically is good they’re only feeding our impact claims.

#### And, there’s zero risk of their offense – adventurism causes soft and hard balancing which collapses hegemony

Pape, 05 (Robert, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. “Soft Balancing against the United States International Security” Summer 2005. International Security, avail. Lexis)

The George W. Bush administration's national security strategy, which asserts that the United States has the right to attack and conquer sovereign countries that pose no observable threat, and to do so without international support, is one of the most aggressively unilateral U.S. postures ever taken. Recent international relations scholarship has wrongly promoted the view that the United States, as the leader of a unipolar system, can pursue such a policy without fear of serious opposition. The most consequential effect of the Bush strategy will be a fundamental transformation in how major states perceive the United States and how they react to future uses of U.S. power. Major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behavior against the United States, by adopting "soft-balancing" measures that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but use international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to delay, frustrate, and undermine U.S. policies. If the Bush administration continues to pursue aggressive unilateral military policies, increased soft balancing could establish the basis for hard balancing against the United States. To avoid this outcome, the United States should renounce the systematic use of preventive war, as well as other aggressive unilateral military policies, and return to its traditional policy governing the use of force -- a case-by-case calculation of costs and benefits. President George W. Bush and his administration are pursuing a profoundly new U.S. national security strategy. Since January 2001 the United States has unilaterally abandoned the Kyoto accords on global warming, rejected participation in the International Criminal Court, and withdrawn from the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, among other unilateralist foreign policies. Although the United States gained considerable international sympathy following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration chose to conduct military operations against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan with the aid of only one country: Great Britain. n1 In 2002 the administration announced that it would replace the Baathist regime in Iraq, a country that posed no observable threat to attack the United States, and to do so with military force "unilaterally if necessary." n2 The United States went on to conquer Iraq in early 2003 despite vigorous efforts by many of the world's major powers to delay, frustrate, and even undermine war plans and reduce the number of countries that would fight alongside the United States. Since then, the United States has threatened Iran and Syria, reaffirmed its commitment to build an ambitious ballistic missile defense system, and taken few steps to mend fences with the international community. The Bush strategy is one of the most aggressively unilateral U.S. national security strategies ever, and it is likely to produce important international consequences. So far, the debate has focused almost exclusively on the immediate consequences of individual elements of the Bush foreign policy -- on abandoning the ABM treaty, conquering Iraq, or failing to accept international limits on the use of force embodied in the United Nations. n3 Despite the significance of these issues, however, the long-term consequences of aggressive unilateralism and the Bush strategy as a whole are likely to be even more momentous. Throughout history, states that have pursued aggressive unilateral military policies have paid a **heavy price**. In fact, major powers have often balanced against such states, though few analysts think that this will happen to the United States. n4 Historically, major powers have rarely balanced against the United States and not at all since the 1990s when it has been the sole superpower. The conventional wisdom among policymakers is that Europe, Russia, China, Japan, and other important regional actors such as Turkey and Brazil may grumble, but they will not stand in the way of U.S. military policies and will quickly seek to mend fences once the United States imposes its will by implementing these policies. Recent international relations scholarship has promoted the view that the United States, as a unipolar leader, can act without fear of serious opposition in the international system. In the early 1990s a number of scholars argued that major powers would rise to challenge U.S. preponderance after the collapse of the Soviet Union and that unipolarity was largely an "illusion" that will not last long. n5 By the late 1990s, however, as it became increasingly evident that unipolarity had not immediately given way to a new round of multipolar politics, the scholarly conventional wisdom began to change. While recognizing that states have often balanced against superior power in the past, most contemporary scholars of unipolarity assert that the United States commands such a huge margin of superiority that second-class powers cannot balance against its power, either individually or collectively. As William Wohlforth writes, "The raw power advantage of the United States means that . . . second-tier states face incentives to bandwagon with the unipolar power."n6 This article advances three propositions that challenge the prevailing view that major powers cannot balance against the United States. First, the most consequential effect of the Bush strategy will be a fundamental transformation in how major states react to future uses of U.S. power. The United States has long been a remarkable exception to the rule that states balance against superior power. Aside from the Soviet Union, major powers have rarely balanced against it. The key reason is not the United States' overwhelming power relative to that of other major powers, which has varied over time and so cannot explain this nearly constant pattern. Rather, until recently the United States enjoyed a robust reputation for nonaggressive intentions toward major powers and lesser states beyond its own hemisphere. Although it has fought numerous wars, the United States has generally used its power to preserve the established political order in major regions of the world, seeking to prevent other powers from dominating rather than seeking to dominate itself. The Bush strategy of aggressive unilateralism is changing the United States' long-enjoyed reputation for benign intent and giving other major powers reason to fear its power. Second, major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behavior against the United States. In the near term, France, Germany, Russia, China, Japan, and other important regional states are unlikely to respond with traditional hard-balancing measures, such as military buildups, war-fighting alliances, and transfers of military technology to U.S. opponents. Directly confronting U.S. preponderance is too costly for any individual state and too risky for multiple states operating together, at least until major powers become confident that members of a balancing coalition will act in unison. Instead, major powers are likely to adopt what I call "soft-balancing" measures: that is, actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies. Soft balancing using international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements has already been a prominent feature of the international opposition to the U.S. war against Iraq. Third, soft balancing is likely to become more intense if the United States continues to pursue an aggressively unilateralist national security policy. Although soft balancing may be unable to prevent the United States from achieving specific military aims in the near term, it will **increase the costs of using U.S. power**, reduce the number of countries likely to cooperate with future U.S. military adventures, and possibly **shift the balance of economic power** against the United States. For example, Europe, Russia, and China could press hard for the oil companies from countries other than the United States to have access to Iraqi oil contracts, which would increase the economic costs of U.S. occupation of the country. Europeans could also begin to pay for oil in euros rather than in dollars, which could reduce demand for the dollar as the world's reserve currency and so increase risks of inflation and higher interest rates in the United States. Most important, soft balancing could eventually evolve into hard balancing. China and European states could also increase their economic ties with Russia while the Kremlin continues or even accelerates support for Iran's nuclear program, a step that would negate U.S. economic pressure on Russia while signaling the start of hard balancing against the United States. Soft balancing, however, is not destiny. The Bush administration's national security strategy of aggressive unilateralism is the principal cause of soft balancing and repudiating this strategy is the principal solution. In practice, this would mean an explicit rejection of the strategy's most extreme elements (e.g., unilateral preventive war), renouncement of the most serious reasons to doubt U.S. motives (e.g., unilateral control over Iraqi oil contracts), and reestablishment of the U.S. commitment to solve important international problems multilaterally (e.g., a renewed commitment to the UN). The reputation of the United States for benign intent would slowly return, and the incentives for balancing against it would **markedly decline**. Although rare circumstances may require the unilateral use of U.S. power in the future, the security of the United States would be significantly enhanced if the Bush administration abandoned its policy of aggressive unilateralism.

#### There’s also an external impact – our Chomsky evidence indicates the perception of U.S. military aggression causes Russia to place its nuclear arsenal on early warning, risking accidental nuclear launch.

#### That’s the biggest impact – US-Russian nuclear conflict is the only war that risks extinction

Bostrom, 02 (Nick, PhD and Professor at Oxford, March, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html)

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently.

### Hard Power = Adventurism

#### Hard power empirically causes adventurism – this collapses heg through overstretch and counterbalancing.

Layne, 06 (Christopher Prof Intl Relations at Texas A&M, 2006. The Peace of Illusions, p. 152-3)

If, as is probable, several new great powers emerge more or less simultaneously in the coming decades, the United States almost certainly will become strategically overextended. (The same result could obtain even if the United States had to deal with threats posed by multiple major regional powers— what U.S. strategists call “near-peer” competitors—in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East.) If new great powers emerge simultaneously in different regions of the globe, the United States would confront a situation similar to that which Britain faced between 1880 and 1900. During this period neither Germany, the United States, nor Japan emerged as a power capable of challenging Britain globally. But their simultaneous rise in three areas of vital strategic concern to Britain—Western Europe, East Asia, and the Western Hemisphere—signaled the relative decline of British power and confronted London with a strategic challenge that it could meet only by accommodating the United States and Japan and conceding their respective preeminence in the Western Hemisphere and East Asia. There is another road to U.S. overextension: the United States could succumb—and, arguably, has—to the “hegemon’s temptation.” The hegemon’s temp tation is caused by the **imbalance of power** in its favor. Conscious both of its overwhelming military superiority and of the fact that no other great powers are capable of restraining its ambitions, a hegemon easily is **lured into overexpansion**. When it comes to hard power, hegemons have it, and seldom can resist flaunting it—especially when the costs and risks of doing so appear to be low.72 Thus, we should expect a unipolar hegemon to initiate many wars and to use its military power promiscuously. From this perspective, it is not surprising that since the cold war the United States has—in addition to Afghanistan and Iraq—intervened in such peripheral places as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo while simultaneously extending its military reach into Central Asia, the Caucasus region, and East Central Europe (all areas never previously viewed as ones where the United States had important interests) The very nature of hegemonic power predisposes dominant powers to overexpand in order to maintain their leading position in the international system. As Gilpin observes, a hegemon earns its prestige—others’ perceptions of the efficacy of its hard power capabilities—by using military power successfully to impose its will on others.7 When a hegemon wields its military power conspicuously, others are put on notice that the prudent course of action is to accommodate its dominance rather than challenging it. In effect, hegemons believe that the frequent use of force has a potent deterrent, or dissuasive, effect on other states. Clearly, U.S. policymakers believe this to be the case. Thus, after extolling the displays of America’s military virtuosity in Afghanistan and Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared that those wars should be a warning to other states: “If you put yourself in the shoes of a country that might decide they’d like to make mischief, they have a very recent, vivid example of the fact that the United States has the ability to deal with this1”74 There is, of course, a paradox to the hegemon’s temptation: **overexpansion leads to “imperial overstretch” and counterhegemonic balancing—the combined effect of which is hegemonic decline.** Strategically, hegemons usually end up biting off more than they can chew.

#### Overwhelming hard power erodes checks on the exercise of American hegemony, causing adventurism and destroying soft power – multipolarity solves

Fukuyama, 07 (Francis Fukuyama, dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and repentant neo-conservative. “A Self-Defeating Hegemony.” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/10/a\_selfdefeating\_hegemony.html)

The second important miscalculation concerned the likely global reaction to America's exercise of its hegemonic power. Many people within the Bush administration believed that even without approval by the UN security council or Nato, American power would be legitimised by its successful use. This had been the pattern for many US initiatives during the cold war, and in the Balkans during the 1990s; back then, it was known as "leadership" rather than "unilateralism". But, by the time of the Iraq war, conditions had changed: the US had grown so powerful relative to the rest of the world that the lack of reciprocity became an intense source of irritation even to America's closest allies. The **structural anti-Americanism** arising from the global distribution of power was evident well before the Iraq war, in the opposition to American-led globalisation during the Clinton years. But it was exacerbated by the Bush administration's "in-your-face" disregard for a variety of international institutions as soon it came into office - a pattern that continued through the onset of the Iraq war. America's third mistake was to overestimate how effective conventional military power would be in dealing with the weak states and networked transnational organisations that characterise international politics, at least in the broader Middle East. It is worth pondering why a country with more military power than any other in human history, and that spends as much on its military as virtually the rest of the world combined, cannot bring security to a small country of 24 million people after more than three years of occupation. At least part of the problem is that it is dealing with complex social forces that are not organised into centralised hierarchies that can enforce rules, and thus be deterred, coerced, or otherwise manipulated through conventional power. Israel made a similar mistake in thinking that it could use its enormous margin of conventional military power to destroy Hizbullah in last summer's Lebanon war. Both Israel and the US are nostalgic for a 20th century world of nation-states, which is understandable, since that is the world to which the kind of conventional power they possess is best suited. But nostalgia has led both states to misinterpret the challenges they now face, whether by linking al-Qaida to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, or Hizbullah to Iran and Syria. This linkage does exist in the case of Hizbullah, but the networked actors have their own social roots and are not simply pawns used by regional powers. This is why the exercise of conventional power has become frustrating. Finally, the Bush administration's use of power has lacked not only a compelling strategy or doctrine, but also simple competence. In Iraq alone, the administration misestimated the threat of WMD, failed to plan adequately for the occupation, and then proved unable to adjust quickly when things went wrong. To this day, it has dropped the ball on very straightforward operational issues in Iraq, such as funding democracy promotion efforts. Incompetence in implementation has strategic consequences. Many of the voices that called for, and then bungled, military intervention in Iraq are now calling for war with Iran. Why should the rest of the world think that conflict with a larger and more resolute enemy would be handled any more capably? But the fundamental problem remains the lopsided distribution of power in the international system. Any country in the same position as the US, even a democracy, would be tempted to exercise its hegemonic power with **less and less restraint**. America's founding fathers were motivated by a similar belief that unchecked power, even when democratically legitimated, could be dangerous, which is why they created a constitutional system of internally separated powers to limit the executive. Such a system does not exist on a global scale today, which may explain how America got into such trouble. A smoother international distribution of power, even in a global system that is less than fully democratic, would pose **fewer temptations** to abandon the prudent exercise of power.

### Adventurism Turns Heg

#### Adventurism causes overstretch and undermines deterrent capabilities

Kober, 07 (Stanley. Research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. September 18. “What Napoleon and Bismarck Teach Us About Preventive War.” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=2822)

The Bush administration's doctrine of preemption is based on the assumption that American power is irresistible. That assumption is now being challenged, just as it has been challenged when it was asserted by other great powers throughout history. Like Napoleon, the Bush administration launched a preventive war and now finds itself confronting a hostile population resisting occupation. Allies are defecting as casualties mount. Victory appears increasingly uncertain. Yet even if the U.S. ultimately prevails in Iraq, the aura of invincible American power has been shattered. The unexpected difficulties encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the stress on American military forces, undermines the threat to use those forces again, which is the very basis of our superpower status. "U.S. rulers are often liable to overestimate their own strength, and underestimate the challenges and problems they face," China's People's Daily noted last May. "They can be described as `**the higher they climb, the harder they fall.'"** Ironically, a war that was supposed to cement America's military superiority is now being viewed as an example of American weakness. It is an outcome the proponents of preemption never envisioned.

#### It also causes counterbalancing

Layne, 06 (Christopher Prof Intl Relations at Texas A&M, 2006. The Peace of Illusions, p. 152-3)

Conscious both of its overwhelming military superiority and of the fact that no other great powers are capable of restraining its ambitions, a hegemon easily is **lured into overexpansion**. When it comes to hard power, hegemons have it, and seldom can resist flaunting it—especially when the costs and risks of doing so appear to be low.72 Thus, we should expect a unipolar hegemon to initiate many wars and to use its military power promiscuously. From this perspective, it is not surprising that since the cold war the United States has—in addition to Afghanistan and Iraq—intervened in such peripheral places as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo while simultaneously extending its military reach into Central Asia, the Caucasus region, and East Central Europe (all areas never previously viewed as ones where the United States had important interests) The very nature of hegemonic power predisposes dominant powers to overexpand in order to maintain their leading position in the international system. As Gilpin observes, a hegemon earns its prestige—others’ perceptions of the efficacy of its hard power capabilities—by using military power successfully to impose its will on others.7 When a hegemon wields its military power conspicuously, others are put on notice that the prudent course of action is to accommodate its dominance rather than challenging it. In effect, hegemons believe that the frequent use of force has a potent deterrent, or dissuasive, effect on other states. Clearly, U.S. policymakers believe this to be the case. Thus, after extolling the displays of America’s military virtuosity in Afghanistan and Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared that those wars should be a warning to other states: “If you put yourself in the shoes of a country that might decide they’d like to make mischief, they have a very recent, vivid example of the fact that the United States has the ability to deal with this1”74 There is, of course, a paradox to the hegemon’s temptation: **o**verexpansion leads to “imperial overstretch” and counterhegemonic balancing—the combined effect of which is **hegemonic decline.** Strategically, hegemons usually end up biting off more than they can chew.

## China turn

### China 1nc

#### Decline prevents inevitable war over Taiwan

Gao Chonglun, "Will the United States Give Up on Its Commitment to Taiwan Security," translated Lisa Ferguson, 3--29--11, <http://watchingamerica.com/News/96212/special-column-by-guo-chonglun-will-the-united-states-give-up-on-its-commitment-to-taiwan-security>

In the tide of the Jasmine Revolution, it appeared that the United States couldn’t decide initially which path to take; when it first started, the United States appeared to welcome it warmly, but by the time it had spread to Bahrain, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the United States had begun to hesitate. Although it was at the request of many European countries, the United States reluctantly agreed to use military force in Libya, but refused to send in ground troops. Moreover, the United States is in a hurry to transfer command of the allied armies to NATO. Many are calling this intervention in Libya “humanitarian intervention,” but the attitude of the American government is far from being a model example of this. Instead, it is making other countries in the world begin to suspect whether — because of Iraq and Afghanistan — U.S. hegemony has begun to deteriorate. Is U.S. foreign policy shrinking back into isolationism? All along, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security was not only reaffirmed by the Taiwan Relations Act and all previous presidents, but it was also the United States making an associated pledge: a commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region. Now, however, there is a sound emerging that perhaps the United States will eliminate Taiwan from its security commitments. 2010 was a pivotal year in China-U.S. relations, first with joint U.S.-Korea exercises in the Yellow Sea, which triggered China’s protest. Then came the China-Japan sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands; the United States, in the spirit of security cooperation, took the position of supporting Japan. Afterward, in the dispute in the South China Sea, the U.S., on behalf of Southeast Asian nations, told China it would intervene. All of these controversies related to territorial waters never happened in the past because China had yet to build up strength. But now, following China’s rise, its military might and economic strength have already created friction between it and other powers. Over the course of China’s rise, many have been looking forward to it becoming more docile, little by little, within the U.S.-led international order; they await the day when Beijing becomes a “responsible shareholder.” Yet 2010 proved that China will not follow in accordance with the rules set by the West, not only because it finds the rules to be unfair, but also because the legitimacy of U.S. leadership has no ground left to stand on after the financial economic crisis. For the sake of its own interests, the U.S. will often shift its troubles onto its neighbors — the quantitative easing (monetary) policy is just one example of this. Consequently, the second pessimistic view emerged, maintaining that conflict between China and the U.S. is unavoidable. They look down upon the research of past sinologists and think that China or the Chinese Communist Party’s so-called “special characteristics” are simply secondary; what really has an effect is international power structure, which does not shift with individual willpower. If China really wants to rise and challenge the American hegemony, then there is bound to be conflict. Lately, however, a third way of thinking has arisen. Professor Charles Glaser of America’s George Washington University wrote an article in the most recent edition of the periodical Foreign Affairs, advocating that the security dilemma between China and the U.S. is not at all absolute. If a few secondary tensions are able to be dealt with properly, then it’s not necessarily the case that automatic mutual confrontation will arise; a military conflict is avoidable. He thinks that just because there are oceans of difference between the two countries as well as mutual nuclear deterrence, this does not mean that they are each other’s enemy. China’s rise will not go so far as to threaten the United States, but it could threaten the security of its Asia-Pacific allies and the U.S. military garrison there. Glaser thinks that China will not push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific in pursuit of greater security. In reality, what he didn’t say is that the U.S. military power deployed in the Asia-Pacific can inhibit the expansion of the Japanese and Korean militaries. In other words, China doesn’t need to worry about Japanese, or even South and North Korean, military conflict, because America’s security coalition in the Asia-Pacific can actually promote security in the region. But there is one exception to this — the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan. He believes that Taiwan is not in the same category as Japan and South Korea. Until now, China still has not given up on using military force against Taiwan, focusing all its resources on intervening in Taiwanese and U.S. military affairs and increasing its threats. As the pace of the People’s Liberation Army’s modernization accelerates, the danger of bilateral conflict also rises. According to the calculations of a realist like Glaser, since China will not change its intentions and the risk of conflict is so great, the U.S. should consider withdrawing its security commitment to Taiwan. This drastic measure could move us away from the conflict’s detonator, while also laying a smooth path for relations between the two nations for future decades. Of course there will be critics who say this would mean the U.S. had yielded to China’s military might. Other than costing the United States its credibility in the Asia-Pacific, it could also whet China’s appetite. But “not all adversaries are Hitler,” as Glaser points out. Looking through the lens of negotiation and compromise, this could help reach a new equilibrium, and tensions would thus recede. Moreover, when announcing the decision to give up on the Taiwan security commitment, the U.S. could still reaffirm its security commitments with other nations and strengthen its exercises with other countries, thus reducing the unease about discarding Taiwan.

#### Decline solves war with China—regionalism, alt is getting dragged into a huge war

Christopher Layne, Professor, National Security, Texas A&M University, "China's Challenge to US Hegemony," CURRENT HISTORY, 1--08, Ebsco.

Notwithstanding these arguments, which are underpinned by a national security discourse that favors American hegemony, the issues at stake in a possible showdown between China and Taiwan simply would not justify the risks and costs of US intervention. Regardless of the rationale invoked, the contention that the United States should go to war to prevent Beijing from using force to achieve reunification with Taiwan (or in response to a unilateral declaration of independence by Taipei) amounts to nothing more than a veiled argument for fighting a "preventive" war against a rising China. SHARING THE BURDEN The final element of a US offshore balancing strategy would be the devolution from the United States to the major powers in Asia of the responsibility for containing China. An offshore balancing strategy would rely on the balance-of-power dynamics of a twenty-first century multipolar global order to prevent China from dominating East Asia. The other major powers in Asia-Japan, Russia, and India-have a much more immediate interest in stopping a rising China in their midst than does the United States. In a multipolar system, the question is not whether balancing will occur, but which state or states will do the heavy lifting. Because the United States is geographically distant from China-and protected both by the expanse of the Pacific Ocean and by its own formidable military (including nuclear) capabilities-the United States has the option of staying out of East Asian security rivalries (at least initially) and forcing Beijing's neighbors to assume the risks and costs of stopping China from attaining regional hegemony. Because its air and naval power is based on long-range strike capabilities, the United States can keep its forces in an over the-horizon posture with respect to East Asia and limit itself to a backstopping role in the unlikely event that the regional balance of power falters. It is hardly surprising-indeed, it parallels in many ways America's own emergence as a great power-that China, the largest and potentially most powerful state in Asia, is seeking a more assertive political, military, and economic role in the region, and even challenging America's present dominance in East Asia. However, this poses no direct threat to US security. Japan, India, and Russia, on the other hand, are worried about the implications of China's rapid ascendance for their security. They should bear the responsibility of balancing against Chinese power. An incipient drift toward multipolarity-which is the prerequisite for the United States to adopt an offshore balancing strategy-is already apparent in East Asia. Driven by fears of US abandonment in a future East Asian crisis, Japan has embarked on a buildup of its military capabilities and has even hinted that it is thinking about acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, the past several years have seen a significant escalation in tensions between China and Japan, fueled both by nationalism and by disputes over control of the South China and East China seas (which may contain large energy deposits). From the standpoint of offshore balancing, Japan's military buildup in response to its fear of China is a good thing if it leads to Japan's reemergence as an independent geopolitical actor. However, Japan's military resurgence is not so good (for the United States) if it takes place under the aegis of the US-Japan security alliance, and if the United States remains in the front lines of the forces containing China. Under those conditions, the United States could find itself ensnared in an Asian conflict; its alliance with Japan risks dragging it into a war with China in which American strategic interests would not be engaged. The idea of an offshore balancing strategy is to get the United States out of China's crosshairs, not to allow it to remain a target because of its present security commitments to allies in the region. The wisdom of risking war with China to maintain US hegemony in East Asia is all the more doubtful because America's predominance in the region is ebbing in any event. One indication of this is that US economic supremacy in East Asia is waning as China rises. China is emerging as the motor of the region's economic growth. While the United States has been preoccupied with Iraq, Iran, and the so-called war on terrorism, China has used its burgeoning economic power to extend its political influence throughout East and Southeast Asia. Indeed, most of the smaller states in Southeast Asia are gradually slipping into Beijing's political orbit because their own prosperity is ever more closely tied to their relations with China. America's strategy of trying to uphold the geopolitical status quo in East Asia clashes with the ambitions of a rising China, which has its own ideas about how East Asia's political and security order should be organized. If the United States puts itself in the forefront of those trying to contain China, the potential for future tension-or worse-in SinoAmerican relations can only increase. By pulling back from its hegemonic role in East Asia and adopting an offshore balancing strategy, the United States could better preserve its relative power and strategic influence. It could stand on the sidelines while that region's great powers enervate themselves by engaging in security competitions. THE TEMPTATION OF POWER If American strategy were determined by the traditional metrics that have governed the grand strategies of great powers-the distribution of power in the international system, geographic proximity of rivals, and military capabilities-China would not be considered much of a threat to the United States. The wellspring of US grand strategy lies elsewhere, however: in Wilsonian ideology. This is why the United States remains wedded to a strategy of upholding its predominance in East Asia, as well as in Europe and the Middle East. One of the few ironclad lessons of history is that great powers that seek hegemony are always opposed-and defeated-by the counterbalancing efforts of other states. Yet the prevailing belief among the American foreign policy community is that the United States is exempt from the fate of hegemons. This belief, really a form of American exceptionalism, is wrong. If Washington gives in to the temptation of hegemonic power, dangerous times lie ahead.

#### U.S. China war over Taiwan leads to World War III

Lee J. Hunkovic, American Military Univesity, "The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the United States of America, 2009, http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

### China 2nc

#### American hegemony will inevitably cause a power war between the united states and china—the 1nc layne evidence proves that the two powers will continuously rub over issues like taiwan, trade and south china sea.

#### Second, the impact is a global nuclear holocaust—the johnson evidence proves that deterrence will fail between the two because of miscalculation over intent and credibility. This swamps the case impact because:

#### A) probability—increasing chinese power coupled with multiple flash-points makes a clash certain

#### B) timeframe—china is poised to invade taiwan and us forces are spread throughout the region, making it spread almost overnight.

#### C) the magnitude—an extinction level nuclear war would supercede anything they could access

#### Chinese ascension absent a change in american policy guarantees war

LAYNE (Professor of Political Science @ Texas A&M) ‘07

[Christopher, American Empire: A Debate , P. 73-74 //wyo-tjc]

To be sure, the United States should not ignore the potential strategic rami- fications of China's arrival on the world stage as a great power. After all, the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict, not peace. On this score, the notion-propagated by Beijing-that China's will be a "peaceful rise" is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capa- bilities because it is unthreatened by any other state. Still, this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in the next decade or two in a war. Whether Washington and Bei- jing actually come to blows, however, depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China, because the United States has the "last clear chance" to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with Beijing. If the United States continues to aim at upholding its current primacy, however, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain.

#### Extended deterrence guarantees war with china within 10 years—taiwan dispute

LAYNE (Professor of Political Science @ Texas A&M) ‘07

[Christopher, American Empire: A Debate , P. 75

Finally, Taiwan is a powder-keg issue in Sino-American relations. China remains committed to national reunification, yet Taiwan is moving percepti- bly toward independence. Almost certainly, Beijing would regard a Taiwanese declaration of independence as a casus belli. It is unclear how the United States would respond to a China-Taiwan conflict, although President George \V Bush created a stir in 2001 when he declared that the United States would intervene militarily in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. For sure, how- ever, it is safe to predict that there would be strong domestic political pressure in favor of American intervention. Beyond the arguments that Chinese mili- tary action against Taiwan would undermine U.S. interests in a stable world order and constitute "aggression," ideological antipathy toward China and support for a democratizing Taiwan would be powerful incentives for Ameri- can intervention. On Taiwan, in other words, the arguments of U.S. primacists have come close to locking-in Washington to a potentially dangerous policy The primacists' claim that the United States must be prepared to defend Taiwan from Chinese invasion overlooks three points. First, for nearly a quar- ter century, the United States has recognized that Taiwan is a Chinese prov- ince, not an independent state. Second, America's European and Asian allies have no interest in picking a quarrel with China over Taiwan's fate. If Wash- ington goes to the mat with Beijing over Taiwan, it almost certainly will do so alone. (Given their unilateralist bent, however, the prospect of fighting China without allies might not be much concern to American primacists.) Third, by defending Taiwan, the United States runs the risk of armed confronta- tion with China-probably not in the immediate future, but almost certainly within the next decade or so.

#### War with china leads to deterrence breakdowns and nuclear holocaust

JOHNSON (author) ‘01

[Chalmers, “Time to Bring the Troops Home”, The Nation, May 14, p. lexis // wyo-tjc]

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China's sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China's borders have virtually no deterrent effect.

## Proliferation turn

### Proliferation 1nc

#### Preponderance triggers nuclear proliferation

Ted Galen Carpenter, (Vice President for Defense Studies, Cato Institute), SMART POWER: TOWARD A PRUDENT FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICA, 2008, 112.

In addition to the motive of deterrence within a region, there is a potential motive of broader deterrence--especially to deter the United States. With regard to that factor, we need to be realistic about the unintended consequences of some U.S. actions. The United States has taken major military action on ten occasions since the end of the Cold War. Although many Americans may think that those episodes were justified, other countries don't necessarily see it the same way. In particular, countries such as Iran and North Korea have seen how the United States has treated non-nuclear adversaries such as Serbia and Iraq, and that may have led them to conclude that the only reliable deterrent to U.S. coercion was a nuclear arsenal.

#### Second, new horizontal proliferation risks several scenarios for nuclear war

TOTTEN (Assoc. Professor at University of Arkansas) ‘94

[Samuel, The Widening Circle of Genocide, p. 289 //wyo-tjc]

There are numerous dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons, including but not limited to the following: the possibility that a nation threatened by destruction in a conventional war may resort to the use of its nuclear weapons; the miscalculation of a threat of an attack and the subsequent use of nuclear weapons in order to stave off the suspected attack; a nuclear weapons accident due to carelessness or flawed technology (e.g., the accidental launching of a nuclear weapon); the use of such weapons by an unstable leader; the use of such weapons by renegade military personnel during a period of instability (personal, national or international); and, the theft (and/or development) and use of such weapons by terrorists. While it is unlikely (though not impossible) that terrorists would be able to design their own weapons, it is possible that they could do so with the assistance of a renegade government.

### Proliferation 2nc

#### Hegemony causes proliferation – US military superiority and interventions cause nations to pursue nuclear arms as the only deterrent against US aggression and coercion – that’s Carpenter

#### the impact is devastating—our totten evidence gives a laundry list of scenarios where new proliferation may cause a nuclear war. This impact is most probable because the rapid rate of proliferation maximizes the danger and the multiple scenarios make some use unavoidable

#### that independently short circuits their offense

Monteiro 12 **–** Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale

(Nuno, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40,

What, then, is the value of unipolarity for the unipole? What can a unipole do that a great power in bipolarity or multipolarity cannot? My argument hints at the possibility that—at least in the security realm—unipolarity does not give the unipole greater influence over international outcomes.118 If unipolarity provides structural incentives for nuclear proliferation, it may, as Robert Jervis has hinted, “have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification.”119 For Jervis, “[t]his raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. . . . In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important.”

#### This is the largest impact because such incidents will escalate to full-scale destruction

UTGOFF (Institute for Defense Analysis) ’02 [Victor, “Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions”, Survival, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer, p. 90 //wyo-tjc]

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

#### Preponderance strategy drives Iran/NorK prolif

John J. Mearsheimer, Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, “Imperial by Design,” THE NATIONAL INTEREST, January/February 2011, http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576, accessed 10-15-11.

IF ALL of this were not enough, global dominance, especially the Bush administration’s penchant for big-stick diplomacy, negatively affects nuclear proliferation as well. The United States is deeply committed to making sure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear arsenal and that North Korea gives up its atomic weapons, but the strategy we have employed is likely to have the opposite effect. The main reason that a country acquires nuclear weapons is that they are the ultimate deterrent. It is extremely unlikely that any state would attack the homeland of a nuclear-armed adversary because of the fear that it would prompt nuclear retaliation. Therefore, any country that feels threatened by a dangerous rival has good reason to want a survivable nuclear deterrent. This basic logic explains why the United States and the Soviet Union built formidable stockpiles during the Cold War. It also explains why Israel acquired atomic weapons and refuses to give them up. All of this tells you that when the United States places Iran, Iraq and North Korea on the “axis of evil” and threatens them with military force, it gives those countries a powerful incentive to acquire a nuclear deterrent. The Bush administration, for example, would not have invaded Iraq in March 2003 if Saddam had an atomic arsenal because the Iraqi leader probably would have used it, since he almost certainly was going to die anyway. It is not clear whether Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons today, but given that the United States and Israel frequently hint that they might attack it nevertheless, the regime has good reason to want a deterrent to protect itself. Similarly, Pyongyang would be foolish to give up its nuclear capability in the absence of some sort of rapprochement with Washington.

#### hegemony creates security vulnerabilities, increasing nuclear proliferation

JERVIS (Prof. Of Int’l Politics at Columbia) ‘03

[Robert, “The Compulsive Empire”, Foreign Policy, Jul/Aug, p. asp

The United States is the strongest country in the world, yet its power remains subject to two familiar limitations: First, it is harder to build than to destroy. Second, success inevitably depends on others, because even a hegemon needs some external cooperation to achieve its objectives. Of course, countries like Syria and Iran cannot ignore U.S. military capabilities. They may well decide to limit their weapons of mass destruction programs and curtail support for terrorism, as Bush expects. But the prospects for long-run compliance are less bright. Although a frontal assault on U.S. interests is unlikely, highly motivated adversaries will not give up the quest to advance their own perceived interests. The war in Iraq has increased the risks of seeking nuclear weapons, for example, but it also has increased the rewards of obtaining them. Whatever else these weapons can do, they can deter all-out invasion, thus rendering them attractive to any state that fears it might be in the Pentagon's gun sights.

## A2 hegemony solves free trade

#### US hegemony can’t spread free trade and collapse of heg won’t collapse the system

**Gady 2010**

[Franz-Stefan, associate at the East West Institute, adjunct research assistance at the Institute for National Strategies Studies of the National Defense University in Washington DC, analyst for the Project on National Security Reform, a congressionally funded non-profit organization founded to reform national security, “Should the United States continue as a champion of free trade?”, November 29, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0912/comm/gady\_freetrade.html]

In reality, there is very little a hegemon can do when it comes to promoting free trade in the international system or influencing other powers to comply when they are not willing. A state that opposes an open system of trade, such as Japan in the 1980s, faced very little consequences from the hegemonic power, i.e. the Unites States. The reason is that the capabilities of a hegemon required to maintain an open system are much bigger (often too big for the hegemon to cope with) if members are opposed to the open system, i.e. free trade, rather than when they are willing to tacitly comply with the existing order. Thus, hegemony is only possible with the tacit cooperation of most of the states in the international system. It follows that if one or two countries oppose policies of the hegemon, it does not necessarily mean a decline of hegemonic power, but the overall limitations of hegemony in the international system. This can be illustrated with the following case study of the British Empire in the 19th century. The pax Britannica was at its height in the period 1849 to 1880; thereafter, other states began to challenge British naval superiority, colonization became widespread and British economic superiority began to fall as well. Thus, one can hypothesize that during the period from 1849 to 1880, British hegemony translated into firm British control of the international economic and financial system. The truth was far from that. For example, the series of treaties that began with the Anglo-French treaty of commerce in 1860 are generally recognized as supplying the building blocks of a low-tariff regime that persisted until the late 1870s and hence, should be seen a sign of British hegemonic influence on the European continent. Nevertheless, three points should be noted. First, the British government did not initiate the negotiations. They were essentially triggered by the transnational collusion of Richard Cobden and Michel Chevalier two businessmen. Second, British Prime minister Palmerston, had rebuffed an earlier French overture on commercial negotiations because he was unwilling to tolerate the possible loss of customs revenue from the wine duty, which the French wanted to get rid off in order to have access to the British domestic market. Third, in 1860 a primary British motivation for seeking a treaty was not to gain lower tariffs and a greater market for exports, but rather to head off a serious deterioration in Anglo-French relations. The British were simply worried about the possibility of a French invasion. At the end, Britain did not succeed in gaining substantial concessions from the French despite its hegemonic position in the world. The British experience with most of the other states of Europe during the period 1848-1880 roughly corresponds to their experience with the French—scattered British successes, but no clear evidence that Britain was making a major impact on the tariff policies of the European states. Another case in point would be Prussia. After 1848, it was not Britain but Austria that dominated Prussian calculations on tariffs. The Prussians were ready to use a low tariff policy to block Austrian entry into the Zollverein. The Prussians desired low Zollverein tariffs in order to maximize the economic and domestic political costs to the Austrian government of joining the organization. Although the Austrians mounted two serious challenges to Prussian dominance in the Zollverein in 1852-3 and 1862-4, the British played no active role in either case. Thus, although Britain was assessed to be most powerful country in the world at that time it still could not influence the behavior of a second rate power such as Prussia. Yet, when Queen Victoria opened the Great World Exhibition in 1851, her country was the world's leading industrial power producing more than half its iron, coal and cotton cloth. Britain was called the “workshop of the world”. The Royal Navy was the biggest fleet of its time and soon the British Empire would rule a quarter of the world. London became the leading financial center. This pax Britannica would last until 1914 and the beginning of the First World War. Throughout that time Britain continued to advocate free trade. As with China in the 21st century, the fear that the rise of a new economic power and the decline of U.S. preponderance may inhibit free trade due to the impossibility of the hegemon to influence the economic policy of other countries is unsubstantiated. As illustrated with the example of Great Britain, the hegemon can rarely influence economic policies when a state’s government or electorate is opposed to the policy since hegemony is built on some form of tacit consensus and economic interdependence between nations.

#### Trade ties and economic exchange would be safer in a world of U.S. withdrawal.

**Layne 2006**

Christopher (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) “The Peace of Illusions” p 177-8

Advocates of hegemony (and selective engagement) also seem to have a peculiar understanding of international economics and convey the impression that international trade and investment will come to a grinding halt if the United States abandons its current grand strategy—or if a Eurasian great power war occurs. This is not true, however. If the United States abandons its current grand strategic role as the protector of international economic openness, international economic intercourse will not stop, even in time of great power war.110 If the United States were to adopt an offshore balancing grand strategy, its own and global markets would adapt to the new political and strategic environment. Finns and investors would reassess the risks of overseas trade and investment, and over time investment and trade flows would shift in response to these calculations. Instead of being diminished, international trade and investment would be diverted to more geopolitically secure regions, and these "safe havens"—especially the United States—would be the beneficiaries. Finally, the assumption that a Eurasia dominated by a hegemon would be closed economically to the United States is dubious. AEurasian hegemon would have a stake in its own economic well-being (bothfor strategic and domestic political reasons), and it would be most unlikely to hive itself off completely from international trade.

# Hegemony Good

## Heg Good – Uniqueness

### Hegemony high 1nc

#### Their uniqueness arguments are wrong—the U.S. remains far ahead despite economic and foreign policy problems

Robert J. Lieber, Professor, Government and International Affairs, Georgetown University, “Can the US Retain Primacy?” ISRAEL JOURNAL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS v.3, 2011, p. 23.

True, there has been a degree of erosion in America’s economic and military power relative to other countries. However, the margin of strength vis-a-vis other international actors has been so wide that despite some attrition, the US still remains in a unique position as compared with other countries. In contrast to the British experience of imperial decline a century ago, America continues to possess a substantial edge, whether measured in terms of its share of world GDP, depth and size of financial markets, technology, demography, or military power projection. In the percentage of GDP devoted to defense it is not truly overstretched. Even with the costs of war in Afghanistan and continuing military commitments in Iraq and elsewhere, current defense spending at 4.9 percent of GDP remains well below Cold War levels, which averaged 8.7 percent in the 1960s, 5.9 percent in the 1970s, and 5.8 percent in the 1980s.

#### Even if others are catching up, lead is so big that the U.S. remains predominant

Robert J. Lieber, Professor, Government and International Affairs, Georgetown University, "Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy, Policy, and Trand Strategy, JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES v. 34 n. 4 2011, ASP.

The declinist proposition that America's international primacy is collapsing as a result of the rise of other countries should also be regarded with caution. On the one hand, the US does face a more competitive world, regional challenges, and some attrition of its relative degree of primacy. This process, or diffusion of power, is not exclusive to the post-Cold War era, but began at least four decades ago with the recovery of Europe and Japan from World War II, the rise of the Soviet Union to superpower status, and the emergence of regional powers in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. 47 Yet in contrast to other great powers that have experienced decline the United States has held a substantially more dominant position. For example, Britain at the start of the twentieth century was already falling behind Germany and the United States, though it did manage to continue for half a century as head of a vast Empire and Commonwealth. Because of the enormous margin of power the US possessed after the end of the Cold War, it should be able to withstand erosion in its relative strength for some time to come without losing its predominant status. While it is true that the weight of important regional powers has increased, many of these are allied or friendly. Those that are not (Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela) do not by themselves constitute serious balancing against the United States and its allies. Russia occupies an intermediate position, at times acting as a spoiler, but not an outright adversary. China presents a potentially more formidable challenge, notably through its growing economic might and in rapid expansion of its military, but has not yet sought to become a true peer competitor. In any case, and despite the burden of a decade of war in the Near East, America continues to possess significant advantages in critical sectors such as economic size, technology, competitiveness, demographics, force size, power projection, military technology, and even in learning how to carry out effective counterinsurgency, and thus retains the capacity to meet key objectives. In sum, though the US predominates by lesser margins, it still remains a long way from being overtaken by peer competitors. However, given profound disagreements about policy, intense partisan rancor among political elites, growing social class division, distrust of government, and deep disagreement about foreign commitments, non-material factors could prove to be a greater impediment to staying power than more commonly cited indicators of economic strength and military over-stretch. Can the American political system produce effective measures to cope with long term burdens of entitlement programs and national debt? Will cultural and generational differences about the uses and even legitimacy of American power lead to abandonment of a global leadership role? And are persistent foreign threats, especially from terrorism and nuclear proliferation, likely to sustain a domestic consensus or instead lead to intensified polarization and retrenchment? The United States retains the power and capacity to play a leading world role. The ultimate questions about America's future are likely to be those of policy and will.

### Hegemony high 2nc

#### Leads now: financial crisis overstated, relative power untouched, immigration, reserve currency

Moises Naim, "Why the United States Will Remain the Strongest Country in the World," FOX NEWS LATINO, 8--9--11, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/08/09/why-united-states-will-remain-strongest-country-in-world/4lko>

The downgrade crisis, and the financial mess that preceded it, has resulted in a raft of doomsday-like pronouncements on the future of the United States. According to the well-known author Christopher Hitchens, "the U.S. financial crisis is just the latest example of the trend that threatens to put the country on a par with Zimbabwe, Venezuela and Equatorial Guinea." Not only that, counters Nicholas Kristof, the New York Times columnist: "It is the unequal distribution of wealth that puts the United States on the same level as banana republics like Nicaragua, Venezuela or Guyana.” Russian President Vladimir Putin goes even further: “In fact, the U.S. is a parasite that lives off of the global economy." American political leaders, meanwhile, respond with finger-pointing. For Mitt Romney, one of the leading Republican presidential hopefuls, the problem is that the U.S. is "...only inches away from ceasing to be a free market economy." And President Barack Obama regrets that his country "does not have an AAA political system to match its AAA credit." It is too easy, these days, to conclude that the United States is a political and economic disaster-zone and that it may not remain the most powerful country in the world. For those who already had doubts about American supremacy, the shameful negotiations about the debt ceiling were the final confirmation that the superpower is in freefall. And, of course, the collapse of the stock market and the possibility that the economy is diving back into recession are yet further manifestations of an unstoppable American debacle. This conclusion, so obvious to so many, is wrong. Here’s why: 1) Some of the main pillars of America’s international dominance are still the world’s strongest. Wall Street, the Pentagon, Hollywood, Silicon Valley, universities and many other sources continue to be unmatched by their foreign rivals. The stock market is taking a beating and budget cuts will weaken many sectors, including, for the first time in decades, the Armed Forces. Still, the current U.S. advantage over its rivals is so large that these cuts will not threaten its position at the top. For example: America’s Coast Guard has more ships than the entire fleets of the 12 largest navies in the world. It is not for nothing that the U.S. spends more on defense than any other country. And in other strategic areas, U.S. supremacy, while under stress and challenged, is still strong. 2) Absolute power does not matter. What matters is relative power compared to rivals. Although the U.S. may be declining in absolute power, its closest competitors also have grave problems and face difficult internal and external threats, both political and economic. These problems weaken them as much or more than those besetting the U.S. 3) Demographics. In almost all rich countries the population is growing slowly or declining. In the U.S. it is increasing. In addition, it remains a magnet for the world's most talented and entrepreneurial people. It is also a country that not only integrates immigrants quickly but it also knows better than most others how to give them opportunities and use them more productively, especially those who are more skilled and better educated. 4) When there’s a global financial panic and investors are seeking a safe haven for their savings, where do they turn? To the United States. As all stock markets are tumbling, the appetite for buying U.S. Treasuries continues unabated. Such was the demand for these bonds, last week that their yields fell to their lowest level in history. The first Monday of trading after the Standard and Poor's downgrade, the demand for U.S. treasury bonds soared. Investors did not care that they would get a minimal return on their capital, their priority was to ensure that they were investing in the bonds of a government that would keep their capital safe. Amazing, huh? We are talking about the same government and the same bonds whose solvency is being fiercely contested. Even a downgrading by the rating agency Standard & Poor's of U.S. sovereign bonds did not produce capital flight from that market. The global financial market gave a resounding answer to those who maintain that the unfortunate debate in Washington over the debt ceiling did irreversible damage to U.S. credit. That idea may play well in editorials and talk shows, but it has been dismissed by those who know about money. Investors speak with deeds, not words. And their decisions show that they believe the U.S. government bonds still offer the safest investment in the world. In the long run the S&P downgrade may end up hurting the credibility of S&P more than the credit of the United States government. 5) The influence of radical and destructive political factions will be temporary. The rise of extremist groups with ideas, which suddenly dominate the political scene only to disappear just as quickly as they appeared, is a recurrent phenomenon in the U.S. McCarthyism and the various populist movements are examples of this. Ross Perot is another. And the Tea Party will be just one more. This will become clear as the practical consequences of the Tea Party ideology will become better known and, more importantly, felt. This includes the groups that have been so easily energized by the Tea Party's anti-Washington rhetoric. Is the United States facing enormous problems? Yes. Does it have more global competitors challenging its supremacy? Of course. Has it been weakened? Yes. More than other countries? No. Will it remain, for the foreseeable future, the most powerful country in the world? Yes.

### Hegemony High – Economy

#### U.S. economy remains in the lead—seen as safe haven from other global risks

Eurasia Group, TOP RISKS: 2012, 1—3—12, p. 4-5.

Like Europe and the Middle East, the G-Zero hits the United States, but in a way that highlights continuing US advantages. As Europe’s troubles continue to roil markets, America’s safe-haven status trumps concerns with deficits, keeping interest rates down and easing pressure on Washington to deal with long-term fiscal challenges. With economic indicators improving, there’s not as much urgency on this issue as media hype would have you believe, and it’s not surprising that a politically deadlocked Washington continues to push off tough decisions until after the 2012 elections. The rubber will hit the road very quickly after the ballots are counted—but on two much narrower issues.

#### U.S. maintains economic leadership—still controls a big chunk of the global economy

Robert Kagan, senior fellow, foreign policy, Brookings Institution, “Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline,” THE NEW REPUBLIC, 1—11—12, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism/, accessed 6-9-12

The answer is no. Let’s start with the basic indicators. In economic terms, and even despite the current years of recession and slow growth, America’s position in the world has not changed. Its share of the world’s GDP has held remarkably steady, not only over the past decade but over the past four decades. In 1969, the United States produced roughly a quarter of the world’s economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter, and it remains not only the largest but also the richest economy in the world. People are rightly mesmerized by the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations whose share of the global economy has been climbing steadily, but this has so far come almost entirely at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have had a declining share of the global economy.

#### Economy is overwhelmingly strong—export growth

Daniel Gross, journalist, “Myth of Decline: U.S. Is Stronger and Faster than Anywhere Else,” NEWSWEEK, 4—30—12, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/04/29/myth-of-decline-u-s-is-stronger-and-faster-than-anywhere-else.html accessed 6-9-12.

To hear declinists tell it, the U.S. doesn’t make anything anymore. Well, yes, except for the $180 billion in goods and services Americans export every month. Outside the U.S., there are 6.6 billion people with generally rising living standards who are willing and eager to buy what Americans are selling. Since bottoming in April 2009 at $124 billion, monthly exports have risen nearly 50 percent. In 2010, when the economy added 1.03 million new jobs, the number of jobs supported by exports rose by 500,000, from 8.7 million to 9.2 million. More people around the world are eating better, which is good, because the U.S. is to food what Saudi Arabia is to oil. Agricultural exports hit a record $115.8 billion in 2010, and in 2011 soared to $136 billion—nearly double the 2007 total. In a modern-day analogue of carrying coals to Newcastle, the U.S. ships beef to Brazil, rice to Japan, and soybeans to China ($9.19 billion worth in 2009 alone). Total exports to China soared from $41.2 billion in 2005 to $104 billion in 2011. “Every unit that gets manufactured in this site this year is going to be exported,” General Electric CEO Jeff Immelt told employees at the company’s gas-turbine plant in Greenville, S.C., in the spring of 2011. I accompanied Immelt as he walked through the immaculate factory. The 2011 production schedule called for 90 such electricity-generating units, at about $25 million each. Small companies have transformed into export powerhouses, as well. Wallquest, a family-owned high-end wallpaper company outside Philadelphia, saw exports rise from 35 percent of sales in 2009 to 65 percent in 2010, as orders streamed in from Russia, Saudi Arabia, and China.

#### U.S. continues to lead economically—entire economy is regenerating

Daniel Gross, journalist, “Myth of Decline: U.S. Is Stronger and Faster than Anywhere Else,” NEWSWEEK, 4—30—12, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/04/29/myth-of-decline-u-s-is-stronger-and-faster-than-anywhere-else.html accessed 6-9-12.

The U.S. is losing primacy in geopolitics, but it remains the indispensable economic nation. The systems that American companies have invented are being put to vital use. Egypt’s pro-democracy activists organized on Facebook. Syrian dissidents make videos of clashes with the Army on iPhones and upload them for the world to see on YouTube. Highly productive American farmers are feeding the world. Planes manufactured by Boeing provide mobility to people in Africa. It’s easy to look at the record of the past few years and despair. The U.S. has a very long way to go to make up for lost ground in housing and, especially, in jobs. The resurgence of the corporate sector, which provides ample reason for optimism, hasn’t translated into new positions for the legions of unemployed. But here, too, there’s positive news. Since February 2010, the private sector, which accounts for 83 percent of all employment, has added nearly 4.1 million jobs, or about 160,000 per month. That’s not sufficient, but it’s a sign that the jobs machine is clearly working again. The public sector has been the sole source of job loss: austerity-minded government entities have cut a million jobs since 2010. But the sharp reductions have come to a halt. In the months since the Lehman debacle, the U.S. has no more lost its ability to grow and innovate than reality-TV producers have lost their ability to coax skanky behavior out of New Jersey’s youth. And despite all the headwinds, there’s no reason the expansion that started in July 2009 can’t go on as long as the previous three, which lasted 73 months, 120 months, and 92 months, respectively. When the definitive history of this period is written, it is possible—no, likely—that this post-bust era will go down not as a time of economic decline, but as one of regeneration.

### Hegemony High – A2 economy low

#### U.S. economy growing

Sherter 12 (Alain Sherter, columnist for CBS MoneyWatch, “U.S. economy growing faster than forecast”, CBS MoneyWatch, a finance website that provides advice on retirement, investing, savings, career and real estate, 11/29/12, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123\_162-57556104/u.s-economy-growing-faster-than-forecast//HZ)

(MoneyWatch) The U.S. economy got an early holiday gift Thursday when the U.S. Commerce Department announced that growth in the third quarter was 2.7 percent, topping a previous forecast. ¶ While the latest economic snapshot is good news for Americans, it raises the heat on Congress and President Barack Obama to reach a deal to avoid taking the nation off the so-called "fiscal cliff," a package of mandated government spending cuts and expiring tax breaks scheduled to take effect in January. That could throw the economy in reverse just as it appears to be gaining speed.¶ The new GDP figures are an update of the agency's estimate last month of 2 percent growth in the July-to-September period. The revised numbers, which are adjusted seasonally, offer a more accurate picture of growth than the government's initial forecast. The economy grew 1.9 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively, in the first and second quarters.¶ Propelling the growth in GDP was stronger consumer spending, federal outlays, expanding business inventories and a renewed housing sector, the Commerce Department said. ¶ Yet the latest report also suggests the economy may be slowing slightly in the fourth quarter. Drags on growth include exports, which slid 1.6 percent for the quarter, compared with a 5.3 percent rise in the previous quarter, and shrinking investment in non-residential real estate. Gains in household income also fell, which could reduce consumer spending in future months. ¶ Much of the growth for the quarter, at 0.8 percent, came from businesses building up inventories. Because they may not need to re-stock in the current quarter, that could effectively steal growth from the last three months of the year. "The bigger the build-up in the third quarter, the more likely we are to see a run down in the fourth," said Paul Ashworth, chief U.S. economist with Capital Economics, in a research note. ¶ Another 0.7 percent of GDP growth stemmed from increased federal spending, mostly for defense. The government is likely to curb such spending in the current quarter, which also could reduce growth. ¶ Perhaps most critically for the recovery, housing around the U.S. continues to show steady, if unexceptional, gains. For the third quarter, home prices around the nation were up 3.6 percent from the year ago-period, according to the Case-Shiller index, and sales of existing houses have grown roughly 10 percent from a year ago. Driving that rebound: Low mortgage rates, which are luring home buyers back into the market and a declining stock of new and existing homes.¶ Rising real estate prices allow homeowners who owe more on their mortgages than their properties are worth to recoup equity. In shedding debt and recovering some of the wealth that vaporized during the housing crash, people are freer to spend, which fuels broader economic expansion.¶ ¶ On the supply side, rising housing values and sales give homebuilders an incentive to put up new homes. As a result, construction expanded across most of the Federal Reserve's 12 districts, the central bank said Wednesday, with new starts roughly 40 percent above year-ago levels.¶ For now, that momentum looks likely to continue. A growing number of Americans plan to buy a home within the next six months, according to the Conference Board, a trade association representing businesses. Patrick Newport, U.S. economist with IHS Global Insight, also said in a report this week that the research firm expects home prices to continue rising over the next five years, although not much faster than inflation.¶ ¶ The other major engine for the economy this year has been consumer spending. That fell slightly in the quarter, to 1.4 percent, down from 2 percent in the previous estimate, Commerce reported. Yet many economists expect that to rebound next year. One good sign is that the key holiday shopping season is off to a good start, fueled by strong Black Friday sales, and expectations for the final month of the year are generally upbeat. ¶ Consumer spending accounts for roughly 70 percent of economic activity. As Americans have continued to spend, even amid mounting public attention on the fiscal cliff, more businesses have started hiring.¶ The number of Americans applying for jobless benefits fell 23,000 last week to 393,000, the U.S. Labor Department said today. The labor market has strengthened in recent months, with the government revising upward previous job-creation estimates. Unemployment fell last month in more than half of the 372 biggest U.S. cities, according to the government. ¶ Despite these tailwinds, job-creation remains too weak to significantly reduce the nation's 7.9 percent unemployment rate. Hiring has shown only modest improvement in recent weeks, according to the Fed. Meanwhile, much of that job growth has been for temporary and part-time workers, while the long-term unemployed still struggle to find work. Unemployment is expected to remain well above 7 percent through the end of 2013, according to research firm Macroeconomic Advisers.¶ In the short term, much depends on how -- and when -- the impasse over the fiscal cliff is resolved.¶ The Congressional Budget Office forecasts that implementing all the planned government spending cuts and tax hikes would reduce real GDP by 0.5 percent in 2013. That would dent spending and push up the jobless rate. But with the automatic cuts phased in over 10 years and tax increases initially taking a relatively small bite out of people's income, the damage could be limited if lawmakers reach a deal early next year.

#### U.S. economy growing at a faster rate than expected

The Guardian 3/28/13 (The Guardian, a British national newspaper”, 3/28/13, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/mar/28/us-economy-grows-faster-rate//HZ)

The US economy grew at a moderately faster rate at the end of last year than previously reported, but the pace of growth remains sluggish, the Commerce Department said on Thursday.¶ In the final quarter of 2013, the US economy expanded at an annual rate of 0.4%. That was slightly better than the previous estimate of 0.1% growth. The revision reflected stronger business investment and export sales.¶ Analysts think the economy is growing at a rate of around 2.5% in the current January-March quarter, which ends this week.¶ Steady hiring has kept consumers spending this year. And a rebound in company stockpiling, further gains in housing and more business spending also likely drove faster growth in the first quarter.¶ The 0.4% growth rate for the gross domestic product, the economy's total output of goods and services, was the weakest quarterly performance in almost two years and followed a much faster 3.1% increase in the third quarter. The fourth quarter was hurt by the sharpest fall in defense spending in 40 years.¶ For all of 2012, the economy grew 2.2% after a 1.8% increase in 2011 and a 2.4% advance in 2010. Since the recession ended in mid-2009, the economy has been expanding at sub-par rates as a string of problems from higher gas prices to Europe's debt crisis have acted as a drag on the US economy.¶ Growth appears to be strengthening this year even after taxes increased on Jan. 1 and automatic government spending cuts totaling $85 billion started to take effect on March 1. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the combination of tax increases and spending cuts could trim economic growth this year by about 1.5 percentage points. The CBO is predicting just 1.5% growth for 2013.¶ But so far, the economy is showing signs of holding its own against the fiscal drag.¶ Employers have added an average of 200,000 jobs a month since November. That helped lower the unemployment rate in February to 7.7%, a four-year low.¶ Economists expect similar job gains in March, in part because a measure of unemployment benefit applications fell this month to a five-year low.¶ Sales of previously occupied homes rose in February to the highest level in nearly three years, while builders broke ground on more houses and apartments. Annual home prices jumped in January by the most since June 2006, according to a closely watched measure.¶ Stock prices have surged. On Wednesday, the Standard & Poor's 500 index was within two points of its all-time high.¶ All of that is making consumers feel wealthier, which could lead to more spending. Consumer spending drives 70% of economic activity.¶ The Federal Reserve still thinks the economy needs aggressive measures to bolster growth. Last week it stood by its plan to keep a key short-term interest rate near zero until unemployment drops below 6.5%. The Fed also left unchanged its plan to keep buying $85 billion in bonds until it sees a substantial improvement in the job market.¶ The slowdown in business inventories trimmed 1.5 percentage points from growth in the fourth quarter and the reductions in defense spending cut another 1.3 percentage points from growth.¶ Consumer spending was growing at a 1.8% rate in the fourth quarter, slightly better than the 1.6% increase in the third quarter but down from last month's estimate that consumer spending was growing by 2.1%.¶ That revision was offset by upward revisions in business investment spending on structures and equipment and by stronger sales of US exports.¶ The government first estimated two months ago that the economy had contracted at an annual rate of 0.1% in the fourth quarter, a decline that was erased by the revisions.¶ The government will release its first look at first quarter growth in 2013 on 26 April.

#### U.S. economy will rebound

Schwartz 6/16/13 (Nelson Schwartz, columnist for The Boston Globe, “Analysts forecast solid growth for US economic rebound”, The Boston Globe, an American daily newspaper based in Boston, Massachusetts, 6/16/13, http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/06/15/analysts-predict-solid-growth-for-economic-rebound/QVdFATRCoX4pngCFqrwRII/story.html//HZ)

NEW YORK — For more than a decade, the economy has failed to grow the way it once did. Unemployment has not stayed this high, this long, since the 1930s.¶ But could the New Normal, as this long economic slog has been called, be growing old?¶ That is the surprising new view of a number of economists in academia and on Wall Street, who are now predicting something the United States has not experienced in years: healthier, more lasting growth.¶ The improving outlook is one reason the stock market has risen so sharply this year, even if street-level evidence for a turnaround, like strong job growth and income gains, has been scant so far.¶ A prominent convert to this emerging belief is Tyler Cowen, an economics professor at George Mason University near Washington and author of “The Great Stagnation,” a 2011 bestseller, who has gone from doomsayer to a decidedly more optimistic perspective.¶ He is not predicting an imminent resurgence. Like most academic economists, Cowen focuses on the next quarter-century rather than the next quarter. But new technologies like artificial intelligence and online education, increased domestic energy production, and slowing growth in the cost of health care have prompted Cowen to reappraise the country’s prospects.¶ “It’s better than it looked,” Cowen said. “Technological progress comes in batches and it’s just a little more rapid than it looked two years ago.” His next book, “Average Is Over: Powering America Beyond the Age of the Great Stagnation,” is due out in September.¶ Certainly, there are significant national headwinds that will not abate anytime soon, including an aging population, government austerity, the worst income inequality in nearly a century, and more than 4 million long-term unemployed workers.¶ These and other forces prompted some leading economists, led by Robert J. Gordon of Northwestern, to conclude not long ago that the arc of American economic growth for centuries was over, to be replaced by decades of stagnation. Productivity might grow steadily, Gordon argued, but the benefits will not flow to most Americans.¶ Other analysts are challenging that perspective, which they said was colored, in part, by the severe downturn that hit the global economy more than five years ago. And some of them now see a brighter outlook right around the corner, not just far into the future.¶ Two widely followed economic forecasters, Morgan Stanley and IHS Global Insight, have both increased their estimates for growth in recent days.¶ “It’s been a long time coming,” said Nariman Behravesh, chief economist at IHS. “There is more optimism about the US and in particular about the second half of this year and 2014. Three months ago, we wouldn’t have come to that same conclusion.”¶ Indeed, a number of forecasters are now predicting that the expansion, which began in 2009 and has remained subpar ever since, might prove to be far more durable than the typical five-to-six-year growth cycle, in part because of the absence of the traditional boom, then bust pattern.¶ In particular, Behravesh and other economists said, the economy has shown greater resilience than expected in the face of tax increases and spending cuts in Washington. As the impact from this fiscal tightening eases, the overall growth rate should pick up.¶ Behravesh now expects the annual growth rate to rise to 2.9 percent in 2014 and 3.5 percent in 2015. If he’s right, it would mark the fastest annual growth since 2005, when the economy expanded by 3.1 percent. It is also well above the 2 percent rise in output the economy has averaged over the last three years.¶ The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office also sees relatively fast growth of 3.4 percent next year, and 3.6 percent between 2015 and 2018.¶ A few other private economists are even more bullish. Jim Glassman, senior economist at JP Morgan Chase’s commercial bank, estimates the economy could expand by 4 percent in both 2014 and 2015. If that were to come to pass, it would be the strongest back-to-back annual growth since the late 1990s.¶ “I think 2014 will be the real deal,” Glassman said. “If we get to that level, which I feel pretty confident about, economists will say it’s about time.”¶ Martin Neil Baily, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Bill Clinton, said he has always been skeptical of Gordon’s long-term view but has recently become more hopeful about the short-term as well.¶ “I don’t buy the historical wave theory,” he said. “He’s right that there are headwinds like slowing population growth but the tech revolution is still very much happening.”¶ In terms of the immediate future, “I thought there was a distinct possibility that spending cuts and tax increases might stall the economy,” he said. “I’m more optimistic now because we seem to be weathering it. There is a sense that we are going to get through this.”

#### The U.S. still has the strongest economy in the world

Sharma 12 (Ruchir Sharma, columnist for The Atlantic, “Comeback Nation: Why the U.S. Economy Is Much Stronger Than You Think”, The Atlantic, an American magazine that covers news on politics, business, culture, and technology, 8/3/12, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/08/comeback-nation-why-the-us-economy-is-much-stronger-than-you-think/260634//HZ)

Usain Bolt is the most dominant sprinter the world has seen in a century, perhaps more, so when he runs at the London games, anything less than victory by a blistering margin will be greeted as a disappointment. Results are always relative to expectations, and this as true for global economic competition as for the 100-meter dash. These days, the United States is an underestimated underdog, while China is still widely seen as something more like Bolt. The expectations gap is crucial to parsing the confused public discussion of the American recovery, and what it means for America's future.¶ Since the crisis of 2008, most Americans have come to expect gloom rather than gold in the near future. The long-term US growth rate is now burdened by our huge debts, and is slowing to 2.5 percent, down from 3.4 percent between 1950 and 2007. This fall is stoking a premature sense that American preeminence is already over. Polls show that a majority of Americans think China is already the world's "leading" economy, even though it is still about one third the size of the U.S. economy. The reality is that, at 2.5 percent growth, the US remains the fastest-growing rich economy, and is in fact regaining some of the recent ground lost to newcomers like China.¶ America's performance should be measured against the current competition, not against the records it set in the 1990s or 2000s. All the big emerging markets are slowing, most notably China, which has lowered its growth target to under 8 percent for the first time in many years and may well fall under 7 percent. It is hard to grow at a sprinter's pace when you are hitting middle age, growing careful and a bit fat. China is all three, having recently reached an average real income of more than $5,000, with a total GDP of more than $7 trillion, and a new taste for welfare state programs. Every "miracle economy," from Japan in the 1970s to South Korea in the 1990s, slowed at this real income level.¶ Unhappily, for those who like to imagine that globalization can produce "win-win" finishes, China's slowdown will be America's gain. The story of American growth slipping by a point will pale in comparison to the three or even four point slip in China. If the U.S. grows 2.5 percent this year, and China slips to 7 percent, the United States should regain the title it lost to China in 2007: that of the single largest contributor to global growth.¶ This year, the United States will also grow faster than the global average for the first time since 2003, the year an unprecedented boom in emerging market growth began. For the next four years, emerging market growth doubled to over 7.0 percent, creating the widespread perception that the rich nations of the West were being overtaken by the rise of the poor. Now, the historic norm is reasserting itself -- the big emerging nations are slowing dramatically, and the coming years are once again likely to produce more laggards than winners. As of 2007 the emerging markets were on average growing three times faster than the United States; now they are growing only twice as fast.¶ Evidence of an American revival, against both developed and emerging world competition, is mounting, driven by the traditional strengths of the American economy--its ability to innovate and adapt quickly. America's worst worries -- heavy debt, slow growth, the fall of the dollar and the decline of manufacturing -- will look much less troubling when compared to its direct rivals. While US growth has slowed by a full point so has growth in Japan and Europe, leaving the United States on top of the league of rich nations.¶ In a global economy that is increasingly shaped by competing forms of capitalism, the American brand appears to be winning. Consider the key challenge of "deleveraging" or digging out from debt. A new study from the McKinsey Global Institute shows that the United States is the only major developed economy that is even loosely following the path of countries that successfully negotiated similar debt-induced recessions, like Sweden and Finland in the 1990s. Total debt as a share of GDP has fallen since 2008 by 16 percent in the United States, while rising in Germany and rising sharply in Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain. As in Sweden during the 90s, the fall in total US debt is due entirely to sharp cuts in the private sector, particularly the finance industry and private households.¶ The weak link in the U.S. response to the debt crisis is the government. The Scandinavian cases show that government needs to start cutting spending and debt roughly four years after the downturn -- exactly the stage where the US is today. Washington has so far failed to put in place a plan for long-term debt reduction, in part because some politicians and pundits are still pushing for more borrowing to ward off "depression." The Scandinavian cases suggest this is exactly the wrong worry right now. The public debt is a big reason that long-term US growth is likely to slow, but even then, it is important to keep America's debt problem in perspective. China is arguably worse off, with total debt equal to 180 percent of GDP. The more wealthy you are, the more debt you can carry, so America's total debt (350 percent) is actually less of a challenge.¶ The most dramatic signs of a US revival are in manufacturing. Even as it was losing out to emerging manufacturing powers in the last decade, the U.S. was reacting much more quickly than other rich nations, by restraining wage growth, boosting the productivity of remaining workers with new technology, allowing a steady fall in the dollar that has made US exports much more competitive, particularly relative to Euro nations, and incorporating inexpensive new foreign sources into its supply chains. The result was that China's rise came largely at Europe's expense. Since 2004 China has gained market share in the export of goods and of manufactured goods, while Europe's share is falling and the US share has held steady. After losing 6 million manufacturing jobs in the last decade, the US gained half a million in the last 18 months while Europe, Canada and Japan lost jobs or saw no change.¶ Energy is also rapidly emerging as an American competitive advantage. After falling for 25 years, the share of the US energy supply that comes from domestic sources has been rising since 2005, from 69 percent to around 80 percent, due to increasing production of oil and particularly natural gas. This is pushing US natural gas prices to the lowest rates in the world, inspiring manufacturers to relocate to the United States. Textiles was one of the first industries to leave the developed world, but recently Santana Textiles moved from Mexico to the US due to energy costs.¶ The big danger in the U.S. remains that the government will fail to attack the debt problem. Just as it makes no sense to analyze emerging markets in terms of generic rubrics like BRICs, developed markets also need to be analyzed as individual stories. The dramatically different approaches of the developed nations to the basic challenges -- deleveraging and maintaining strength in manufacturing -- is going to put them on very different growth paths. And if you compare the United States to its rich peers, it has the best chance to be a Breakout Nation, particularly if Washington can get its game together and attack the public debt.

#### U.S. economy growth is key to hegemony

Kempe 12 (Frederick Kempe, columnist for Reuters, “America’s second chance at global leadership”, Reuters, an international news agency, 11/29/12, http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/2012/12/11/americas-second-chance-at-global-leadership//HZ)

Read between the lines of the U.S. intelligence community’s quadrennial global trends report, a document released this week that has significant influence on White House thinking, and the message to President Obama is clear.¶ First, the United States is at a far more crucial juncture of human history than most Americans realize – reminiscent of 1815, 1918, 1945 and 1989. Second, the United States has something that is unprecedented among the world’s great powers, a second chance to shape the international economic and political system.¶ Read more deeply, and you’ll find a stark warning for the president within the National Intelligence Council’s 140-page “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds” report. The world may suffer severe consequences – ranging from economic slowdown and environmental catastrophe to violent conflict and global anarchy – if the U.S. fails to act, escape the fiscal cliff, restore its political effectiveness, revive its economic competitiveness, and engage China and a host of other rising actors.¶ The NIC lays out the stakes clearly for the U.S.:¶ How the U.S. evolves over the next 15-20 years – a big uncertainty – and whether the U.S. will be able to work with new partners to reinvent the international system will be among the most important variables in the future shape of the global order. Although the United States’ (and the West’s) relative decline vis-à-vis the rising states is inevitable, its future role in the international system is much harder to project: the degree to which the U.S. continues to dominate the international system could vary widely.¶ The challenge for U.S. leaders is that their margin of error is much smaller than it was after World War II. Then, America’s share of global GDP was 50% – more than twice what it is today. A mixture of post-war devastation and American economic and military dominance empowered the U.S. to construct, with friends and allies, a global institutional architecture that included the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a host of others.¶ Today, the relative decline of U.S. political and economic power, an ongoing euro zone crisis that saps key allies’ energies and confidence, and the rise of China weaken American leverage. According to the NIC report, by 2030, Asia will surpass North America and Europe“in terms of global power.” The factors are a combination of economic size, population, military spending and technological investment. The NIC says China will pass U.S. GDP in the 2020’s.¶ Though dampened, America’s ability to lead remains significant through 2030 due to its unique economic, social and military assets and the lack of any single or group of powers willing to supplant its global role.¶ Beyond that, many of the trends outlined by the NIC report may be uniquely favorable to U.S. prospects, including new energy extraction and manufacturing technologies that could in the best case help underpin average economic growth for the U.S. by as much as 2.7 percent per year through 2030.¶ The NIC also focuses on technology-driven “individual empowerment” as the first of four megatrends that will reduce poverty and double the size of the global middle class through 2030. The report calls it a “tectonic shift” that means “for the first time, a majority of the world’s population will not be impoverished.” This is not a guarantee of a move toward greater democracy or western values, but middle class populations make greater demands for accountable, responsible, transparent governance. Individual empowerment, however, has a darker side that means individuals and small groups will have greater access to lethal and disruptive technologies, “enabling them to perpetrate large-scale violence – a capability formerly the monopoly of states.”¶ The NIC, which serves as the intelligence community’s center for medium and long-term analysis, does not have a mandate to recommend policy from its findings. That is left to organizations like the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based think tank and public policy group. (Disclosure: I am president of the council and, in its non-government capacity, it has convened many of the global workshops that contributed to the NIC report).¶ The Atlantic Council’s report – “Envisioning 2030: US Strategy for a Post-Western World,” proposes an approach that starts with President Obama recognizing the magnitude of the moment and the likelihood that his actions now will have consequences that will be felt for generations.¶ President Obama has been right to focus on “nation-building at home.” U.S. economic and innovative strength is the foundation for any global leadership role. However, even a revitalized U.S. economy won’t be enough to secure the future.¶ The U.S., with less absolute power, must act more creatively and collaboratively. What one already sees in the Arab Awakening in the Middle East is that national power will compete with new, multifaceted and amorphous networks – enabled by technology and instant communication.¶ At the same time, the U.S. must safeguard its longest standing alliance, NATO, and its most important strategic asset, Europe, by helping its allies manage the euro zone crisis while promoting a transatlantic free trade, investment and economic cooperation agreement.¶ The Obama administration must also deepen U.S.-Chinese cooperation, the most important single factor shaping the international system. A broad array of issues are at stake, such as multilateral institutions, the global financial system, the nuclear future, cyber security, climate change and global resource scarcity.¶ The Obama administration also has an immediate need to address instability in the greater Middle East, from North Africa to Pakistan, where potential threats include nuclear-armed regional powers, failed nuclear states and terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.¶ Perhaps the most powerful message to President Obama from the NIC report is the following: Getting re-elected was the easy part. How he manages this juncture in human history, a much more difficult task, will determine his legacy.

### Hegemony High – military

#### The U.S. maintains unmatched military supremacy

Robert Kagan, senior fellow, foreign policy, Brookings Institution, “Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline,” THE NEW REPUBLIC, 1—11—12, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism/, accessed 6-9-12

Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, “military strength underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America’s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually—a higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior expenditures underestimate America’s actual superiority in military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire’s relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not yet arrived.

#### U.S. still enjoys a massive military advantage

Peter Feaver, Professor, Professor, Political Science and Public Policy, Duke University, “American Strategy: Grand vs. Grandiose,” AMERICA’S PATH: GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION, ed. R.Fontaine & K.M. Lord, Center for a New American Century, 5—12, p. 63.

America’s military advantage relative to others is greater than its economic advantage. In terms of share of global gross domestic product, the power of the United States is somewhat less than what it was roughly half a century ago, and it will likely recede slowly, if at all, over the next several decades. In terms of share of military power projection – the capacity to deploy substantial military forces far from the homeland – the United States has enjoyed a large and growing advantage over rivals for the past two decades. In the coming years, that advantage could begin to recede as the Chinese military ramps up.

#### Military power unmatched--Iraq/Afghanistan didn't hurt

Robert J. Lieber, Professor, Government and International Affairs, Georgetown University, "Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy, Policy, and Trand Strategy, JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES v. 34 n. 4 2011, ASP.

In addition, the American military remains unmatched and despite intense stress from nearly a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq it has not suffered the disarray that afflicted it in Vietnam. This is evident in terms of indicators such as successful recruitment and performance of the volunteer force, the ongoing quality of the officer corps, and broad public support for the military as well as casualty tolerance. Moreover, in its capabilities, technology, capacity to project power, and command of the global commons – as dramatically evident in the recent take-down of Osama bin Laden – the US has actually increased its military margin as compared with others, though with the important exception of China.

### Hegemony High – Soft Power

#### **Hegemony is sustainable, no rising powers want to overtake and soft power guarantees**

Aboutalebi 13’

Sina Aboutalebi · International Affairs Researcher & Analyst, June 26, 2013 “American Leadership in a Revised Unipolar World”, <http://sinaaboutalebi.com/tag/american-innovation/>, DA: 7/15/2013

Granted, the United States has retained some [key competitive advantages](http://www.policymic.com/articles/1739/u-s-remains-the-only-superpower) it still enjoys. The United States is at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in computers, medicine and aerospace making it the [world’s leading innovation hub](http://images.businessweek.com/ss/09/03/0312_innovative_countries/24.htm). In fact, the United States government is still the global leader in [research and development spending](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324677204578185552846123468.html). As mentioned earlier, the United States has world-class institutions of higher education that are the envy of the world. Not to mention the predominance of American films, music and iconic products worldwide that has translated to [soft power](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power) in political terms. The United States has enjoyed these advantages for several generations and with no direct competition from any other single country, the United States will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. This despite there being no appropriate historical models for the United States to follow.¶ Although unipolarity never quite existed before the end of the Cold War, there have been times in history when certain powers did dominate. But even among these, no comparable historical models exist. The Roman empire was sacked and torn to pieces only to be replaced by the chaos of the Middle Ages. The British Empire had the United States itself to help rebuild after World War II and to challenge the Soviet Union. Moreover, the United Kingdom was an empire whose reign differed in kind and not simply degree to the United States. And then there was the Soviet Union which is a non-starter. With no reasonable models for it to follow, the United States does not have the luxury to simply abandon its global responsibilities.¶ Where we find ourselves today is a unipolar world where the United States is looking to find other countries to share it’s burden. So far this path has not been very fruitful. China, for example is extremely [reluctant](http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43101&Cr=&Cr1=#.Ucn0Jj7zZHk) to meddle in the internal affairs of any other nation in any way. Russia, because of its own host of [domestic concerns](http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/01/24/russias-three-biggest-problems/) is not in a position to offer global leadership outside the nonproliferation realm. Regional powers like Brazil and South Africa lack the military and political might to play a significant leadership role beyond their respective regions.¶ The United States is now more forced to lead rather than willing to lead. This is the new normal in global politics characterized by the Obama Administration’s default “[go out and make me do it](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-dreier/go-out-and-make-me-do-it_b_281631.html)” posture. Note, that this is not the ‘[nonpolar](http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/living-in-a-non-polar-world)’ world that Richard Haass describes. Rather it’s what I call a revised unipolar world where the United States must increasingly make tough decisions on what major conflict, crisis or issue it should lead. Consequently, Washington will be increasingly accused of being the aggressor or the ‘do nothing’ superpower. Unless the international community can come together and agree to sharing the burden of the world’s conflicts, crises or issues, this revised unipolar world will be continue to be our reality.

#### America needs to reengage in 21st century diplomacy to cement their worldwide soft power

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American Heritage Foundation“Russia’s Throwback Anti-Americanism”, 1/25/2013, <http://blog.heritage.org/2013/01/25/russias-throwback-anti-americanism/>, DA: 7 – 15 – 2013

The State Duma has proposed a bill that would ban journalists with foreign citizenship from appearing on national TV, including Vladimir Pozner, a veteran of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika era.¶ United Russia officials are debating a series of measures to protect the country from perceived foreign threats. These include restrictions on the number of foreign films that can be shown and preventing government officials from marrying foreigners.¶ The odious Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the head of Russia’s Liberal-Democratic Party, announced that his party is working on legislation to “liberate the Russian language from trash and foreign words,” including various “Americanisms.”¶ This all comes about after the Duma passed the Dima Yakovlev law, which banned Americans from adopting Russian children and supporting Russian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Some Russian senators and journalists even insinuated that Americans are adopting Russian babies to get organs for transplantation and to collect disability payments.¶ Some Russian NGOs may now have to close due to lack of funds as a result of this anti-American measure. Russian democracy is not the only victim, however, because many Russian orphans will now be deprived of loving homes.¶ The anti-American hysteria at home pales in comparison to the Russian effort to influence public opinion abroad. Russia Today, a state-funded news organization, broadcasts in English, Arabic, and Spanish and hosts one of the most popular YouTube news channels. Russia Today’s goal, however, is to broadcast a Kremlin-created narrative that is unadulterated U.S.-bashing. Russia’s soft power is anything but soft.¶ The Heritage Foundation has warned before that the United States is losing the public diplomacy battle to countries such as Russia, China, and Qatar. Congress and the State Department need to meet this challenge by funding, designing, and implementing a cutting-edge and effective system of international broadcasting for the 21st century—or risk losing ground in the emerging public diplomacy battle.

#### **Smart power sustainable and essential**

Clinton 12’

“The Art of Smart Power”, July 18, 2012, Hillary Clinton <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/07/195193.htm#.UAcqu8YP1LM.facebook>

So we are exploring new ways to reach beyond traditional government-to-government relations and engage directly with people around the world. That means¶ using technologies such as Twitter and SMS to open dialogues with everyone from civil society advocates in Russia to farmers in Kenya to students in Colombia.¶ But it also means advancing a comprehensive agenda to support effective democratic transitions in places such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya and championing the¶ universal rights of people everywhere. In today’s world, this is a hallmark of American leadership and a strategic imperative.¶ My experiences as secretary of state have reaffirmed the link between standing up for human dignity abroad and ensuring national security at home. It is no¶ coincidence that many of the places where we see the most instability and conflict are also places where women are abused and denied their rights, young people¶ are ignored, minorities are persecuted and civil society is curtailed. Think of the Taliban burning down girls’ schools in Afghanistan, or the use of mass rape as a¶ weapon of war in Congo. These kinds of abuses aren’t just symptoms of instability – they actually drive instability.¶ By the same token, it is also no coincidence that many of our closest allies are countries that embrace pluralism and tolerance, equal rights and equal opportunities.¶ These are not western values, they are universal values. So, it is in our interest to help those who have been historically excluded to become full participants in the¶ economic and political lives of their countries. And it is in our interest to support citizens working for democratic change, whether they are in Tunis or Rangoon.¶ Otherwise, we will keep facing the same cycles of conflict and volatility.¶ In particular, empowering women and girls around the world is crucial to seizing long-term opportunities for promoting peace, democracy and sustainable¶ development. We know that when women have the opportunity to contribute, they can drive social, political and economic progress not just for themselves, but for¶ entire societies. Goldman Sachs has reported that reducing barriers to women’s participation in the workforce would increase America’s GDP by 9 per cent,¶ increase the eurozone’s by 13 per cent and Japan’s by 16 per cent. That is growth we cannot afford to pass up. So we’ve made expanding opportunities for women¶ a cornerstone of America’s foreign policy. We’ve launched ambitious efforts to increase women’s participation in the economy by opening access to credit and¶ markets, to enhance the role of women in resolving conflicts and maintaining security, and to focus global health programmes on the needs of mothers, who are¶ linchpins of entire communities.

Whether it is elevating an institution such as the East Asia Summit to provide a forum for regional co-operation, using new economic tools such as hi-tech sanctions¶ to advance strategic ends, or engaging directly with civil society to take on scourges such as corruption or extremism, the common thread running through all our¶ efforts is a commitment to adapt America’s global leadership for the needs of a changing world.¶ And even as we seek out new partnerships and new ways of solving problems, there will continue to be times when the U.S. will and must act boldly, directly and¶ alone – for example, to pursue Osama Bin Laden. Such occasions will be rare, and we will turn to them only as a last resort, but we take seriously our¶ responsibilities as a global leader and our responsibilities to the American people.¶ All of this – the changing international landscape, the complex demands on America’s global leadership and our efforts to revitalise diplomacy for the 21st century –¶ was on my mind as I arrived in Beijing on that tense day in May. And it gave me confidence as we negotiated our way through the week. In the end, the relationship¶ we have worked so hard to build with China proved more durable and dynamic than many feared. Both countries stayed focused on our shared agenda and¶ engaged candidly on a wide range of critical issues, from cyber-security to North Korea to the South China Sea. And today, that blind dissident is safely studying¶ law in New York.¶ America and our allies have come through a long decade of war, terrorism and recession. These continue to be difficult days for many of our citizens. But as I travel¶ the world, I see evidence that our leadership is still respected and required. Yes, this is because of our military and our material might, but it is also because of our¶ commitment to fairness, justice, freedom and democracy – not just to our own good, but to the greater good.¶ There is no real precedent in history for the role we play or the responsibility we have shouldered, and there is no alternative. That is what makes American¶ leadership so exceptional, and it is why I am confident that we will continue to serve and defend a peaceful and prosperous global order for many years to come

### Hegemony High – Hard Power

#### Our military is undefeatable – nationalism and strength are intertwined

Crusader 13 , Christ. "Christscrusader." Christscrusader, political blogger - N.p., 18 May 2013. Web. 15 July 2013. <http://christscrusader.wordpress.com/2013/05/18/why-is-the-us-military-the-best-in-the-world/>PL

The US Military has always been the strongest in the world. There are a few reasons for this besides the common reasons that you may hear from liberals who think that it is because we spend way too much [money](http://christscrusader.wordpress.com/2013/05/18/why-is-the-us-military-the-best-in-the-world/) on our military and defense in general, or that it’s because we “have less horses and bayonets”. You see, our military is the best in the world because they aren’t just soldiers, they are citizens who decided they wanted to fight for their fellow citizens, their country, and their freedom. They are citizens, but they are heroes also. Let me explain. Many countries, mainly countries ruled by totalitarians, like to keep a good relationship with their military to keep them from siding with the citizens who want to revolt, therefore they treat them as “higher-ups” or just treat them better than the citizens in general. The troops in these countries are also raised knowing that they will have to enter the military and, therefore grow up [training](http://christscrusader.wordpress.com/2013/05/18/why-is-the-us-military-the-best-in-the-world/) and preparing for their service believeing that they are better than an ordinary person. Things in the United States are very different. Troops in the US are raised knowing that they can do whatever they want with their lives. They grow up as ordinary citizens. They know how to connect with ordinary people. Since they can connect with ordinary people, the US military capitalizes on this. They do this by really bringing out this communication skill through training and even going as far for Green Beret Special Forces to teach them the language of the place that they’re sending the troops so that they can go and find allies behind enemy lines, and since the people of all of these totalitarian countries only know that all their military does is harass them so it is easy for our troops to go in their and [find people](http://christscrusader.wordpress.com/2013/05/18/why-is-the-us-military-the-best-in-the-world/) willing to give information and even fight for our cause. It is not only the Special Forces who do this though. Have you seen the pictures of all of the troops in afghanistan giving the children candy and little gifts and talking with the adults and just being able to connect with the people who live with the enemy? This is impossible for the other countries because all they know is to kill the enemy and advance, but they would never expect to get attacked from behind by their own people. Also, when our troops come home whether their time is up or they are home for a visit, they are treated like normal citizens so they know exactly how all of the other citizens feel because they are citizens. Since they know how the people feel, they will always fight for the people and never against them, and if you attack their people, you’re going down. Troops in totalitarian countries, honestly, could care less if a few people die in their country because all they know is to keep the people under control and that the people are under them. Our troops love the country and the people and the liberty that they defend, and that’s what makes them strong.

#### The US military is the strongest – overkill of funding

**Ball 13,** James. "World Military Power â“ Which Nations Are Leading the Arms Race?" The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 16 June 2013. Web. 15 July 2013. Valentina D'Efilippo and James Ball The Guardian, Sunday 16 June 2013 14.30 EDT.PL

It's more difficult to weigh up the strength of modern militaries than you might think. Our infographic parade ground brings together the 30 countries with the most soldiers for a comparison of [military](http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/military) might. China easily takes an unsurprising first place with 2.2 million active troops versus just under 1.5 million US soldiers. But are India (1.3 million soldiers) and North Korea (1.1 million troops) really the third and fourth greatest military powers on the planet? Maybe not – because gear is a big factor, too: the US has 8,700 tanks, 6,400 attack helicopters and 11 aircraft carriers. Although impressive on their own, India's 5,900 tanks, 140 helicopters and sole aircraft carrier don't really stack up – just one example of the vast capability gaps between all those generals. But money also talks – especially in America. The US spends more than $700bn a year on its military, which is not only more than any other nation, but more than the next 14 biggest spenders combined. Perhaps it's not just the results, though, but also the commitment that counts. One way to measure this is to consider how much of a nation's GDP (its annual economic output) is spent on the military. In the US this is a pretty hefty figure (about 4.7%). But that's nothing compared with North Korea, which spends more than 20% of its GDP on its armed forces. Of course, in reality it's not conventional forces that would be likely to settle any full-on modern contest. We live in the nuclear era, after all, and between them these nations have estimated stockpiles of more than 22,500 warheads. Maybe it's worth giving peace a chance for just a little bit longer, eh?

#### Hard power is a pre-requisite to global leadership

**Kurata 13** , Philip. "IIP Digital | U.S. Department of State." Clinton Says Both Hard and Soft Power Needed for Diplomacy. N.p., 01 Feb. 2013. Web. 15 July 2013.PL

Washington — The United States needs both "soft power" and "hard power" to deal with a world populated by nonstate actors and transnational threats that defy unilateral solutions, according to outgoing Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. “More countries than ever have a voice in global debates. We see more paths to power opening up as nations gain influence through the strength of their economies rather than their militaries. And political and technological changes are empowering nonstate actors, like activists, corporations and terrorist networks,” Clinton said in remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations January 31, the second-to-last day on her job. She said that U.S. military and economic strength will remain the foundation of U.S. global leadership, which supports the spread of universal values. American hard power was used to good effect to stop Libya’s former dictator Muammar Qadhafi from massacring his people and to hunt down and bring to justice Osama bin Laden, she said. “America’s ability to project power all over the globe remains essential,” she said. “We will ensure freedom of navigation in all the world’s seas. We will relentlessly go after al-Qaida, its affiliates and its wannabes. We will do what is necessary to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon,” she said. But for other issues, she said, complex approaches are required. As the United States expands its engagement with Asia, she said, Washington has sent Marines to Australia and at the same time signed a treaty with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that could prove instrumental in defusing tensions in the South China Sea. “How could we approach an issue as thorny and dangerous as the territorial disputes in the South China Sea without a deep understanding of energy politics, subtle multilateral diplomacy, smart economic statecraft and a firm adherence to universal norms?” she said. She said the way the United States handles its relationship with China will have global consequences. “We are trying to write a new answer to the age-old question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet,” she said. The United States is using every lever at its disposal covering traditional strategic issues such as North Korea, maritime security and human rights and emerging challenges such as climate change, cybersecurity, and intellectual property protection, she said. “The Pacific is big enough for all of us, and we will continue to welcome China’s rise if it chooses to play a constructive role in the region. For both of us, the future of this relationship depends on our ability to engage across all these issues at once,” she said. While consolidating its engagement with Asia, the United States will not take its eyes off the Middle East and North Africa, Clinton said. The United States will have to use “every single tool in our toolkit” to address both the active conflicts and the underlying causes, she added. One particular tool, improving the lives of women and children, is exceptionally important. “The evidence is absolutely indisputable. If women and girls everywhere were treated as equal to men in rights, dignity and opportunity, we would see political and economic progress everywhere,” she said. Asked about where U.S. diplomacy could improve, she said the U.S. government could do a better job communicating with the rest of the world. “We have basically abdicated … the broadcast media,” she said. She said the U.S. government should modernize its broadcasting services to better undermine and rebut extremist messaging.

#### Hard power prevents conflict in Asia, Europe, the Middle East

Stratfor 13. "The Virtues Of Hard Power." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 22 May 2013. Web. 15 July 2013.

Stratfor is a geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and organizations around the world.PL

Hard power has not been in vogue since the Iraq War turned badly in about 2004. In foreign policy journals and at elite conferences, the talk for years has been about “soft power,” “the power of persuasion” and the need to revitalize the U.S. State Department as opposed to the Pentagon: didn’t you know, it’s about diplomacy, not military might! Except when it isn’t; except when members of this same elite argue for humanitarian intervention in places like Libya and Syria. Then soft power be damned. The fact is that hard power is supremely necessary in today’s world, for reasons having nothing to do with humanitarian intervention. Indeed, the Harvard professor and former government official, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., who, in 2004, actually coined the term “soft power” in an eponymous book, has always been subtle enough in his own thinking to realize how relevant hard power remains. As I write, the two areas of the world that are most important in terms of America’s long-term economic and political interests — Asia and Europe — are undergoing power shifts. [The growth of Chinese air and naval power](https://www.stratfor.com/node/189170) is beginning to rearrange the correlation of forces in Asia, while the [weakening of the European Union in geopolitical terms](https://www.stratfor.com/node/195877) – because of its ongoing fiscal crisis — is providing an opportunity for a new Russian sphere of influence to emerge in Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, both challenges require robust diplomacy on America’s part. But fundamentally what they really require is a steadfast commitment of American hard power. And the countries in these two most vital regions are not bashful about saying so. [Security](http://www.forbes.com/security/) officials in countries as diverse as Japan and Poland, Vietnam and Romania desperately hope that all this talk about American soft power overtaking American hard power is merely that — talk. For it is American warships and ground forces deployments that matter most to these countries and their officials. Indeed, despite the disappointing conclusions to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, rarely before has American hard power been so revered in places that actually matter. Asia is the world’s demographic and economic hub, as well as the region [where the great sea lines of communication coalesce](https://www.stratfor.com/node/194257). And unless China undergoes a profound political and economic upheaval — of a degree not yet on the horizon — the Middle Kingdom will present the United States with its greatest 21st century competitor. In the face of China’s military rise, [Japan is shedding its quasi-pacifistic orientation](https://www.stratfor.com/node/195745) and adopting a positive attitude toward military expansion. In a psychological sense, Japan no longer takes the American air and naval presence in Northeast Asia for granted. It actively courts American hard power in the face of a territorial dispute with China over islands in the East China Sea. Japan knows that, ultimately, it is only American hard power that can balance against China in the region. For South Korea, too, American hard power is critical. Though the South Korean military can ably defend itself against North Korea’s, again, it is America’s air and naval presence in the region that provides for a favorable balance of power that defends Seoul against [Pyongyang and its ally in Beijing](https://www.stratfor.com/node/196799). As for Taiwan, its very existence as a state [depends on the American military’s Pacific presence](https://www.stratfor.com/node/2891). Don’t tell officials in the Philippines that American hard power is any less relevant than in previous decades. Like Japan, after years of taking the U.S. Navy and Air Force for granted, Manila is literally [desperate for American military support](https://www.stratfor.com/node/191996) and presence against China, with which it disputes potentially resource-rich islands and geographical features in the South China Sea. Like Japan and South Korea, the Philippines is a formal treaty ally of the United States: that is to say, these countries matter. As for Taiwan, it is arguably one of the finest examples of a functioning democracy in the world beyond the West, as well as geopolitically vital because of its position on the main sea lines of communication. Thus, Taiwan too, matters greatly. Vietnam, for its part, has emerged as a critical de facto ally of the United States. It is the single most important Southeast Asian country preventing China’s domination of the strategically crucial South China Sea. And what is Vietnam doing? It is refitting [Cam Ranh Bay as a deep-water harbor](https://www.stratfor.com/node/189792), officially to attract navies from India, Russia and elsewhere; but especially to attract the U.S. Navy. Malaysia plays down its close relationship with the United States, as part of a delicate diplomatic minuet to get along with both China and the Muslim world. Nevertheless, the number of visits of American warships to Malaysian ports has jumped from three annually in 2003 to well over 50. As for Singapore, one of its diplomats told me: “We see American hard power as benign. The U.S. Navy defends globalization by protecting the sea lanes, which we, more than any other people, benefit from. To us, there is nothing dark or conspiratorial about the United States and its vast security apparatus.” In 1998, the Singaporeans built Changi Naval Base solely to host American nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines. In 2011, there were 150 American warship visits to Singapore. Then there are the four American littoral combat ships that, it was announced in 2011, would be stationed in Singapore. At the other end of Eurasia, whatever their public comments, diplomats from countries in Central and Eastern Europe are worried about any American shift away from hard power. In the 1990s, the security situation looked benevolent to them. They were in the process of joining NATO and the European Union, even as Russia was weakened by chaos under Boris Yeltsin’s undisciplined rule. Following centuries of interminable warfare, they were finally escaping history, in other words. Now NATO and the European Union — so vigorous and formidable in the 1990s – [look fundamentally infirm](https://www.stratfor.com/node/197327). Meanwhile, Russia has been, for the moment, revitalized through a combination of natural gas revenues and [Vladimir Putin](http://www.forbes.com/profile/vladimir-putin/)‘s dynamic authoritarianism-lite. Russia once again beckons on the doorstep of Europe, and the Poles, Romanians and others are scared. Forget NATO. With declining defense budgets of almost all European member states, NATO is to be taken less and less seriously. The Poles, Romanians and so on now require unilateral U.S. hard power. For years already, the Poles and Romanians have been participating in U.S. military missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and sub-Saharan Africa. They have been doing so much less because they actually believe in those missions, but in order to prove their mettle as reliable allies of the United States — so that the United States military will be there for them in any future hour of need. As for the Middle East, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries all desperately require U.S. hard power: If not specifically for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, then certainly in order to promote a [balance of power unfavorable to Iran’s regional hegemony](https://www.stratfor.com/node/192438). Soft power became a trendy concept in the immediate wake of America’s military overextension in Iraq and Afghanistan. But soft power was properly meant as a critical accompaniment to hard power and as a shift in emphasis away from hard power, not as a replacement for it. Hard power is best employed not when America invades a country with its ground troops but when it daily projects military might over vast swaths of the earth, primarily with air and naval assets, in order to protect U.S. allies, world trade and a liberal maritime order. American hard power, thus, must never go out of fashion.

### Hegemony High – technology

#### American leader in global Tech-- ensures long term sustainability

**Mantri 2013** (Rajeev Mantri: executive director at Navam Capital, a venture capital firm in India. The huffington post: “Challenging Silicon Valley's Innovation Hegemony” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rajeev-mantri/innovation-hegemony_b_2442062.html>).

For several decades, **Silicon Valley has had a** near-**monopoly on innovation**. **The Valley emerged out of America's deep commitment to higher education and scientific research, combined with the American will to maintain leadership in defense technology.** Through the second half of the 20th century, China was disastrously experimenting with Maoism, India was embracing Socialism, a fragmented Europe was rebuilding after the Second World War and the other superpower, Soviet Russia, was persisting with its Communist economic model. **The Americans invested public and private capital in fundamental research and development, allowing private enterprise to drive economic growth and entrepreneurial small businesses to commercialize publicly-funded scientific research. America invented the venture capital model to commercialize such research.**¶ It stood out as an oasis in a world where central planning and a state control of the economy was the norm. Owing to a liberal immigration policy**, it became a magnet for talent from around the world.** Scores of scientists migrated from Europe to America in the throes of the Second World War, including titans like Enrico Fermi and Albert Einstein. Nobel laureates Hargobind Khorana and Subramanyan Chandrasekhar, both of whom completed their college education in India, also made America their home.¶ The migration of talent from other parts of the world to America continued through the 1960s and 1970s, with the best talent from China and India making the move, thanks to the economic havoc caused by the destructive ideas of Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.¶ In this way**, America managed to consolidate the world's best scientific talent. It then gave them a platform and funding to invent and create. The scientists and engineers** who went to America might not all have founded technology companies, but through their **work at private research labs, government research institutions, universities and startups, laid the foundations for America's technological prowess that underpins its military and economic might to this day.**¶ It is important to recognize that this was a historical aberration and cannot be sustained by design -- America positioned itself to benefit from the poor choices that the rest of the world made. A reversion to the mean is underway, and the tide has started turning over the last two decades. Besides increased economic and financial integration worldwide permitting capital flows on a global scale, economic reforms catalyzing sustained growth in Asia and the creation of a common market in Europe have fostered economic blocks that can compete with America.¶ **Sector after sector has become more globalized.** Venture capital investing, long the exclusive preserve of a clutch of firms on Silicon Valley's famed Sand Hill Road and till recently heavily concentrated in the United States, is now unmistakably global. Risk capital flows to places that have talented people pursuing breakthrough business ideas -- and sustained global growth over the last two decades has set the stage for a need for technological innovation across economies and geographies. The rise of the Asian consumer is creating opportunities for innovation in all kinds of consumer products. Transplanting ideas from elsewhere doesn't always cut it with the taste and sensibility of consumers in Asian countries. With increasing consumption, there is a glaring need for efficiency in resource utilization and energy use.¶ Challenging economic conditions combined with more stringent immigration policies in developed nations have made it appealing for accomplished scientists and engineers from developing nations to return home, where in many cases there is stronger economic growth alongside a new focus on nurturing and financing science and technology. This has set the stage for venture capital investing in emerging markets.¶ **America has a long lead**, but the rest of the world is catching up. **It will continue to maintain primacy in Internet innovation** in particular because of the spending capacity of the American consumer. The Internet is a platform for consumption, be it consuming information which allows for digital advertising to flourish or purchasing products through Internet-based retailers. **America's consumption power allows it be the breeding ground for global Internet giants such as Google, Amazon and Facebook, and it will dominate in web innovation as long as the American consumer has clout.**¶ New York-based venture capitalist Fred Wilson recently wrote about how the Valley's dominance could be upended if there was a new wave of technological disruption, far separated from the computing and Internet industry on which the Valley has been built. Wilson said that should Silicon Valley miss such a new wave, it could look like Detroit in a few decades.¶ Just as a consumer-centric economy allows it to dominate Internet innovation, it also creates an insulation from innovation in non-consumer industries. The world has become a dramatically different place in the last few decades, and **such innovations that define the next wave of technological disruption can come from any nation that has a sufficiently large pool of talented people working to solve the big challenges in energy, health care, clean technology and other sectors**. That would weaken Silicon Valley's grip on driving innovation -- and further undermine **America's standing as a global power.**

#### US has unsurpassable lead in high tech—no true rivals

**Fingleton 2013**(Eamonn Fingleton: A former editor for Forbes and the Financial Times, Eamonn Fingleton spent 27 years monitoring East Asian economics from a base in Tokyo. Forbes: “Globalism and Technology: A Hidden Misconception That Dooms the U.S. Economy” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/eamonnfingleton/2013/03/31/globalism-and-technology-a-hidden-misconception-that-dooms-the-u-s-economy/2/>).

In the face of an ever-burgeoning Chinese economic challenge**, Americans of all political stripes have drawn comfort from one thing: America’s seemingly impregnable lead in high technology**. Thanks to a unique culture of freedom, **America is said to be equipped with an enduring, world-beating edge in inventiveness – something an authoritarian China can never hope to match.**¶ Here, for instance, is how Mitt Romney put it at a presidential campaign appearance last summer: “While the Chinese may be able to make a television set at less cost than we can, they cannot invent the television set like we can…..**America leads the world in technology and innovation and creativity……and that will allow us to have the economic might which is necessary to finance the military might which provides [our] world power.”**¶ President Bill Clinton made a similar point when, on a visit to China some years ago, he commented: “In this global information age, **when economic success is built on ideas, personal freedom is … essential to the greatness of any modern nation.”**¶ It is past time such thinking was challenged. As a growing number of prominent observers are now arguing, it is a dangerous mistake to assume that America’s future as an “innovation superpower” is assured. Although such observers – they include IBM’s former director of research Ralph Gomory, the economist Pat Choate, and the British political scientist James Wilsdon – do not concur on all the details, in aggregate their concerns paint a disturbing picture.¶ Of course, **no one disputes that twentieth century** **America made a giant contribution to the history of technology.** On a rough guess, between one-fifth and one-third of all technological innovations that have shaped our modern world originated in America. The problem is that the past may not be a guide to the future.¶ Certainly any considered view of the relationship between political freedom, technology, and economic leadership suggests conclusions sharply at odds with the received wisdom:

### Hegemony High – Education

#### No rivalry to combat US heg—Leadership in education ensures sustainability

**HAASS 2013** (RICHARD N. HAASS: President, Council on Foreign Relations Expertise

U.S. foreign policy; international security; globalization; Asia; Middle East. NYTimes: “America Can Take a Breather. And It Should.” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/23/opinion/sunday/america-can-take-a-breather-and-it-should.html?pagewanted=all>).

¶ Yet the United States enjoys a respite all the same. For the three and a half centuries of the modern international era, great powers have almost always confronted rivals determined to defeat them and replace the global order they worked to bring about. In the last century, this process unfolded three times. The results were violent, costly and dangerous, and included two world wars and a cold war.¶ ¶ Today, there are threats, but they tend to be regional, years away or limited in scale. None rises to the level of being global, immediate and existential. **The United States faces no great-power rival. And this is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.**¶¶ **The biggest strategic question facing America is how to extend this respite rather than squander it.** This will require restraining foreign involvement and restoring domestic strength. We can no longer seek to remake countries in the Middle East and South Asia, as was tried at great cost and with little success in Iraq and Afghanistan.¶ ¶ Instead, we must revive the American economy, something that will not only improve the living standards of our citizens but also generate the resources to discourage would-be competitors from choosing the path of confrontation and to deal with them if they opt for confrontation all the same.¶ ¶ The Obama administration has embraced much of this thinking in its foreign policy, especially when it comes to exercising restraint in the greater Middle East. But it has done less well at home, where it has often held back from pushing much-needed reforms.¶ ¶ **Still, the United States stands first among unequals. American primacy is, in part, a consequence of innate advantages: political stability, healthy demographics and commitment to the rule of law. We have a rich endowment of energy, minerals, water and arable land as well as considerable openness to immigrants who are responsible for a disproportionate amount of innovation.**¶¶ **There are excellent institutions of higher education, venture capital and a legal system that allows second chances in the wake of failure.** And good relations with **our immediate neighbors allow us to focus our foreign policy farther afield, rather than on our borders as most other countries must do.**¶¶ **None of the other major powers of this era — China, Russia, Europe, Japan, India — are tempted to challenge the United States for primacy**. America’s per-capita gross domestic product is at least six times that of China, and the United States spends more on defense than the next 10 countries combined.¶ ¶ Moreover**, many potential future competitors depend** in no small part **on their access to American markets, technology, goods and services**. They do not always agree with the United States, but they don’t see it as implacably hostile or as an impediment to their own core objectives. And they are often preoccupied with and limited by their own domestic economic, social and political challenges.¶ ¶ **China is** the country most often cited as a potential challenger. But it is being **held back by slowing economic growth, pervasive corruption, widespread environmental degradation, an aging population and a top-heavy political system.** China and the other principal powers seek less to overthrow the existing international order than to join it or something like it. They are more interested in integration than in revolution.¶ ¶ This situation isn’t cause for complacency. Primacy is not license to do as we please. A respite is, by definition, temporary — a departure from history, not history’s end. It allows a shift of emphasis, not withdrawal from the world.¶ ¶ Overseas, our attention should be focused on those places where America’s interests are greatest and where our available policy tools — the military, aid, trade and diplomacy — can accomplish the most good. This means limiting wars of choice and wholesale efforts to remake societies like the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the surge in Afghanistan in 2009.¶ ¶ It also means refraining from direct armed intervention in Syria’s current civil war. And when it comes to Iran, we need to emphasize diplomacy, sanctions and other alternatives to military force to dissuade it from crossing the nuclear weapons threshold.¶ ¶ Most important, we should step up efforts to maintain stability in Asia and the Pacific Ocean, where this century’s great powers could easily collide and where American diplomatic, military and economic tools are well suited to ensure that they do not. Modest increases in America’s Air Force and naval presence can reassure allies like Japan and South Korea while sending implicit warnings to China and North Korea, and diplomacy can make clear that China is welcome to join new regional trade arrangements, reducing the possibility that the relationship will become adversarial.¶ ¶ At home, we must work to restore the foundations of American power. In many cases, this doesn’t even require spending more — often there is little relationship between our investments and the results.¶ ¶ **The United States spends nearly twice as much as other industrialized nations per citizen on health care — often with worse outcomes. We spend more per student on education than most other wealthy countries,** with few results to show for it. **Attracting top-quality teachers, rewarding them for success, and enabling parents and students to choose effective schools** would be a better use of resources.¶ ¶ And with only modest government funds we could foster public-private partnerships to rebuild this country’s often crumbling infrastructure, refashion immigration policy to give preference for visas and green cards to many more immigrants with advanced degrees and needed skills, and above all reduce long-term entitlement obligations, cutting the ratio of public debt to G.D.P.

## Heg Good – Sustainable

### Hegemony Sustainable 2ac

#### U.S. still maintains a massive lead—the margin may have decreased, but will be able to maintain pre-eminence for a long time

Robert J. Lieber, Professor, Government and International Affairs, Georgetown University, “Is American Decline Real?” SALON, 5—14—12, <http://www.salon.com/2012/05/14/is_american_decline_real/>, accessed 6-9-12.

Beyond material strengths, the society itself benefits from a durable political system, rule of law, vigorous free press and information media, and a competitive and adaptable economy, as well as strong traditions of entrepreneurship and innovation, leadership and critical mass in new technology, and a history of resilience and flexibility in overcoming adversity. The declinist proposition that America’s international primacy is collapsing as a result of the rise of other countries should also be regarded with caution. On the one hand, the United States does face a more competitive world, regional challenges, and some attrition of its relative degree of primacy. This process, or diffusion of power, is not exclusive to the post–Cold War era, but began at least four decades ago with the recovery of Europe and Japan from World War II, the rise of the Soviet Union to superpower status, and the emergence of regional powers in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. Still, in contrast to other great powers that have experienced decline, the United States has held a substantially more dominant position. For example, Britain at the start of the twentieth century was already falling behind Germany and the United States, although it did manage to continue for half a century as head of a vast empire and commonwealth. Because of the enormous margin of power the United States possessed after the end of the Cold War, it should be able to withstand erosion in its relative strength for some time to come without losing its predominant status. While it is true that the weight of important regional powers has increased, many of these are allied or friendly. Those that are not (Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela) do not by themselves constitute serious balancing against the United States and its allies. Russia occupies an intermediate position, at times acting as a spoiler, but not an outright adversary. China presents a potentially more formidable challenge, notably through its growing economic might and the rapid expansion of its military capacity, but it has not yet become a true peer competitor. In any case, and despite the burden of a decade of war in the Middle East, America continues to possess significant advantages in economic breadth and depth, science, technology, competitiveness, demography, force size, power projection, military technology, and even in learning how to carry out effective counterinsurgency, and thus retains the capacity to meet key objectives. In sum, although the United States predominates by lesser margins, it still remains a long way from being overtaken by peer competitors. However, given profound disagreements about policy, intense partisan rancor among political elites, growing social-class division, distrust of government, and deep disagreement about foreign commitments, nonmaterial factors could prove to be a greater impediment to staying power than more commonly cited indicators of economic problems and military overstretch. The United States retains the power and capacity to play a leading world role. The ultimate questions about America’s future are likely to be those of policy and will.

#### U.S. decline is not inevitable—need to work to maintain credibility to exert effective leadership, will require some constraint

Richard K. Betts, Professor, War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, “American Strategy: Grand vs. Grandiose,” AMERICA’S PATH: GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION, ed. R.Fontaine & K.M. Lord, Center for a New American Century, 5—12, p. 35.

Soft Primacy. It would make no sense for the United States to throw away its “number one” status in the world, even if it puts a higher premium on prudence, restraint and accommodation. The United States can easily exercise more restraint and still preserve its primacy in international affairs. Although the rise of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) will probably erode the margin of American power over time, the gap that marks unipolarity is so large that American primacy is likely to last for many years. In fact, restraint may safeguard primacy better than activism that causes expensive disappointments and subverts credibility. Credibility comes from the belief abroad that Washington will surely follow through and do what is necessary to win when it commits to action. Thus, credibility can only suffer from overreaching, which is more likely if commitments are frequent and risky.

#### No decline—U.S. is uniquely suited to renew its power

Dr. Eric S. Edelman, U.S. Ambassador and diplomat (ret.), UNDERSTANDING AMERICA’S CONTESTED PRIMACY, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 10—21—10, p. 28.

Most importantly Huntington argues that the ability to renew its power is the ultimate test of a great power. On this dimension he points to America’s open economy, competition, economic and social mobility and immigration as persistent sources of American strength. In addition the United States is strong across the various elements of national power; in that sense its power is “multidimensional.” Geographical location, or in Huntington’s terminology, the United States’ “structural position in world politics,” far removed from most major world conflicts, inclines others to seek US leadership in resolution of international disputes. America’s ideological appeal rounds out the list of non-economic factors contributing to the United States’ commanding position in world affairs.

### Hegemony Sustainable 1ar

#### No decline—other powers declining too, nor rival, alliance systems, education/tech, economy ensure American leadership

Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellow, Brookings Institution, "The U.S. Still Has a Promising Future," LOS ANGELES TIMES, 8--11--11, LN.

Yes, the United States has problems. But let's not lose sight of its many strengths. The U.S. Capitol building stands at night in Washington, D.C. on July 29. Despite everything, the United States is still the best country in the world. (Joshua Roberts / Bloomberg) Amid all the talk of gloom and doom in the United States, with the stock market's near-crash and the renewed threat of a double-dip recession, it is worth pausing to remember that the United States remains the greatest country on Earth. It is also the country with the most promising future. I make these assertions not as a matter of national pride, but as an analytical conclusion. This is not to discourage serious attention to deficit reduction, economic renewal and political reform — all of which we greatly need — or to trivialize the country's admittedly serious problems. Nor is it meant to deny the plight of the many Americans who have suffered enormously as a result of the punishing economic downturn of the last three years. But when the news is generally bleak, there is always a danger we will talk ourselves into greater fatalism, and more extreme responses, than are warranted or wise. Consider our strengths, beginning with who we are. The United States remains the land where people around the world dream of living, and they still arrive in substantial numbers, enriching our melting-pot society and energizing the economy. Our population today is at just over 300 million, with a modest and steady growth rate. Almost every other major industrial power is in decline, with low birthrates and aging populations that will soon put a huge strain on their economies. Countries such as Turkey and Brazil have healthy population growth rates too, and they have promising futures. But they are middle powers at most. China is rising impressively, but it also has huge problems, with far too many people for a relatively modest landmass. The country's one-child policy, designed to address that overpopulation, will, within a decade or two, result in huge numbers of retirees relative to the size of its working-age population, a far greater challenge than we will face here. India's problem is the opposite but just as serious. Unable to get any handle on its population growth, India's demographics verge on unsustainable. To be sure, these other countries can make progress, and we wish them well as they try. But the notion that their futures are all bright and rosy while ours is declining does not comport with the facts. Partly because of our large immigrant population, partly because of our historical role in the two world wars and in the Cold War, and partly because of our openness and transparency as a political system, the United States is also blessed with an enviable system of alliances. We have some 70 formal and informal allies around the world. We are not universally loved, to be sure, and even many of our allies are critical of American foreign policy. But they tend not to fear us, worrying about their own neighbors (or the prospect of anarchy) more than us. As a result, more than 70% of combined global economic power is loosely organized under what might be termed the U.S. global alliance system. Additionally, even many key neutral countries like India and Indonesia prefer to work with us rather than against us on most global security matters. By contrast, Russia's limited alliances feature standouts like Belarus, and China's only formal security partner is North Korea. In addition to having perhaps the healthiest demographic profile of any middle or major power, and by far the strongest alliances over a sustained period of any major power in history, the United States also has the best advanced educational system in the world. We hear lots about the troubled state of our public education system, and to be sure, it needs improvement. But at the more advanced level, we remain at the front. Recent studies estimate that the United States has more than half of the world's best 100 universities. The intellectual excellence does not end there. Of the $1.2 trillion the world spent on research and development activities last year, $400 billion was spent in the U.S. Europe in aggregate spent less than $300 billion. Totals for China and Japan were each around $150 billion. Others were far behind. Sure, China educates 600,000 engineers a year to our 60,000, but more than half that larger Chinese figure is made up of technicians trained in two-year colleges. Comparing apples to apples, the ratio is more like 200,000 to 60,000, and our students have far better universities to attend. China's prowess and progress in economic growth and in manufacturing are remarkable and commendable, but at least for another year or two, the United States remains the top manufacturer as measured by value added to its products. Our setbacks in recent decades in many areas like steel, concrete, textiles and cars are partially compensated for by continued excellence in aircraft, pharmaceuticals, industrial chemicals and many computer-related technologies (especially software and related products). Although foreigners just overtook Americans in the number of U.S. patents received each year, we still generate about 48% of the country's patents; not bad for 5% of the world's population. For the reasons stated above, along with the relative openness of our society and the dependability of our legal systems, the World Economic Forum still put the U.S. at No. 4 in its World Competitiveness Ranking for 2010. The countries ahead of the U.S. were Switzerland, Sweden and Singapore, with combined populations far less than that of California. So yes, let's fix America's problems, but in the meantime let's not lose sight of what's right.

#### dominance in all power areas mean that heg is sustainable

Brooks and Wohlforth 08, Associate Professor of Government in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College and Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government (Stephen and William, World Out of Balance, pg 27- 31)

“Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing,” historian Paul Kennedy observes: “I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close.” Though assessments of U.S. power have changed since those words were written in 2002, they remain true. Even when capabilities are understood broadly to include economic, technological, and other wellsprings of national power, they are concentrated in the United States to a degree never before experienced in the history of the modern system of states and thus never contemplated by balance-of-power theorists. The United spends more on defense than all the other major military powers combined, and most of those powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make any effort to match U.S. capabilities even more daunting that the gross spending numbers imply. Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investment that give the United States a dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities. As table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were more than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American. And this disparity has been sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has invested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D. These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest U.S. forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity arises from “command of the commons” – that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it, Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military, and political assistance….Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had. Posen’s study of American military primacy ratifies Kennedy’s emphasis on the historical importance of the economic foundations of national power. It is the combination of military and economic potential that sets the United States apart from its predecessors at the top of the international system. Previous leading states were either great commercial and naval powers or great military powers on land, never both. The British Empire in its heyday and the United States during the Cold War, for example, shared the world with other powers that matched or exceeded them in some areas. Even at the height of the Pax Britannica, the United Kingdom was outspent, outmanned, and outgunned by both France and Russia. Similarly, at the dawn of the Cold War the United States was dominant economically as well as in air and naval capabilities. But the Soviet Union retained overall military parity, and thanks to geography and investment in land power it had a superior ability to seize territory in Eurasia. The United States’ share of world GDP in 2006, 27.5 percent, surpassed that of any leading state in modern history, with the sole exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had temporarily depressed every other major economy). The size of the U.S economy means that its massive military capabilities required roughly 4 percent of its GDP in 2005, far less than the nearly 10 percent it averaged over the peak years of the Cold War, 1950-70, and the burden borne by most of the major powers of the past. As Kennedy sums up, “Being Number One at great cost is one thing; being the world’s single superpower on the cheap is astonishing.”

### Hegemony Sustainable – Alliance Shift

#### U.S. power will stay—will forge new partnerships to preserve its power

Walter Russell Mead, Professor, Foreign Affairs and Humanities, Bard College, “The Myth of America’s Decline,” WALL STREET JOURNAL, 4—9—12, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577305531821651026.html, accessed 6-9-12.

It won't be easy, and success won't be total. But even in the emerging world order, the U.S. is likely to have much more success in advancing its global agenda than many think. Washington is hardly unique in wanting a liberal world system of open trade, freedom of the seas, enforceable rules of contract and protection for foreign investment. What began as a largely American vision for the post-World War II world will continue to attract support and move forward into the 21st century—and Washington will remain the chairman of a larger board. Despite all the talk of American decline, the countries that face the most painful changes are the old trilateral partners. Japan must live with a disturbing rival presence, China, in a region that, with American support, it once regarded as its backyard. In Europe, countries that were once global imperial powers must accept another step in their long retreat from empire. For American foreign policy, the key now is to enter deep strategic conversations with our new partners—without forgetting or neglecting the old. The U.S. needs to build a similar network of relationships and institutional linkages that we built in postwar Europe and Japan and deepened in the trilateral years. Think tanks, scholars, students, artists, bankers, diplomats and military officers need to engage their counterparts in each of these countries as we work out a vision for shared prosperity in the new century. The American world vision isn't powerful because it is American; it is powerful because it is, for all its limits and faults, the best way forward. This is why the original trilateral partners joined the U.S. in promoting it a generation ago, and why the world's rising powers will rally to the cause today.

#### U.S. is not in decline—global power is simply rebalancing, witnessed by the decline of our old allies

Walter Russell Mead, Professor, Foreign Affairs and Humanities, Bard College, “The Myth of America’s Decline,” WALL STREET JOURNAL, 4—9—12, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577305531821651026.html, accessed 6-9-12.

The world balance of power is changing. Countries like China, India, Turkey and Brazil are heard from more frequently and on a wider range of subjects. The European Union's most ambitious global project—creating a universal treaty to reduce carbon emissions—has collapsed, and EU expansion has slowed to a crawl as Europe turns inward to deal with its debt crisis. Japan has ceded its place as the largest economy in Asia to China and appears increasingly on the defensive in the region as China's hard and soft power grow. The international chattering class has a label for these changes: American decline. The dots look so connectable: The financial crisis, say the pundits, comprehensively demonstrated the failure of "Anglo-Saxon" capitalism. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have sapped American strength and, allegedly, destroyed America's ability to act in the Middle East. China-style "state capitalism" is all the rage. Throw in the assertive new powers and there you have it—the portrait of America in decline. Actually, what's been happening is just as fateful but much more complex. The United States isn't in decline, but it is in the midst of a major rebalancing. The alliances and coalitions America built in the Cold War no longer suffice for the tasks ahead. As a result, under both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, American foreign policy has been moving toward the creation of new, sometimes difficult partnerships as it retools for the tasks ahead.

### Hegemony Sustainable – Demographics

#### Robust demographics lock in long-term U.S. leadership

Dr. Eric S. Edelman, U.S. Ambassador and diplomat (ret.), UNDERSTANDING AMERICA’S CONTESTED PRIMACY, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 10—21—10, p. 72-73.

An additional, and extremely important, long-term factor underpinning likely continued US global economic leadership is demographics. The US fertility rates are among the highest in the developed world and are virtually at replacement. In addition, the United States also assimilates immigrants without getting “cultural indigestion.” Mark Haas has noted that although the United States is growing older, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than all the other great powers. Consequently, the economic and fiscal costs for the United States created by social aging (although staggering, especially for health care) will be significantly lower for it than for potential competitors. Global aging is therefore not only likely to extend U.S. hegemony (because the other major powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States’ economic and military power lead), but deepen it as these other states are likely to fall even farther behind the United States.” With a growing population that will be more youthful than other developed countries (or China) the United States would appear to be in a favorable position. As Nicholas Eberstadt has noted “if the American moment passes, or U.S. power in other ways declines, it won’t be because of demography.”132 Coupled with favorable internal demographic trends, immigration serves as a constant source of renewed American power.

#### U.S. will stay in the lead—demographics

Dr. Eric S. Edelman, U.S. Ambassador and diplomat (ret.), UNDERSTANDING AMERICA’S CONTESTED PRIMACY, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 10—21—10, p. xviii.

An additional, and extremely important, long-term factor underpinning likely continued US global economic leadership is demographics. The US fertility rates are among the highest in the developed world and are virtually at replacement. With a growing population that will be more youthful than other developed countries (or China) the United States would appear to be in a favorable position. One could also add to the long list of US advantages the political and social stability that has made it the safe haven for global investors.

#### Aging only helps the U.S.

Michael Beckley, research fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and Internaitonal Affairs, Harvard University, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 36 n. 3, Winter 2011-12, p. 61-62.

The United States, by contrast, “can be said to be a young and even a developing country.”99 Its working age population will grow by 17 percent over the next forty years while that of all the other major powers (except India) will decline (see figure 2).100 Moreover, its pension system is better funded, its public welfare commitments more modest, and its citizens more productive (in terms of hours worked and years employed) than any other major power.101 “Global aging,” Mark Haas writes, “is therefore not only likely to extend U.S. hegemony . . . but deepen it as . . . other states are likely to fall even farther behind.”

### Hegemony Sustainable – Military

#### Military power unmatched--Iraq/Afghanistan didn't hurt

Robert J. Lieber, Professor, Government and International Affairs, Georgetown University, "Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy, Policy, and Trand Strategy, JOURNALOF STRATEGIC STUDIES v. 34 n. 4 2011, ASP.

In addition, the American military remains unmatched and despite intense stress from nearly a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq it has not suffered the disarray that afflicted it in Vietnam. This is evident in terms of indicators such as successful recruitment and performance of the volunteer force, the ongoing quality of the officer corps, and broad public support for the military as well as casualty tolerance. Moreover, in its capabilities, technology, capacity to project power, and command of the global commons – as dramatically evident in the recent take-down of Osama bin Laden – the US has actually increased its military margin as compared with others, though with the important exception of China.

#### The military can’t be balanced or equaled

Hingorani 2004, Micky. “The American Superpower: A Reappraisal of the United States Based on a Changing World Dynamic” AllAcademic. copyright 2004 allacademic URL subject to change based on page (53 total) http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/0/7/3/2/0/pages73201/p73201-51.php

Huntington's analysis makes sense, but despite what labels academics give to the structure of world order, the defining characteristic is a superior United States. The actual retreat of America into a multipolar world seems almost absurd. American dominance in all sectors continues unabated. Not only is the military is unparalleled, but Bush has made clear in his national security strategy that America would continue to build its military stronger so that it would be inconceivable to balance against. Economically, the United States is still strong and the dollar remains the currency of choice. Overall America still commands respect and the ability to produce credit. Unipolarity therefore, seems all but guaranteed. Perhaps another state could surpass the U.S. in the strength of their economy. Japan may be able to do it, or the European Union as they further integrate and make more efficient use of their combined resources. Still, neither, in the foreseeable future will be able to inspire the same confidence in their abilities as the United States may due to their experience in handling the world economy. The military, however, will undoubtedly remain unrivaled. To assume that multipolarity will occur in respect to defense is preposterous. It requires realist thinking and the associated assumption that other nations will attempt to counterbalance. All the major nations of the world would need to come together in an alliance and accelerate their military programs drastically to even approach the U.S. over the next few years, assuming that Washington does not further ramp up its defense capabilities in response. Clearly then, America still has hard power, and will remain to do so for the years ahead, but these are the hallmarks of a superpower.

### Hegemony Sustainable – Resources

#### U.S. will remain ahead—agricultural, energy resources

Dr. Eric S. Edelman, U.S. Ambassador and diplomat (ret.), UNDERSTANDING AMERICA’S CONTESTED PRIMACY, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 10—21—10, p. 69-70.

Natural resources are another area of enduring advantage for the United States. First, the United States is a major food producer and exporter. The US food industry is the largest in the world, representing almost 13 per cent of GDP. It is the second largest employer in the nation after the federal government. America’s farmers and producers have never been more efficient or productive than they are today. Agriculture has been “a bastion of American competitiveness” even as other US industries have faced devastating international competition. US agriculture represents 10 percent of US exports and accounts for about 20 percent of the global market for agricultural products. Agriculture has played a prominent part in American grand strategy since the time of the Founders when Thomas Paine announced that the United States could stand against Britain’s power because US food products “are the necessaries of life, and will always have a market while eating is the custom” abroad.¶ Energy resources are another advantage. The media have lavished a great deal of attention on the United States’ dependency on imported oil, a true strategic liability, but they have neglected coal and gas resources. In fact, the United States (combined with Canada) trails only the Middle East in the wealth of its energy resources. The United States holds the world’s largest proven reserves of coal, almost 250 billion tons, and ninety years’ worth of natural gas. That is not to mention discoveries of shale oil deposits in the Green River formation found in Utah, Wyoming and Colorado. Although the total recoverable amount of shale oil is unknown, a recent RAND study suggests that the mid-range of estimates would amount to three times the known oil reserves of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Over the long run, if oil prices stay high, this could be a critical source of potential competitive advantage with China whose energy dependency is a key vulnerability. Much, of course, will depend on the impact that the pending cap and trade legislation has on the United States’ ability to capitalize on these resources.

### Hegemony Sustainable – Size of Lead

#### U.S. will be able to maintain leadership even with some gradual erosion—previous lead was enormous

Robert J. Lieber, Professor, Government and International Affairs, Georgetown University, “Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy, Policy, and Grand Strategy,” JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES v. 34 n. 4, 2011, p. 526-527.

The declinist proposition that America’s international primacy is collapsing as a result of the rise of other countries should also be regarded with caution. On the one hand, the US does face a more competitive world, regional challenges, and some attrition of its relative degree of primacy. This process, or diffusion of power, is not exclusive to the post-Cold War era, but began at least four decades ago with the recovery of Europe and Japan from World War II, the rise of the Soviet Union to superpower status, and the emergence of regional powers in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa.47 Yet in contrast to other great powers that have experienced decline the United States has held a substantially more dominant position. For example, Britain at the start of the twentieth century was already falling behind Germany and the United States, though it did manage to continue for half a century as head of a vast Empire and Commonwealth. Because of the enormous margin of power the US possessed after the end of the Cold War, it should be able to withstand erosion in its relative strength for some time to come without losing its predominant status. While it is true that the weight of important regional powers has increased, many of these are allied or friendly. Those that are not (Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela) do not by themselves constitute serious balancing against the United States and its allies. Russia occupies an intermediate position, at times acting as a spoiler, but not an outright adversary. China presents a potentially more formidable challenge, notably through its growing economic might and in rapid expansion of its military, but has not yet sought to become a true peer competitor. In any case, and despite the burden of a decade of war in the Near East, America continues to possess significant advantages in critical sectors such as economic size, technology, competitiveness, demographics, force size, power projection, military technology, and even in learning how to carry out effective counterinsurgency, and thus retains the capacity to meet key objectives.

#### U.S. maintains a huge lead even if it has declined relatively--even critics agree

Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor Emeritus, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT ,”America’s Decline is Real – And Increasingly Self-Inflicted,” TOMDISPATCH, 2—14—12, http://www.alternet.org/world/154133/noam\_chomsky:\_america's\_decline\_is\_real\_--\_and\_increasingly\_self-inflicted/, accessed 6-9-12.

American decline is real, though the apocalyptic vision reflects the familiar ruling class perception that anything short of total control amounts to total disaster. Despite the piteous laments, the U.S. remains the world dominant power by a large margin, and no competitor is in sight, not only in the military dimension, in which of course the U.S. reigns supreme. China and India have recorded rapid (though highly inegalitarian) growth, but remain very poor countries, with enormous internal problems not faced by the West. China is the world’s major manufacturing center, but largely as an assembly plant for the advanced industrial powers on its periphery and for western multinationals. That is likely to change over time. Manufacturing regularly provides the basis for innovation, often breakthroughs, as is now sometimes happening in China. One example that has impressed western specialists is China’s takeover of the growing global solar panel market, not on the basis of cheap labor but by coordinated planning and, increasingly, innovation. But the problems China faces are serious. Some are demographic, reviewed inScience, the leading U.S. science weekly. The study shows that mortality sharply decreased in China during the Maoist years, “mainly a result of economic development and improvements in education and health services, especially the public hygiene movement that resulted in a sharp drop in mortality from infectious diseases.” This progress ended with the initiation of the capitalist reforms 30 years ago, and the death rate has since increased. Furthermore, China’s recent economic growth has relied substantially on a “demographic bonus,” a very large working-age population. “But the window for harvesting this bonus may close soon,” with a “profound impact on development”: “Excess cheap labor supply, which is one of the major factors driving China's economic miracle, will no longer be available.”

### Hegemony Sustainable – Tech/Innovation

#### U.S. culture is uniquely suited to drive innovation

Rob Asghar, fellow, Center on Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California, “The Myth of America’s Decline,” CNN 11—17—11, www.cnn.com/2011/11/17/opinion/asghar-globalization/index.html, accessed 6-9-12.

Meanwhile, America is the best at being America, because America is the closest thing to a society that unambivalently enjoys being American. The United States has cultural and demographic traits that remain unique -- for better and worse. American culture is peculiarly tilted toward valuing disruptive new ideas and welcoming the immigrant who brings such ideas into its society. An individualistic, heterogeneous, novelty-seeking American culture, strengthened by a critical mass of interdisciplinary American research universities that draw the world's best minds, represents a considerable edge in social and economic innovation. For today's emerging economies to become long-term giants, rather than variations of prerevolution Iran and the Soviet Union, they must become more economically and socially integrated. And to become economically integrated, they must become culturally integrated, which means a host of conflicts are on the horizon regarding varying societal views on change, tradition, materialism, social mobility, openness, patronage and so on. It will not be easy, and success is not inevitable. Many emerging nations are like a young child on the precipice of a tense and unpredictable adolescence. Eastern nations may in time become better than the West at the freewheeling socioeconomics that America and the rest of the West invented, but not without considerable social turmoil. A true taste for innovation and adaptation will result only from a vigorous clash between individualistic impulses and communitarian ones -- clashes that will take decades to play out, with uncertain outcomes. Americans may block their own path and sabotage their own cultural tilt toward innovative growth if political dysfunction continues. But with even some sensible reform of the political system, a resilient, forward-thinking and forward-moving economy should result. America was the key force in popping open the Pandoran box of commercial and cultural globalization, with all the attendant anxieties and unintended consequences. But the globalization game is an inherently American game, and it will take a great deal of luck, strategy and determination for someone else to play the game better than Americans are able to play it.

#### U.S. tech leadership remains strong now

Michael Beckley, research fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and Internaitonal Affairs, Harvard University, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 36 n. 3, Winter 2011-12, p. 71-72.

Technological leaders sometimes rest on their laurels and abandon innovative efforts in favor of “finding new markets for old products.”143 The United States, however, looks set to excel in emerging high-technology industries. It has more nanotechnology centers than the next three nations combined (Germany, the United Kingdom, and China) and accounts for 43 percent of the world’s nanotechnology patent applications (see figure 7).144 In biotechnology, the United States accounts for 41.5 percent of patent applications (China accounts for 1.6 percent) and 76 percent of global revenues.145 The United States accounts for 20 to 25 percent of all patent applications for renewable energy, air pollution, water pollution, and waste management technologies; China accounts for 1 to 4 percent of the patent applications in these areas (see figure 8).146 Since 1991, the United States has increased its lead in patent applications over China in all of these industries.¶ Finally, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has identified ten “knowledge- and technology-intensive industries” that are capable of “altering lifestyles and the way business is conducted across a wide range of sectors.”147 The U.S. lead, in terms of value added, in knowledge- and technology-intensive manufacturing industries dipped during the 2001 recession but quickly recovered and has increased overall since 1996. Over the same time period, the United States steadily increased its lead in knowledgeand technology-intensive services (see figures 9 and 10).

#### Our form of innovation snowballs

Michael Beckley, research fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and Internaitonal Affairs, Harvard University, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 36 n. 3, Winter 2011-12, p. 56-57.

Wealth functions as a source of power because it insulates a state from dependence on others and provides things of value that can be used in bargaining situations. As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye point out, economic interdependence involves relations of asymmetric vulnerability.80 Wealthy states are better equipped to wield market access and economic sanctions as tools of influence over others. They also have more capital to fund technological innovation and military modernization. All states face the dilemma of balancing short-term spending against long-term economic growth. This predicament, however, is less acute for wealthy states, which can sustain significant investments in innovation and military power with a relatively small percentage of their total resources.¶ The ability to innovate, defined as the creation of new products and methods of production, also constitutes a source of power. Like wealthy states, innovative countries are less dependent on others and more capable of producing goods that others value. Innovation also creates wealth and tends to beget further innovation as individual discoveries spawn multiple derivative products and improvements. Innovative activity therefore tends to cluster in particular places and provide certain countries with significant technological and military advantages. As Joshua Goldstein has shown, “The country creating a major cluster of innovations often finds immediate military applications and both propels itself to hegemonic status and maintains that status by that mechanism.”

### Hegemony Sustainable – A2 Brazil Rise

#### No Brazil rise to challenge the U.S.—multiple internal factors check

Dr. Eric S. Edelman, U.S. Ambassador and diplomat (ret.), UNDERSTANDING AMERICA’S CONTESTED PRIMACY, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 10—21—10, p. 44.

Nonetheless, Brazil still has longstanding economic and social limitations. The country trails other large developing countries in levels of educational attainment, spending on research and infrastructure development (South Korea for example issues thirty times as many patents a year as Brazil). Violent crimes are endemic. The country suffers from chronic underinvestment. Government spending is growing at an alarming pace. Regulations and labor laws are complicated and constraining and there are chronic fears about the country’s finances (which have exposed it to repeated meltdowns in response to international economic developments). President Lula da Silva has also worked assiduously to address the deep chasm between rich and poor that has long been a major social problem for Brazil.81 Maintaining the stable macroeconomic platform for growth that President Lula inherited from his predecessor will be vital to sustain the progress that Brazil has made in the past decade.

#### Brazil rise won’t undermine the U.S.—will seek partnership

Dr. Eric S. Edelman, U.S. Ambassador and diplomat (ret.), UNDERSTANDING AMERICA’S CONTESTED PRIMACY, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 10—21—10, p. xiv.

After many years of anticipation it may well be that Brazil is finally “getting it together.” With a growth rate of five percent and additional oil resources coming on line, Brazil has no domestic security issues or hostile neighbors and is hospitable to FDI. Nonetheless, Brazil still has longstanding economic and social limitations. On the regional level, Brazil has already played a leading role in managing hemispheric security issues like the crises in Haiti and more recently in Honduras; however, as the NIC suggests a more global role would appear to be a bit of a stretch, particularly given the economic vulnerabilities mentioned above. If anything, Brazil looks like a prime candidate for a stronger relationship with the United States in order to serve as a model-example of successful integration into the global economy and an alternative to the populist, anti-globalization agenda promoted by Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, as well as to help manage security problems in the hemisphere (much as India may emerge as a US partner in Asia).

### Hegemony Sustainable – A2 China Rise

#### China is not catching up--U.S. remains well ahead

Michael Beckley, research fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and Internaitonal Affairs, Harvard University, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 36 n. 3, Winter 2011-12, p. 43-44.

This study addresses these shortcomings by comparing the United States and China across a large set of economic, technological, and military indicators over the past twenty years. The results are mixed, but the bulk of the evidence supports the alternative perspective. Over the last two decades, globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens have expanded significantly, yet the United States has not declined; in fact it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991.¶ China has narrowed the gap in terms of GDP and now exports a greater volume of high-technology products and employs more scientists than any country in the world. However, GDP correlates poorly with national power; more than 90 percent of China’s high-tech exports are produced by foreign firms and consist of low-tech components; and China’s quantitative advantage in scientists has not yet translated into qualitative advantages in innovation. The United States suffers from a huge debt problem that its political system appears ill-suited to solve. China, however, faces its own fiscal mess, which may be more intractable than America’s.¶ The widespread misperception that China is catching up to the United States stems from a number of analytical flaws, the most common of which is the tendency to draw conclusions about the U.S.-China power balance from data that compare China only to its former self. For example, many studies note that the growth rates of China’s per capita income, value added in hightechnology industries, and military spending exceed those of the United States and then conclude that China is catching up. This focus on growth rates, however, obscures China’s decline relative to the United States in all of these categories. China’s growth rates are high because its starting point was low. China is rising, but it is not catching up.

#### No China rise--multiple constraints

Richard Heinberg, senior fellow, Post Carbon Institute, "Geopolitical Implications of 'Peak Everything'," SOLUTIONS JOURNAL, 1--12, [www.postcarbon.org/article/660520-geopolitical-implications-of-peak-everything](http://www.postcarbon.org/article/660520-geopolitical-implications-of-peak-everything), accessed 4-9-12.

China is the rising power of the 21st century, according to many geopolitical pundits, with a surging military and plentiful cash with which to buy access to resources (oil, coal, minerals, and farmland) around the planet. Yet while it is building an imperial-class navy that could eventually threaten America’s, Beijing suffers from domestic political and economic weaknesses that could make its turn at the center of the world stage a brief one. These include limits to available coal resources, a domestic real estate bubble, weakness in its banking sector, falling demand for Chinese exports in the U.S. and Europe, and widespread local political corruption.

#### China’s rise is limited—economic, resource, demographic, environmental problems

Robert J. Lieber, Professor, Government and International Affairs, Georgetown University, “Can the US Retain Primacy?” ISRAEL JOURNAL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS v.3, 2011, p. 30-31.

China has been the subject of much uncritical observation, while in reality Beijing faces a host of serious problems that it will need to overcome, and for which the solutions are difficult or uncertain. These include the likelihood that the economic model of export-led growth cannot be sustained indefinitely, as well as increasing raw material costs, demands for higher wages, pressures for revaluation of the yuan, and widening foreign resentments over the PRC’s predatory and mercantilist behavior. China’s extraordinary growth has taken place with enormous damage to its environment, as evident in severe pollution of the air, ground water, and food chain. Banks hold a large number of bad loans, and an enormous commercial and residential real estate bubble carries the potential for future financial disruption. China lacks an adequate social safety network, and in the next ten to fifteen years will also face a major demographic problem. Due to its one child policy, China’s population is expected to peak near 1.4 billion and then enter what a leading demographer cites as an era of “prolonged, even indefinite, population decline and a period of accelerated ageing.

### Hegemony Sustainable – A2 Counterbalancing

#### No counterbalancing—American leadership is seen as largely benign by foreign elites

Dr. Eric S. Edelman, U.S. Ambassador and diplomat (ret.), UNDERSTANDING AMERICA’S CONTESTED PRIMACY, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 10—21—10, p. xi.

Although the point remains controversial it seems apparent that America, while clearly creating some resentments with its policies, continues to be seen (particularly by governments) as relatively benign in its interactions with other powers. America shares a fundamental view of the world rooted in the neo-liberal orthodoxy of free markets, open societies, and democratic institutions that emerged as a consensus prescription for peace and prosperity after the collapse of communism. This “transnational liberalism” inclines national elites to see a broad confluence of interest with the United States and reduces their tendency to try and counterbalance American power. As the guarantor of the international world economy and a provider of security and stability because of its alliance system, the United States provides global public goods which others cannot provide.

#### No counterbalancing—easier for states to free-ride on global goods

Dr. Eric S. Edelman, U.S. Ambassador and diplomat (ret.), UNDERSTANDING AMERICA’S CONTESTED PRIMACY, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 10—21—10, p. 11-12.

Although the point remains controversial it seems apparent that America, while clearly creating some resentments with its policies, continues to be seen (particularly by governments) as relatively benign in its interactions with other powers. America shares a fundamental view of the world rooted in the neoliberal orthodoxy of free markets, open societies, and democratic institutions that emerged as a consensus prescription for peace and prosperity after the collapse of communism. This “transnational liberalism” inclines national elites to see a broad confluence of interest with the United States and reduces their tendency to try and counterbalance American power. As the guarantor of the international world economy and a provider of security and stability because of its alliance system, the United States provides global public goods which others cannot provide. In that sense the question that Stanley Hoffman posed some years ago of whether the United States should pursue primacy or world order seems to be a false dichotomy. As Michael Mandelbaum has persuasively argued, to the degree that there is world order, it exists because American primacy, combined with the triumph of neoliberal ideas, has allowed the United States to provide governmental functions to the rest of the world, chief among them being the maintenance of the global commons — air, sea, and space.25

### Hegemony Sustainable – A2 Debt

#### China has equal problems, it’s growth will slow for demographic reasons

Michael Beckley, research fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and Internaitonal Affairs, Harvard University, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 36 n. 3, Winter 2011-12, p. 60-61.

At first glance, China’s fiscal future appears much brighter than the United States’. The Chinese economy grew 8 percent annually throughout the global financial crisis, and its reported debt-to-GDP ratio is only 19 percent.91 China’s true level of public debt, however, is likely much higher than reported because a great deal of state spending is funneled through investment entities connected to local governments. Estimates that take this spending into account put China’s debt-to-GDP ratio between 75 and 150 percent.92 The Chinese government projects annual growth rates of 7 percent between now and 2030. Some prominent investors and economists, however, believe Chinese growth will plunge to 2 to 5 percent within the next decade following the collapse of a “debt-fueled bubble.”93¶ These predictions are speculative and may turn out to be overly pessimistic. 94 What is more certain, however, is that several factors that allowed for rapid Chinese growth (e.g., a surplus of cheap labor and capital, expanding export markets abroad, and sufficient water supplies) are disappearing.95 Chief among these factors is China’s “demographic dividend.”96 In the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese government encouraged Chinese women to bear multiple children to boost the working-age population. In the 1970s, however, the Chinese government reversed course and instituted the one-child policy. As a result, China will soon confront the most severe aging process in human history. Within twenty years, China will have 300 million pensioners, causing the ratio of workers per retiree to plummet from 8 to 1 today to 2 to 1 by 2040.97 The fiscal cost of this swing in dependency ratios may exceed 80 to 100 percent of China’s GDP.

#### Budget is not destiny for leadership—policy changes can be made, long-term forecasts are unreliable, will not cut defense spending

Robert J. Lieber, Professor, Government and International Affairs, Georgetown University, “Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy, Policy, and Grand Strategy,” JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES v. 34 n. 4, 2011, p. 516-517.

Mandelbaum’s argument cannot by any means be discounted, not least because of the increasing proportion of entitlement programs in the federal budget. Here, however, my own approach draws upon three broader considerations. First, it is well to keep in mind the unreliability of long-term economic forecasts. Even slight changes in relevant parameters produce widely varying results the farther into the future that projections are made. Illustratively, medium and long-term estimates of federal budget balances during recent decades have often been wide of the mark because even modest annual variances in productivity gross domestic product (GDP) growth, employment, inflation, and tax revenues can quickly cause forecasts to become outdated. In this light, forecasts that extend to the years 2040–50, as in the Global Trends 2025 report become deeply problematic.23 Second, major economic, social or political crises can make it possible to shatter political taboos and enable political leaders to implement policy changes once thought impossible. Moreover, while current defense spending is enormous in dollar terms, and despite the burdens of Afghanistan and Iraq, it amounted to just 4.9 per cent of GDP in the 2011 fiscal year. In historic terms, the per centage is modest in comparison with double digit shares during the early Cold War decades and 6.6 per cent at the height of the Reagan buildup in the mid- 1980s. A third reason to question whether deficit and entitlement costs may compel severe cutbacks in defense and foreign policy concerns the likelihood of external threats which can lead policymakers to maintain foreign commitments even when their preferences might have led them in the opposite direction. As a telling example, consider President Obama’s ownership of two wars: Iraq, where he had to follow a pace of withdrawal notably slower than that he had advocated as a senator and presidential candidate, and Afghanistan, which he had previously identified as the necessary war, but where he had to commit 30,000 additional troops, funding to support the effort, and substantial economic and military assistance to neighboring Pakistan. Moreover, as the March 2011 Libyan intervention suggests, no matter how reluctant a president may be, circumstances can compel action and involvement.

#### Budget constraints won't limit leadership--three reasons

Robert J. Lieber, Professor, Government and International Affairs, Georgetown University, "Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy, Policy, and Trand Strategy, JOURNALOF STRATEGIC STUDIES v. 34 n. 4 2011, ASP.

The impact of financial constraints, especially the current and projected burdens of debt and deficits, thus need to be taken very seriously. In this regard, Michael Mandelbaum makes a compelling argument that these conditions will force a strategy of retrenchment. He focuses on the tenacious budgetary dilemmas that policymakers will be forced to deal with in the coming years and that in his judgment will compel a less expansive foreign policy. Mandelbaum cites the combined effects of expanding deficits during the previous decade, the enormous costs of the financial crisis, and the growing burden of entitlement programs as the baby boom generation retires, and observes that ‘the serious money … is to be found in the defense budget’. He avoids the facile arguments of the declinists and sees these changes as occurring gradually and reluctantly, but nonetheless unavoidably because of the daunting political obstacles to cutting spending on entitlement programs or increasing taxes in sufficient amounts to cope with long-term trends in budget deficits and the national debt. 22 Mandelbaum's argument cannot by any means be discounted, not least because of the increasing proportion of entitlement programs in the federal budget. Here, however, my own approach draws upon three broader considerations. First**,** it is well to keep in mind the unreliability of long-term economic forecasts. Even slight changes in relevant parameters produce widely varying results the farther into the future that projections are made. Illustratively, medium and long-term estimates of federal budget balancesduring recent decadeshave often been wide of the markbecause even modest annual variances in productivity gross domestic product (GDP) growth, employment, inflation, and tax revenues can quickly cause forecasts to become outdated. In this light, forecasts that extend to the years 2040–50, as in the Global Trends 2025 report become deeply problematic. Second, major economic, social or political crises can make it possible to shatter political taboos and enable political leaders to implement policy changes once thought impossible. Moreover, while current defense spending is enormous in dollar terms, and despite the burdens of Afghanistan and Iraq, it amounted to just 4.9 per cent of GDP in the 2011 fiscal year. In historic terms, the per centage is modest in comparison with double digit shares during the early Cold War decades and 6.6 per cent at the height of the Reagan buildup in the mid-1980s. A third reason to question whether deficit and entitlement costs may compel severe cutbacks in defense and foreign policy concerns the likelihood of external threats which can lead policymakers to maintain foreign commitments even when their preferences might have led them in the opposite direction. As a telling example, consider President Obama's ownership of two wars: Iraq, where he had to follow a pace of withdrawal notably slower than that he had advocated as a senator and presidential candidate, and Afghanistan, which he had previously identified as the necessary war, but where he had to commit 30,000 additional troops, funding to support the effort, and substantial economic and military assistance to neighboring Pakistan. Moreover, as the March 2011 Libyan intervention suggests, no matter how reluctant a president may be, circumstances can compel action and involvement.

### Hegemony Sustainable – A2 Economy

#### U.S. economic foundation remains strong—higher education, entrepreneurship, demographics, new oil reserves

Ian Bremmer, “Five Myths About America’s Decline,” WASHINGTON POST, 5—3—12, www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-americas-decline/2012/05/03/gIQAvlnvzT\_story.html, accessed 6-9-12.

2. America’s economic future is bleak. Part of the reason the United States is less willing to engage abroad is because it has its hands full with economic concerns at home: spiraling federal debt, high unemployment, lower wages and a growing disparity of wealth. But while the U.S. economic outlook may not shine as bright as it once did, it is hardly grim. America’s higher education system is unparalleled, with a record 725,000 foreign students enrolled at U.S. universities last year. No country has a greater capacity for technological breakthroughs: The United States is the destination of choice for aspiring entrepreneurs, it’s the research and development center of the world, and Silicon Valley’s start-ups and venture capitalism are exemplary. On energy, innovation in unconventional oil and gas resources has been the biggest game-changer of the past decade, with U.S.-based companies leading the charge. The United States is now the largest natural gas producer in the world. It is also the world’s largest food exporter, giving America some leverage against food price shocks or shortages. Demographically, the United States is better off than other large economies. The U.S. population is expected to rise by more than 100 million by 2050, and the labor force should grow by 40 percent. Compare that with Europe, where the population is slated to shrink by as much as 100 million people over the same span, or to China, where the labor force is already contracting.

#### U.S. economy remains strong—still accounts for approximately 20% of global output, has a robust, growing population and tech base

Robert J. Lieber, Professor, Government and International Affairs, Georgetown University, “Is American Decline Real?” SALON, 5—14—12, <http://www.salon.com/2012/05/14/is_american_decline_real/>, accessed 6-9-12.

The problem of “wallet” has since become more pressing. Even before the financial crisis that began in 2008, the historian Niall Ferguson cited the shift in America’s balance of payments and the change in its net international investment position – the difference between American-owned assets abroad and foreign-owned American assets – as a sign of deterioration. In doing so, he invoked comparisons with the decline and fall of the Roman Empire nearly two millennia ago. The comparison is tempting, but as with the parallels to the British experience of the past century, its relevance is tenuous at best. Certainly the domestic situation is more difficult now than two decades ago. Yet while these problems should not be minimized, they should not be overstated either. Contrary to what many observers would assume, the United States has managed to hold its own in globalized economic competition and its strengths remain broad and deep. For the past several decades, its share of global output has been relatively constant at between one-quarter and one-fifth of world output. According to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 1980, the United States accounted for 26.0 percent of world GDP, and in 2011, 21.5 percent. These figures are based on GDP in national currency. Alternative calculations using purchasing power parities are somewhat less favorable, but still show the United States with 19.1 percent in 2011, as contrasted with 24.6 percent in 1980. Moreover, America benefits from a growing population and one that is aging more slowly than all its possible competitors except India. And despite a dysfunctional immigration system, it continues to be a magnet for talented and ambitious immigrants. It is a world leader in science and in its system of research universities and higher education, and it has the advantage of continental scale and resources. In short, the United States remains the one country in the world that is both big and rich.

### Hegemony Sustainable – A2 Military Overstretch

#### military overstretch not a problem—cheap by historic standards, no incentive to balance

Michael Beckley, research fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and Internaitonal Affairs, Harvard University, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 36 n. 3, Winter 2011-12, p. 49.

To be sure, the costs of maintaining U.S. military superiority are substantial. By historical standards, however, they are exceptionally small.41 Past hegemons succumbed to imperial overstretch after fighting multifront wars against major powers and spending more than 10 percent (and often 100 or 200 percent) of their GDPs on defense.42 The United States, by contrast, spends 4 percent of its GDP on defense and concentrates its enmity on rogue nations and failed states. Past bids for global mastery were strangled before hegemony could be fully consolidated. The United States, on the other hand, has the advantage of being an extant hegemon—it did not overturn an existing international order; rather, the existing order collapsed around it. As a result, its dominant position is entrenched to the point that “any effort to compete directly with the United States is futile, so no one tries.”

#### No military budget overstretch—does not overly impact our budget

Robert Kagan, senior fellow, foreign policy, Brookings Institution, “Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline,” THE NEW REPUBLIC, 1—11—12, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism/, accessed 6-9-12

What about the financial expense? Many seem to believe that the cost of these deployments, and of the armed forces generally, is a major contributor to the soaring fiscal deficits that threaten the solvency of the national economy. But this is not the case, either. As the former budget czar Alice Rivlin has observed, the scary projections of future deficits are not “caused by rising defense spending,” much less by spending on foreign assistance. The runaway deficits projected for the coming years are mostly the result of ballooning entitlement spending. Even the most draconian cuts in the defense budget would produce annual savings of only $50 billion to $100 billion, a small fraction—between 4 and 8 percent—of the $1.5 trillion in annual deficits the United States is facing. In 2002, when Paul Kennedy was marveling at America’s ability to remain “the world’s single superpower on the cheap,” the United States was spending about 3.4 percent of GDP on defense. Today it is spending a little under 4 percent, and in years to come, that is likely to head lower again—still “cheap” by historical standards. The cost of remaining the world’s predominant power is not prohibitive.

#### We are not overstretched militarily—have far fewer troops abroad than during the Cold War

Robert Kagan, senior fellow, foreign policy, Brookings Institution, “Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline,” THE NEW REPUBLIC, 1—11—12, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism/, accessed 6-9-12

AGAIN, THESE common assumptions require some examination. For one thing, how “overstretched” is the United States? The answer, in historical terms, is not nearly as much as people imagine. Consider the straightforward matter of the number of troops that the United States deploys overseas. To listen to the debate today, one might imagine there were more American troops committed abroad than ever before. But that is not remotely the case. In 1953, the United States had almost one million troops deployed overseas—325,000 in combat in Korea and more than 600,000 stationed in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. In 1968, it had over one million troops on foreign soil—537,000 in Vietnam and another half million stationed elsewhere. By contrast, in the summer of 2011, at the height of America’s deployments in its two wars, there were about 200,000 troops deployed in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan combined, and another roughly 160,000 troops stationed in Europe and East Asia. Altogether, and including other forces stationed around the world, there were about 500,000 troops deployed overseas. This was lower even than the peacetime deployments of the Cold War. In 1957, for instance, there were over 750,000 troops deployed overseas. Only in the decade between the breakup of the Soviet empire and the attacks of September 11 was the number of deployed forces overseas lower than it is today. The comparison is even more striking if one takes into account the growth of the American population. When the United States had one million troops deployed overseas in 1953, the total American population was only 160 million. Today, when there are half a million troops deployed overseas, the American population is 313 million. The country is twice as large, with half as many troops deployed as fifty years ago.

### Hegemony Sustainable – A2 Multipolarity Inevitable

#### No shift to a multipolar world – US holds power

Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, August/September 2007, “End of Dreams, Return of History”, Hoover Institution, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html, The world has become normal again. The years immediately following the end of the Cold War offered a tantalizing glimpse at a new kind of international order, with nations growing together or disappearing altogether, ideological conflicts melting away, cultures intermingling through increasingly free commerce and communications. But that was a mirage, the hopeful anticipation of a liberal, democratic world that wanted to believe the end of the Cold War did not end just one strategic and ideological conflict but all strategic and ideological conflict. People and their leaders longed for “a world transformed.” 1 Today the nations of the West still cling to that vision. Evidence to the contrary — the turn toward autocracy in Russia or the growing military ambitions of China — is either dismissed as a temporary aberration or denied entirely.¶ The world has not been transformed, however. Nations remain as strong as ever, and so too the nationalist ambitions, the passions, and the competition among nations that have shaped history. The world is still “unipolar,” with the United States remaining the only superpower. But international competition among great powers has returned, with the United States, Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, Iran, and others vying for regional predominance. Struggles for honor and status and influence in the world have once again become key features of the international scene. Ideologically, it is a time not of convergence but of divergence. The competition between liberalism and absolutism has reemerged, with the nations of the world increasingly lining up, as in the past, along ideological lines. Finally, there is the fault line between modernity and tradition, the violent struggle of Islamic fundamentalists against the modern powers and the secular cultures that, in their view, have penetrated and polluted their Islamic world.

#### Layne concedes multipolarity not inevitable

Christopher Layne, professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, Summer 2009, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?”, International Security, Volume 34, Number 1, Project Muse, umn-rks

These trends, however, do not conclusively demonstrate that the international system is becoming multipolar. Projections of future GDP alone do not mean that states such as China (or India, Russia, Japan, or the EU) will become new poles of power in the international system. International relations theory still has not produced a unified theory of great power emergence, notwithstanding that some scholars have made important contributions that enhance understanding of this geopolitical phenomenon.55 We do know, however, that great power emergence results from the complex interplay of structural constraints (concern for security) and unit-level decisions (rising states must decide to convert their increasing wealth into hard power and geopolitical [End Page 163] influence). Moreover, merely aspiring to great power status does not assure success. Mobilizing and converting economic and social resources into military power and diplomatic influence is not easy, and states often are plagued by what David Baldwin called the “paradox of unrealized power.”56 Here, the issue of state capacity—the effectiveness of the state’s administrative and political machinery, and quality of its leaders—comes to the forefront.57¶ Assessing the prospects for multipolarity or bipolarity is further complicated because measuring state power is hard.58 Consider, for example, the spectacularly wrong widespread belief in the 1970s and 1980s that Japan would overtake the United States as the world’s dominant economic power and possibly become a full-fledged superpower.59 Proponents of this view missed the important factors that ultimately held Japan back, including the Japanese economic bubble; insufficient state capacity and political corruption; and adverse demographic trends.¶ The “rise of China” school could be wrong for similar reasons. Although China experienced annual growth rates in the double digits from the mid-1980s through 2006, this does not necessarily mean that it can sustain similar growth over the next two decades.60 Straight-line projections of present growth rates into the future may be wrong. Moreover, the long-term effects of the current global financial and economic crisis are an important wild card, and it is unclear how the relative growth rates of the United States and China will be affected. Opinion is divided on the question of which country is more likely to gain relative advantage.61 Finally, other factors—for example, domestic political instability, environmental degradation, public health issues, and demographic trends—could derail China’s ascent to great power status.62 If, [End Page 164] however, China remains on track (as all the publications reviewed herein except for World Out of Balance predict), it soon will be both a potent military and economic force in the international system. In that event, based on what history and offensive realist theory tell us, we should expect to see an increasingly wealthy China convert its economic strength into military muscle and to seek hegemony in Asia.63

### Hegemony Sustainable – A2 Rising Powers

#### No challengers

Robert D. Kaplan, Center for a New American Security and Stephen S. Kaplan, former vice chair, National Intelligence Council, "America Primed," THE NATIONAL INTEREST, March/April 2011, ASP.

But in spite of the seemingly inevitable and rapid diminution of U.S. eminence, to write America’s great-power obituary is beyond premature. The United States remains a highly capable power. Iraq and Afghanistan, as horrendous as they have proved to be—in a broad historical sense—are still relatively minor events that America can easily overcome. The eventual demise of empires like those of Ming China and late-medieval Venice was brought about by far more pivotal blunders. Think of the Indian Mutiny against the British in 1857 and 1858. Iraq in particular—ever so frequently touted as our turning point on the road to destruction—looks to some extent eerily similar. At the time, orientalists and other pragmatists in the British power structure (who wanted to leave traditional India as it was) lost some sway to evangelical and utilitarian reformers (who wanted to modernize and Christianize India—to make it more like England). But the attempt to bring the fruits of Western civilization to the Asian subcontinent was met with a violent revolt against imperial authority. Delhi, Lucknow and other Indian cities were besieged and captured before being retaken by colonial forces. Yet, the debacle did not signal the end of the British Empire at all, which continued on and even expanded for another century. Instead, it signaled the transition from more of an ad hoc imperium fired by a proselytizing lust to impose its values on others to a calmer and more pragmatic empire built on international trade and technology.1 There is no reason to believe that the fate of America need follow a more doomed course. Yes, the mistakes made in Iraq and Afghanistan have been the United States’ own, but, though destructive, they are not fatal. If we withdraw sooner rather than later, the cost to American power can be stemmed. Leaving a stable Afghanistan behind of course requires a helpful Pakistan, but with more pressure Washington might increase Islamabad’s cooperation in relatively short order. In terms of acute threats, Iran is the only state that has exported terrorism and insurgency toward a strategic purpose, yet the country is economically fragile and politically unstable, with behind-the-scenes infighting that would make Washington partisans blanch. Even assuming Iran acquires a few nuclear devices—of uncertain quality with uncertain delivery systems—the long-term outlook for the clerical regime is itself unclear. The administration must only avoid a war with the Islamic Republic. To be sure, America may be in decline in relative terms compared to some other powers, as well as to many countries of the former third world, but in absolute terms, particularly military ones, the United States can easily be the first among equals for decades hence. China, India and Russia are the only major Eurasian states prepared to wield military power of consequence on their peripheries. And each, in turn, faces its own obstacles on the road to some degree of dominance. The Chinese will have a great navy (assuming their economy does not implode) and that will enforce a certain level of bipolarity in the world system. But Beijing will lack the alliance network Washington has, even as China and Russia will always be—because of geography—inherently distrustful of one another. China has much influence, but no credible military allies beyond possibly North Korea, and its authoritarian regime lives in fear of internal disruption ifits economic growth rate falters. Furthermore, Chinese naval planners look out from their coastline and see South Korea and a string of islands—Japan, Taiwan and Australia—that are American allies, as are, to a lesser degree, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand. To balance a rising China, Washington must only preserve its naval and air assets at their current levels. India, which has its own internal insurgency, is bedeviled by semifailed states on its borders that critically sap energy and attention from its security establishment, and especially from its land forces; in any case, India has become a de facto ally of the United States whose very rise, in and of itself, helps to balance China. Russia will be occupied for years regaining influence in its post-Soviet near abroad, particularly in Ukraine, whose feisty independence constitutes a fundamental challenge to the very idea of the Russian state. China checks Russia in Central Asia, as do Turkey, Iran and the West in the Caucasus. This is to say nothing of Russia’s diminishing population and overwhelming reliance on energy exports. Given the problems of these other states, America remains fortunate indeed. The United States is poised to tread the path of postmutiny Britain. America might not be an empire in the formal sense, but its obligations and constellation of military bases worldwide put it in an imperial-like situation, particularly because its air and naval deployments will continue in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world. No country is in such an enviable position to keep the relative peace in Eurasia as is the United States—especially if it can recover the level of enduring competence in national-security policy last seen during the administration of George H. W. Bush. This is no small point. America has strategic advantages and can enhance its power while extricating itself from war. But this requires leadership—not great and inspiring leadership which comes along rarely even in the healthiest of societies—but plodding competence, occasionally steely nerved and always free of illusion.

#### No challengers to US dominance

#### A) Aging

Kurlantzick 10 (Joshua, Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, “Dazzled by Asia,” The Boston Globe, February 7, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/02/07/dazzled\_by\_asia/?page=full)

Yet there are many good reasons to think that Asia’s rise may turn out to be an illusion. Asia’s growth has built-in stumbling blocks. Demographics, for one. Because of its One Child policy, China’s population is aging rapidly: According to one comprehensive study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, by 2040 China will have at least 400 million elderly, most of whom will have no retirement pensions. This aging poses a severe challenge, since China may not have enough working-age people to support its elderly. In other words, says CSIS, China will grow old before it grows rich, a disastrous combination. Other Asian powers also are aging rapidly - Japan’s population likely will fall from around 130 million today to 90 million in 2055 - or, due to traditional preferences for male children, have a dangerous sex imbalance in which there are far more men than women. This is a scenario likely to destabilize a country, since, at other periods in history when many men could not marry, the unmarried hordes turned to crime or political violence. .

#### B. Political instability and nationalism

Kurlantzick 10 (Joshua, Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, “Dazzled by Asia,” The Boston Globe, February 7, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/02/07/dazzled\_by\_asia/?page=full)

Looming political unrest also threatens Asia’s rise. China alone already faces some 90,000 annual “mass incidents,” the name given by Chinese security forces to protests, and this number is likely to grow as income inequality soars and environmental problems add more stresses to society. India, too, faces severe threats. The Naxalites, Maoists operating mostly in eastern India who attack large landowners, businesses, police, and other local officials, have caused the death of at least 800 people last year alone, and have destabilized large portions of eastern India. Other Asian states, too, face looming unrest, from the ongoing insurgency in southern Thailand to the rising racial and religious conflicts in Malaysia. Also, despite predictions that Asia will eventually integrate, building a European Union-like organization, the region actually seems to be coming apart. Asia has not tamed the menace of nationalism, which Europe and North America largely have put in the past, albeit after two bloody world wars. Even as China and India have cooperated on climate change, on many other issues they are at each other’s throats. Over the past year, both countries have fortified their common border in the Himalayas, claiming overlapping pieces of territory. Meanwhile, Japan is constantly seeking ways to blunt Chinese military power. People in many Asian nations have extremely negative views of their neighbors - even though they maintain positive images of the United States. More broadly, few Asian leaders have any idea what values, ideas, or histories should hold Asia together. “The argument of an Asian century is fundamentally flawed in that Asia is a Western concept, one that is not widely agreed upon [in Asia],” says Devin Stewart, a Japan specialist at the Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs. Even as Asia’s miracle seems, on closer inspection, less miraculous, America’s decline has been vastly overstated.

#### C. Military

Kurlantzick 10 (Joshua, Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, “Dazzled by Asia,” The Boston Globe, February 7, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/02/07/dazzled\_by\_asia/?page=full)

To become a global superpower requires economic, political, and military might, and on the last two counts, the United States remains leagues ahead of any Asian rival. Despite boosting defense budgets by 20 percent annually, Asian powers like India, China, or Indonesia will not rival the US military for decades, if ever - only the Pentagon could launch a war in a place like Afghanistan, so far from its homeland. When a tsunami struck South and Southeast Asia five years ago, the region’s nations, including Indonesia, Thailand, and India, had to rely on the US Navy to coordinate relief efforts. America also has other advantages that will be nearly impossible to remove. With Asian nations still squabbling amongst themselves, many look to the United States as a neutral power broker, a role America plays around the world. German writer and scholar Joseph Joffe calls the United States today the “default power”: No one in the world trusts anyone else to play the global hegemon, so it still falls to Washington.

## Impacts

### Hegemony Good – Kagan

#### American hegemony is necessary to prevent a multitude of conflicts in every region of the world – a multipolar world would not solve global problems, but would only increase the likelihood of war

Kagan 7 [Robert, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “End of Dreams, Return of History, 6-19, <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end_of_dreams_return_of_histor.html>]

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe 's stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that 's not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world 's great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China 's neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene -- even if it remained the world's most powerful nation -- could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe -- if it adopted what some call a strategy of "offshore balancing" -- this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, "offshore" role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more "even-handed" policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel 's aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn 't change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn 't changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

### Hegemony Good – Thayer

#### US hegemony is vital to preventing every major impact.  Decline will trigger a catastrophic collapse of the global order.  History is on our side

Thayer 6 [Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Missouri State University [Thayer, Bradley A., "In Defense of Primacy.," National Interest; Nov/Dec2006 Issue 86, p32-37]

U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such aft effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why :democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.( n4) As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic

### Hegemony Good – Barnett

#### Extinction

Thomas P.M. Barnett, chief analyst, Wikistrat, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S. and Globalization, at Crossroads,” WORLD POLITICS REVIEW, 3—7—11, [www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads)

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread ofhuman rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

### Hegemony Good – Lashout

#### Decline risks American lashout

G. John Ikenberry, Professor, International Relations, Princeton University, "Illusions of Empire," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March/April 2004, ASP.

Two implications follow from the United States' strange condition as "economically dependent and politically useless." First, the United States is becoming a global economic predator, sustaining itself through an increasingly fragile system of "tribute taking." It has lost the ability to couple its own economic gain with the economic advancement of other societies. Second, a weakened United States will resort to more desperate and aggressive actions to retain its hegemonic position. Todd identifies this impulse behind confrontations with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Indeed, in his most dubious claim, Todd argues that the corruption of U.S. democracy is giving rise to a poorly supervised ruling class that will be less restrained in its use of military force against other democracies, those in Europe included. For Todd, all of this points to the disintegration of the American empire. Todd is correct that the ability of any state to dominate the international system depends on its economic strength. As economic dominance shifts, American unipolarity will eventually give way to a new distribution of power. But, contrary to Todd's diagnosis, the United States retains formidable socioeconomic advantages. And his claim that a rapacious clique of frightened oligarchs has taken over U.S. democracy is simply bizarre. Most important, Todd's assertion that Russia and other great powers are preparing to counterbalance U.S. power misses the larger patterns of geopolitics. Europe, Japan, Russia, and China have sought to engage the United States strategically, not simply to resist it. They are pursuing influence and accommodation within the existing order, not trying to overturn it. In fact, the great powers worry more about a detached, isolationist United States than they do about a United States bent on global rule. Indeed, much of the pointed criticism of U.S. unilateralism reflects a concern that the United States will stop providing security and stability, not a hope that it will decline and disappear.

#### America will cling to hegemony as long as possible—means their impact turns are inevitable

Calleo 9 – David P. Calleo (University Professor at The Johns Hopkins University and Dean Acheson Professor at its Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)) 2009 “Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy” p. 4-5

It is tempting to believe that America’s recent misadventures will discredit and suppress our hegemonic longings and that, following the presidential election of 2008, a new administration will abandon them. But so long as our identity as a nation is intimately bound up with seeing ourselves as the world’s most powerful country, at the heart of a global system, hegemony is likely to remain the recurring obsession of our official imagination, the id´ee fixe of our foreign policy. America’s hegemonic ambitions have, after all, suffered severe setbacks before. Less than half a century has passed since the “lesson of Vietnam.” But that lesson faded without forcing us to abandon the old fantasies of omnipotence. The fantasies merely went into remission, until the fall of the Soviet Union provided an irresistible occasion for their return. Arguably, in its collapse, the Soviet Union proved to be a greater danger to America’s own equilibrium than in its heyday. Dysfunctional imaginations are scarcely a rarity – among individuals or among nations. “Reality” is never a clear picture that imposes itself from without. Imaginations need to collaborate. They synthesize old and new images, concepts, and ideas and fuse language with emotions – all according to the inner grammar of our minds. These synthetic constructions become our reality, our way of depicting the world in which we live. Inevitably, our imaginations present us with only a partial picture. As Walter Lippmann once put it, our imaginations create a “pseudo-environment between ourselves and the world.”2 Every individual, therefore, has his own particular vision of reality, and every nation tends to arrive at a favored collective view that differs from the favored view of other nations. When powerful and interdependent nations hold visions of the world severely at odds with one another, the world grows dangerous.

### Hegemony Good – Impact Wall

#### Alt to heg is massive great power wars

Yuhan Zhang, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Lin Shi, Columbia University, “America’s Decline: A Harbinger of Conflcit and Rivalry,” EAST ASIA FORUM, 1—22—11, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/>

This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

#### Power vacuums cause nuclear war

Colin Gray, Prorfessor, International Politics and Strategic Studies, University of Reading, THE SHERIFF: AMERICA’S DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER, 2004, p. 10.

The United States could pick up its military ball and go home. It could choose to rely for world order on the hidden hand of universal commercial self-interest somewhat guided by such regional and local balances and imbalances of power as may be extant or might emerge. In effect, frequently this would translate as a green light for regional bullies to mark out their territories (and sea space and air space). Thus far, the contemporary United States is showing no persuasive evidence of an inclination to bring itself home as a political-military influence. The issue is not whether America's skills in statecraft are fully ad­equate for the sheriff role (whose would be?). Rather, is it whether there is to be a sheriff at all. If the United States declines the honor, or takes early retirement, there is no deputy sheriff waiting, trained and ready for promotion. Furthermore, there is no world-ordering mechanism worthy of the name which could substitute for the au­thority and strength of the American superpower. At present there is no central axis of a balance of power to keep order, while the re­gional balances in the Middle East and South and East Asia are as likely to provoke as to cool conflict—and conflict with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at that.

#### Weakness risks war--multiple scenarios

Victor Hanson, Senior Fellow in Residence, Classics and Military History, Hoover Institution, “Change, Weakness, Disaster Obama: Anwers from Victor Davis Hanson,” Interview with Oregon Patriots, 12—7—09, <http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson121609.html>, accessed 9-17-11.

BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result from President Obama’s marked submissiveness [7] before the world [8]?  Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the *mea culpas*. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc.  BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage?  Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

#### We will be tested—Pakistan, North Korea among others

Ralph Peters, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army (ret.), “America the Weak: US Risks Turmoil Under Prez O,” NEW YORK POST, 10—20—08, [www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/item\_GS5vnNwCO6UjfBPf3uobyM](http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/item_GS5vnNwCO6UjfBPf3uobyM), accessed 9-17-11.

 IF Sen. Barack Obama is elected president, our re public will survive, but our international strategy and some of our allies may not. His first year in office would conjure globe-spanning challenges as our enemies piled on to exploit his weakness. Add in Sen. Joe Biden - with his track record of calling every major foreign-policy crisis wrong for 35 years - as vice president and *de facto* secretary of State, and we'd face a formula for strategic disaster. Where would the avalanche of confrontations come from? \* *Al Qaeda*. Pandering to his extreme base, Obama has projected an image of being soft on terror. Toss in his promise to abandon Iraq, and you can be sure that al Qaeda will pull out all the stops to kill as many Americans as possible - in Iraq, Afghanistan and, if they can, here at home - hoping that America will throw away the victories our troops bought with their blood. Pakistan. As this nuclear-armed country of 170 million anti-American Muslims grows more fragile by the day, the save-the-Taliban elements in the Pakistani intelligence services and body politic will avoid taking serious action against "their" terrorists (while theatrically annoying Taliban elements they can't control). The Pakistanis think Obama would lose Afghanistan - and they believe they can reap the subsequent whirlwind. \* ***Iran***. Got nukes? If the Iranians are as far along with their nuclear program as some reports insist, expect a mushroom cloud above an Iranian test range next year. Even without nukes, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would try the new administration's temper in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. \* ***Israel***. In the Middle East, Obama's election would be read as the *end* of staunch US support for Israel. Backed by Syria and Iran, Hezbollah would provoke another, far-bloodier war with Israel. Lebanon would disintegrate. \* *Saudi Arabia*. Post-9/11 attention to poisonous Saudi proselytizing forced the kingdom to be more discreet in fomenting terrorism and religious hatred abroad. Convinced that Obama will be more "tolerant" toward militant Islam, the Saudis would redouble their funding of bigotry and butchery-for-Allah - in the US, too. \* Russia. Got Ukraine? Not for long, *slabiye Amerikantsi*. Russia's new czar, Vladimir Putin, intends to gobble Ukraine next year, assured that NATO will be divided and the US can be derided. Aided by the treasonous Kiev politico Yulia Timoshenko - a patriot when it suited her ambition, but now a Russian collaborator - the Kremlin is set to reclaim the most important state it still regards as its property. Overall, 2009 may see the starkest repression of freedom since Stalin seized Eastern Europe. \* *Georgia*. Our Georgian allies should dust off their Russian dictionaries. \* *Venezuela*. Hugo Chavez will intensify the rape of his country's hemorrhaging democracy and, despite any drop in oil revenue, he'll do all he can to export his megalomaniacal version of gun-barrel socialism. He'll seek a hug-for-the-cameras meet with President Obama as early as possible. \* *Bolivia.* Chavez client President Evo Morales could order his military to seize control of his country's dissident eastern provinces, whose citizens resist his repression, extortion and semi-literate Leninism. President Obama would do nothing as yet another democracy toppled and bled. \* North Korea. North Korea will expect a much more generous deal from the West for annulling its pursuit of nuclear weapons. And it will regard an Obama administration as a green light to cheat. \* *NATO*. The brave young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe will be gravely discouraged, while the appeasers in Western Europe will again have the upper hand. Putin will be allowed to do what he wants.

#### Risks Pakistan’s collapse, nuclear terrorism

Reid Pauly, “Understanding Pakistan,” Ploughares Fund, 10—13—10, <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:rpNGBY3viskJ:ploughshares.org/news-analysis/morning-joe/LINK%3Fpage%3D3+%22Whether+you+are+concerned+with+success+in+Afghanistan,+preventing%22&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>, accessed 9-17-11.

Whether you are concerned with success in Afghanistan, preventing nuclear terrorism, or any other host of global security issues, the link between the stability of Pakistan and the security of the world is very clear. To better understand this region of the world the Council on Foreign Relations recently released “[Crisis Guide: Pakistan](http://www.cfr.org/interactives/CG_Pakistan/index.html)” -- an interactive, beautifully edited, and authoritative analysis of the current state of affairs in South Asia. Last week reports of increased construction at Pakistani nuclear facilities spurred a range of articles on Pakistan’s nuclear program and the security of the regime. Ploughshares Fund President Joe Cirincione was quoted in an [AFP article](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hu6W0zY7WwgBZ_sZr5nY7K74K1Sw?docId=CNG.9c785ad010af3908e94058c220f5a603.181) saying, "It's the security of the government that worries me. If the government falls that's when the nightmare comes…American politicians and policymakers live in a constant state of denial about Pakistan. They see a mess and then they look away and pretend it's all going to get better somehow.” CFR's “[Crisis Guide: Pakistan](http://www.cfr.org/interactives/CG_Pakistan/index.html)” provides an in-depth and comprehensive look at the country's history and possible futures. The CFR expert interviews feature many prominent Ploughshares Fund grantees and affiliated organizations, including [Shija Nawaz](http://www.acus.org/users/shuja-nawaz) of the [Atlantic Council](http://www.acus.org/), [Ashley Tellis](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=198) of the [Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](http://carnegieendowment.org/), [Pervez Hoodbhoy](http://www.ploughshares.org/sites/default/files/Pervez%20Hoodbhoy_1.png), and [Steve Coll](http://www.newamerica.net/people/steve_coll) of the [New America Foundation](http://www.newamerica.net/). Ploughshares board member [Reza Aslan](http://www.ploughshares.org/about-us/reza-aslan) is also featured in the videos. As Steve Coll explains in the presentation, “Pakistan’s stability is in the world’s interest…As Pakistan has developed, the sources of its instability have acquired global dimension.” Similarly, President Obama rightly acknowledged in his speech on Afghanistan strategy at West Point in 2009, “We will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan.”

#### Nuclear terrorism risks a full-scale nuclear war

Martin Hellman, Professor, Stanford University, "Defusing the Nuclear Threat," Spring 2008, www.nuclearrisk.org/primer.php, accessed 9-12-10.

Although clearly different in nature, nuclear terrorism and nuclear war are coupled. One of the possible triggers for a full-scale nuclear war is an act of nuclear terrorism. Particularly if directed against an American or Russian city, the resultant chaos has the potential to push the world over the nuclear cliff, much as a terrorist act in Sarajevo in 1914 was the spark that set off the First World War. Conversely, the danger of nuclear terrorism is increased by the large number of nuclear weapons. With over 25,000 still in existence and thousands of people involved in their maintenance, storage and security, the chance for error, theft or illicit sale is much too high. More than fifteen years after the bipartisan Nunn-Lugar Act initiated funding for dismantling and protecting "loose nukes" in the former Soviet Union, that effort is only about half complete [NTI 2007].

#### Pakistan instability risks nuclear war

Frederick W. Kagan, resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute and Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow, Brookings Institution, “Pakistan’s Problem, Our Problem,” NEW YORK TIMES 11—18—07, [www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/opinion/18kagan.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/opinion/18kagan.html), accessed 9-17-11.

AS the government of Pakistan totters, we must face a fact: the United States simply could not stand by as a nuclear-armed Pakistan descended into the abyss. Nor would it be strategically prudent to withdraw our forces from an improving situation in Iraq to cope with a deteriorating one in Pakistan. We need to think — now — about our feasible military options in Pakistan, should it really come to that.  We do not intend to be fear mongers. Pakistan’s officer corps and ruling elites remain largely moderate and more interested in building a strong, modern state than in exporting terrorism or nuclear weapons to the highest bidder. But then again, Americans felt similarly about the shah’s regime in Iran until it was too late.  Moreover, Pakistan’s intelligence services contain enough sympathizers and supporters of the Afghan Taliban, and enough nationalists bent on seizing the disputed province of Kashmir from India, that there are grounds for real worries.  The most likely possible dangers are these: a complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum; a total loss of federal control over outlying provinces, which splinter along ethnic and tribal lines; or a struggle within the Pakistani military in which the minority sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda try to establish Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism.  All possible military initiatives to avoid those possibilities are daunting. With 160 million people, Pakistan is more than five times the size of Iraq. It would take a long time to move large numbers of American forces halfway across the world. And unless we had precise information about the location of all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials, we could not rely on bombing or using Special Forces to destroy them.  The task of stabilizing a collapsed Pakistan is beyond the means of the United States and its allies. Rule-of-thumb estimates suggest that a force of more than a million troops would be required for a country of this size. Thus, if we have any hope of success, we would have to act before a complete government collapse, and we would need the cooperation of moderate Pakistani forces.  One possible plan would be a Special Forces operation with the limited goal of preventing Pakistan’s nuclear materials and warheads from getting into the wrong hands. Given the degree to which Pakistani nationalists cherish these assets, it is unlikely the United States would get permission to destroy them. Somehow, American forces would have to team with Pakistanis to secure critical sites and possibly to move the material to a safer place.  For the United States, the safest bet would be shipping the material to someplace like New Mexico; but even pro-American Pakistanis would be unlikely to cooperate. More likely, we would have to settle for establishing a remote redoubt within Pakistan, with the nuclear technology guarded by elite Pakistani forces backed up (and watched over) by crack international troops. It is realistic to think that such a mission might be undertaken within days of a decision to act. The price for rapid action and secrecy, however, would probably be a very small international coalition.  A second, broader option would involve supporting the core of the Pakistani armed forces as they sought to hold the country together in the face of an ineffective government, seceding border regions and Al Qaeda and Taliban assassination attempts against the leadership. This would require a sizable combat force — not only from the United States, but ideally also other Western powers and moderate Muslim nations.  Even if we were not so committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western powers would need months to get the troops there. Fortunately, given the longstanding effectiveness of Pakistan’s security forces, any process of state decline probably would be gradual, giving us the time to act.  So, if we got a large number of troops into the country, what would they do? The most likely directive would be to help Pakistan’s military and security forces hold the country’s center — primarily the region around the capital, Islamabad, and the populous areas like Punjab Province to its south.  We would also have to be wary of internecine warfare within the Pakistani security forces. Pro-American moderates could well win a fight against extremist sympathizers on their own. But they might need help if splinter forces or radical Islamists took control of parts of the country containing crucial nuclear materials. The task of retaking any such regions and reclaiming custody of any nuclear weapons would be a priority for our troops.  If a holding operation in the nation’s center was successful, we would probably then seek to establish order in the parts of Pakistan where extremists operate. Beyond propping up the state, this would benefit American efforts in Afghanistan by depriving terrorists of the sanctuaries they have long enjoyed in Pakistan’s tribal and frontier regions.  The great paradox of the post-cold war world is that we are both safer, day to day, and in greater peril than before. There was a time when volatility in places like Pakistan was mostly a humanitarian worry; today it is as much a threat to our basic security as Soviet tanks once were. We must be militarily and diplomatically prepared to keep ourselves safe in such a world. Pakistan may be the next big test.

### Hegemony Good – free trade

#### Heg solves trade and war

Zhang and Shi 2011

[ a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. \*\* Columbia University. She also serves as an independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and a consultant for the World Bank in Washington, D.C. “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry” <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/>)

This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to **mute great power conflicts**. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and **conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid.** As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have **historically possessed a zero-sum element**. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where **great power wars re-emerge**, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

#### Trade is inevitable—the only question is whether its transition to global liberalization caused by hegemony or regional trade blocks that cause war

Bergsten 1997

[The Economist, Fred, “Global Trade and American Politics,” 27 September 1997, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/print.cfm?doc=pub&ResearchID=291]

Third, American leadership has been crucial in assuring the compatibility, indeed the complimentarity, of regional and global liberalisation. Some purists have condemned the United States for deviating from the exclusive pursuit of multilateral agreements. But American strategy has promoted regional arrangements (starting with its pact with Canada and extending through NAFTA to the current FTAA and APEC initiatives) partly to press the more inward-looking EU and others to move ahead on the global path. Now that so many regional arrangements are in place or underway, America's defection could throw the whole process into reverse. Key groups—the EU, Mercosur and perhaps some new Asian groupings—could forget the global track and bring to life the much feared nightmare of a world of hostile trade blocs. Fourth, American trade policy itself could suffer irreparable harm from a failure of the current legislative effort. The United States is in its seventh year of expansion with unemployment and inflation at their lowest in decades. Its chief competitors in Europe and Japan remain mired in prolonged slumps. President Clinton was decisively re-elected a year ago and remains extremely popular. If the United States cannot pursue trade liberalisation now, when will it ever be able to? A failure, or a severe limitation on the use of new authority (e.g., to add only Chile to NAFTA), would represent a stunning victory for organised labor and others that oppose globalisation. Such a victory would be led by Congressman Richard Gephardt, the minority leader of the House of Representatives, and a likely presidential candidate in 2000. The United States has not had a protectionist President for a century (though Ronald Reagan's wrong-headed macroeconomic policies produced a spate of new import quotas) but such an outcome is by no means impossible if the present debate were to misfire. The countries that have taken out insurance policies against a US reversion to protectionism via free trade agreements, Canada and Mexico, have not idly overcome their historical aversions to getting into bed with their superpower neighbor. The Global Impact Would all this be so serious for the rest of the world? After all, the United States is no longer hegemonic in economic terms. Its share of world output has dropped below a quarter and its share of trade is even less. The EU is larger on both counts and the creation of the euro will end America's monetary dominance. Moreover, globalisation has enormous momentum. Big trade agreements have been proceeding without America. The EU brokered an interim financial services agreement in 1995 when America chose to stay out, is expanding its membership and heading toward mostly free trade with its Mediterranean neighbors by 2010, and is pursuing agreements with Mercosur and Mexico. Subregional pacts such as Mercosur and the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement are moving ahead. Canada and Mexico have concluded their own free trade agreements with Chile. All these deals hurt the United States, by creating or threatening discrimination against it,—but this is nothing more than turnabout for America's own preferential compacts. The global problem is that American disengagement would puncture, and probably destroy, the prospects for consummating the extraordinarily promising scenario for world trade that has evolved since the end of the Uruguay Round and is now poised to proceed. That scenario has two related elements. The first is credible implementation of the two huge regional free trade agreements launched in 1994, the FTAA and APEC. Their conversion from political pledges to practical realities would provide huge new reductions of trade barriers. It would also bring irresistible pressure on the EU and others to avoid the risk of facing costly discrimination by joining a new global liberalisation initiative. APEC is particularly crucial to this strategy. Because of it's size, its pledge in 1994 to achieve free trade in the region is potentially the most far-reaching economic agreement in history. At the same time, its devotion to “open regionalism” means that it will offer to extend its liberalisation to non-members. The EU has always said that “it will not be left behind if APEC does what it says it will do,” as was indeed the case with the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) a year ago. APEC thus dramatically magnifies America's own effort to continue reducing global barriers. The second element in the global scenario would then be a major new effort in the WTO, perhaps the “Millennium Round” called for by Sir Leon Brittan or at least a simultaneous “round-up” of key issues as proposed by my colleague Jeffrey Schott. As in the past, rounds or round-ups that include a number of issues and sectors will be needed to meet the diverse interests of the full WTO membership and permit the necessary tradeoffs across topics that produce far-reaching liberalisation. It is true that the ITA and the telecommunications agreement represented victories for the sectoral approach but talks on maritime services collapsed and the outcome of the current renewed effort on financial services is unclear. A broader approach will almost certainly be required to provide substantial global progress. Once all the regional arrangements are on their way to being realised, about two-thirds of world trade will in fact have achieved, or be headed toward, barrier-free status. The WTO membership would then recognise that global free trade was a practical reality and guide the next round(s) by setting an explicit goal of reaching that milestone—perhaps by 2010 on the APEC and Euromed models. The WTO's director-general Renato Ruggiero, the Canadian government, and the declaration of the WTO's ministerial conference in Singapore last December have all already endorsed variants of that prospect. In addition, this scenario would decisively counter the risk that the regional pacts will become sources of new international conflict. Mr. Ruggiero has put it nicely: regionalism will undoubtedly continue to proliferate so the issue is whether the groupings go off on their own, with possibly disastrous consequences, or increasingly fuse into a common global context that eventually wipes out their preferential features. The latter outcome is obviously superior but the chances of reaching it would be severely jeopardised by a prolonged period of American inaction. There would be even bigger cost to the world from a failure of the Clinton fast-track effort: an enormous boost to the backlash against globalisation. Such a backlash is evident almost everywhere, from striking workers in France to the tirades of Malaysia's prime minister against international investors. There is some justice in the complaints. On balance, globalisation is clearly good for every country, but many governments have been slow to erect the necessary domestic complements. Without adequate safety nets to cushion adjustment burdens, and worker training that will convert potential losers into winners who can take advantage of the better jobs and higher wages that become available, political support for globalisation may be impossible to sustain. In this environment, victory for the anti-globalisation forces in the United States could have terrible global consequences. Defensive reactions would surface almost immediately, especially in the Asian and Latin American countries that depend most heavily on the American market. China, Russia and others could lose interest in further liberalisation and joining the WTO. A half century of global economic opening could stall or even be thrown into reverse. The broader international credibility of the United States would of course suffer severely as well, with substantial implications for international politics and even global security. It would be impossible for America to withdraw from such a central component of international affairs, or indeed repudiate initiatives undertaken with great fanfare by its own president and his predecessors, without jolting confidence in its staying power in other respects. Doubts about a sustained American presence would become particularly acute in Asia, where security considerations are a central (if largely unspoken) rationale for APEC, adding to future risks in the world's most volatile region. It would be the ultimate irony if “the only remaining superpower” entered the twenty-first century with a policy of disengagement on the very issues which most of the world, with the end of the Cold War, now places at the top of the international agenda.

### Hegemony Good – Heg v. K's

#### War is at its lowest level in history because of US primacy---best statistical studies prove heg solves war because it makes democratic peace resilient and globalization sustainable---it’s the deeper cause of proximate checks against war

Owen ‘11 (John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony**.** A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

#### We outweigh ----- heg decline takes out their alternative

Wohlforth 09

[William C. Wohlforth, Professor of government @ Dartmouth College, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, Pg. 33-35]

The upshot is a near scholarly consensus that unpolarity’s consequences for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article questions the consensus on two counts. First, I show that it depends crucially on a dubious assumption about human motivation. Prominent theories of war are based on the assumption that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity. This is why such theories seem irrelevant to interactions among great powers in an international environment that diminishes the utility of war for the pursuit of such ends. Yet we know that people are motivated by a great many noninstrumental motives, not least by concerns regarding their social status. 3 As John Harsanyi noted, “Apart from economic payoffs, social status (social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior.”4 This proposition rests on much firmer scientific ground now than when Harsanyi expressed it a generation ago, as cumulating research shows that humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.5 [End Page 29] ¶ Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. [6](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f6) Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is.¶ Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f7) “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”[8](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f8) While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.[9](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f9) ¶ I begin by describing the puzzles facing predominant theories that status competition might solve. Building on recent research on social identity and status seeking, I then show that under certain conditions the ways decision makers identify with the states they represent may prompt them to frame issues as positional disputes over status in a social hierarchy. I develop hypotheses that tailor this scholarship to the domain of great power politics, showing how the probability of status competition is likely to be linked to polarity. The rest of the article investigates whether there is sufficient evidence for these hypotheses to warrant further refinement and testing. I pursue this in three ways: by showing that the theory advanced here is consistent with what we know about large-scale patterns of great power conflict through history; by [End Page 30] demonstrating that the causal mechanisms it identifies did drive relatively secure major powers to military conflict in the past (and therefore that they **might do so again if the world were bipolar or multipolar**); and by showing that observable evidence concerning the major powers’ identity politics and grand strategies under unipolarity are consistent with the theory’s expectations. ¶ Puzzles of Power and War Recent research on the connection between the distribution of capabilities and war has concentrated on a hypothesis long central to systemic theories of power transition or hegemonic stability: that major war arises out of a power shift in favor of a rising state dissatisfied with a status quo defended by a declining satisfied state.[10](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f10) Though they have garnered substantial empirical support, these theories have yet to solve two intertwined empirical and theoretical puzzles—each of which might be explained by positional concerns for status. ¶ First, if the material costs and benefits of a given status quo are what matters, why would a state be dissatisfied with the very status quo that had abetted its rise? The rise of China today naturally prompts this question, but it is hardly a novel situation. Most of the best known and most consequential power transitions in history featured rising challengers that were prospering mightily under the status quo. In case after case, historians argue that these revisionist powers sought recognition and standing rather than specific alterations to the existing rules and practices that constituted the order of the day. ¶ In each paradigmatic case of hegemonic war, the claims of the rising power are hard to reduce to instrumental adjustment of the status quo. In R. Ned Lebow’s reading, for example, Thucydides’ account tells us that the rise of Athens posed unacceptable threats not to the security or welfare of Sparta but rather to its identity as leader of the Greek world, which was an important cause of the Spartan assembly’s vote for war.[11](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f11) The issues that inspired Louis XIV’s and Napoleon’s dissatisfaction with the status quo were many and varied, but most accounts accord [End Page 31] independent importance to the drive for a position of unparalleled primacy. In these and other hegemonic struggles among leading states in post-Westphalian Europe, the rising challenger’s dissatisfaction is often difficult to connect to the material costs and benefits of the status quo, and much contemporary evidence revolves around issues of recognition and status.[12](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f12) ¶ Wilhemine Germany is a fateful case in point. As Paul Kennedy has argued, underlying material trends as of 1914 were set to propel Germany’s continued rise indefinitely, so long as Europe remained at peace.[13](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f13) Yet Germany chafed under the very status quo that abetted this rise and its elite focused resentment on its chief trading partner—the great power that presented the least plausible threat to its security: Great Britain. At fantastic cost, it built a battleship fleet with no plausible strategic purpose other than to stake a claim on global power status.[14](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f14) Recent historical studies present strong evidence that, far from fearing attacks from Russia and France, German leaders sought to provoke them, knowing that this would lead to a long, expensive, and sanguinary war that Britain was certain to join.[15](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f15) And of all the motivations swirling round these momentous decisions, no serious historical account fails to register German leaders’ oft-expressed yearning for “a place in the sun.” ¶ The second puzzle is bargaining failure. Hegemonic theories tend to model war as a conflict over the status quo without specifying precisely what the status quo is and what flows of benefits it provides to states.[16](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f16) Scholars generally follow Robert Gilpin in positing that the underlying issue concerns a “desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations work,” “the nature and governance of the system,” and “the distribution of territory among the states in the system.”[17](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f17) If these are the [End Page 32] issues at stake, then systemic theories of hegemonic war and power transition confront the puzzle brought to the fore in a seminal article by James Fearon: what prevents states from striking a bargain that avoids the costs of war? [18](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f18) Why can’t states renegotiate the international order as underlying capabilities distributions shift their relative bargaining power? ¶ Fearon proposed that one answer consistent with strict rational choice assumptions is that such bargains are infeasible when the issue at stake is indivisible and cannot readily be portioned out to each side. Most aspects of a given international order are readily divisible, however, and, as Fearon stressed, “both the intrinsic complexity and richness of most matters over which states negotiate and the availability of linkages and side-payments suggest that intermediate bargains typically will exist.”[19](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f19) Thus, most scholars have assumed that the indivisibility problem is trivial, focusing on two other rational choice explanations for bargaining failure: uncertainty and the commitment problem.[20](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f20) In the view of many scholars, it is these problems, rather than indivisibility, that likely explain leaders’ inability to avail themselves of such intermediate bargains. ¶ Yet recent research inspired by constructivism shows how issues that are physically divisible can become socially indivisible, depending on how they relate to the identities of decision makers.[21](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.wohlforth.html#f21) Once issues surrounding the status quo are framed in positional terms as bearing on the disputants’ relative standing, then, to the extent that they value their standing itself, they may be unwilling to pursue intermediate bargaining solutions. Once linked to status, easily divisible issues that theoretically provide opportunities for linkages and side payments of various sorts may themselves be seen as indivisible and thus unavailable as avenues for possible intermediate bargains. ¶ The historical record surrounding major wars is rich with evidence suggesting that positional concerns over status frustrate bargaining: expensive, protracted conflict over what appear to be minor issues; a propensity on the part of decision makers to frame issues in terms of relative rank even when doing so makes bargaining harder; decision-makers’ [End Page 33] inability to accept feasible divisions of the matter in dispute even when failing to do so imposes high costs; demands on the part of states for observable evidence to confirm their estimate of an improved position in the hierarchy; the inability of private bargains to resolve issues; a frequently observed compulsion for the public attainment of concessions from a higher ranked state; and stubborn resistance on the part of states to which such demands are addressed even when acquiescence entails limited material cost.

## A2 impact turns

### A2 Adventurism Turn

#### Even without hegemony, interventions are inevitable – empirics

Kagan 2011

[Robert adjunct professor of history at Georgetown University, PhD in US history from American University in Washington, D.C, former foreign policy advisor to John McCain, , The Weekly Standard, Vol. 16, No. 18 “The Price of Power,” <http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?nopager=1>)

Today this alleged profligacy in the use of force is variously attributed to the influence of “neoconservatives” or to those Mearsheimer calls the “liberal imperialists” of the Clinton administration, who have presumably now taken hold of the Obama administration as well. But the critics share a common premise: that if only the United States would return to a more “normal” approach to the world, intervening abroad far less frequently and eschewing efforts at “nation-building,” then this would allow the United States to cut back on the resources it expends on foreign policy. Thanks to Haass’s clever formulation, there has been a great deal of talk lately about “wars of choice” as opposed to “wars of necessity.” Haass labels both the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan “wars of choice.” Today, many ask whether the United States can simply avoid such allegedly optional interventions in the future, as well as the occupations and exercises in “nation-building” that often seem to follow. Although the idea of eliminating “wars of choice” appears sensible, the historical record suggests it will not be as simple as many think. The problem is, almost every war or intervention the United States has engaged in throughout its history has been optional—and not just the Bosnias, Haitis, Somalias, or Vietnams, but the Korean War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and even World War II (at least the war in Europe), not to mention the many armed interventions throughout Latin America and the Caribbean over the course of the past century, from Cuba in 1898 to Panama in 1989. A case can be made, and has been made by serious historians, that every one of these wars and interventions was avoidable and unnecessary. To note that our most recent wars have also been wars of choice, therefore, is not as useful as it seems. In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898: Cuba, 1898 The Philippines, 1898-1902 China, 1900 Cuba, 1906 Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912 Mexico, 1914 Haiti, 1915 Dominican Republic, 1916 Mexico, 1917 World War I, 1917-1918 Nicaragua, 1927 World War II, 1941-1945 Korea, 1950-1953 Lebanon, 1958 Vietnam, 1963-1973 Dominican Republic, 1965 Grenada, 1983 Panama, 1989 First Persian Gulf war, 1991 Somalia, 1992 Haiti, 1994 Bosnia, 1995 Kosovo, 1999 Afghanistan, 2001-present Iraq, 2003-present That is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. Since the end of the Cold War, it is true, the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit.

#### US pursuit of hegemony is inevitable – only a question of effectiveness

Calleo 2010

(David P, Director – European Studies Program and Professor @ SAIS, “American Decline Revisited,” Survival, 52:4, 215 – 227)

The history of the past two decades suggests that adjusting to a plural world is not easy for the United States. As its economic strength is increasingly challenged by relative decline, it **clings all the more to its peerless military prowess.** As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, that overwhelming military power, evolved over the Cold War, is less and less effective. In many respects, America's geopolitical imagination seems frozen in the posture of the Cold War. The lingering pretension to be the dominant power everywhere has encouraged the United States to hazard two unpromising land wars, plus a diffuse and interminable struggle against 'terrorism'. Paying for these wars and the pretensions behind them confirms the United States in a new version of Cold War finance. Once more, unmanageable fiscal problems poison the currency, an old pathology that firmly reinstates the nation on its path to decline. It was the hegemonic Cold War role, after all, that put the United States so out of balance with the rest of the world economy. In its hegemonic Cold War position, the United States found it necessary to run very large deficits and was able to finance them simply by creating and exporting more and more dollars. The consequence is today's restless mass of accumulated global money. Hence, whereas the value of all global financial assets in 1980 was just over 100% of global output, by 2008, even after the worst of the financial implosion, that figure had exploded to just under 300%.25 Much of this is no doubt tied up in the massive but relatively inert holdings of the Chinese and Japanese. But thanks to today's instantaneous electronic transfers, huge sums can be marshalled and deployed on very short notice. It is this excess of volatile money that arguably fuels the world's great recurring bubbles. It can create the semblance of vast real wealth for a time, but can also (with little notice) sow chaos in markets, wipe out savings and dry up credit for real investment. What constitutes a morbid overstretch in the American political economy thus ends up as a threat to the world economy in general. To lead itself and the world into a more secure future the United States must put aside its old, unmeasured geopolitical ambitions paid for by unlimited cheap credit. Instead, the United States needs a more balanced view of its role in history. But America's post-Soviet pundits have, unfortunately, proved more skilful at perpetuating **outmoded dreams of past glory** than at promoting the more modest visions appropriate to a plural future. One can always hope that newer generations of Americans will find it easier to adjust to pluralist reality. The last administration, however, was not very encouraging in this regard. III What about Barack Obama? So far, his economic policy has shown itself probably more intelligent and certainly more articulate than his predecessor's. His thinking is less hobbled by simple-minded doctrines. It accepts government's inescapable role in regulating markets and providing a durable framework for orderly governance and societal fellowship. To be sure, the Obama administration, following in the path of the Bush administration, has carried short-term counter-cyclical stimulation to a previously unimagined level. Perhaps so radical an expansion of credit is unavoidable under present circumstances. The administration is caught between the need to rebalance by scaling back and the fear that restraint applied now will trigger a severe depression. Obama's chief aide, Rahm Emanuel, is famous for observing: 'Rule one: Never allow a crisis to go to waste. They are opportunities to do big things.'26 So far, Obama's administration has made use of its crisis to promote an unprecedented expansion of welfare spending.27 Much of the spending is doubtless good in itself and certainly serves the administration's strong counter-cyclical purposes. But at some point the need to pass from expansion to stabilisation will presumably be inescapable. Budget cuts will have to be found somewhere, and demographic trends suggest that drastic reductions in civilian welfare spending are unlikely. Elementary prudence might suggest that today's financial crisis is an ideal occasion for America's long-overdue retreat from geopolitical overstretch, a time for bringing America's geopolitical pretensions into harmony with its diminishing foreign possibilities and expanding domestic needs. The opportunities for geopolitical saving appear significant. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), current military plans will require an average military budget of $652bn (in 2010 dollars) each year through 2028. The estimate optimistically assumes only 30,000 troops will be engaged abroad after 2013. As the CBO observes, these projections exceed the peak budgets of the Reagan administration's military build-up of the mid-1980s (about $500bn annually in 2010 dollars). This presumes a military budget consuming 3.5% of GDP through 2020.28 Comparable figures for other nations are troubling: 2.28% for the United Kingdom, 2.35% for France, 2.41% for Russia and 1.36% for China.29 Thus, while **the** financial **crisis has** certainly made Americans fear for their economic future, it does **not** yet seem to have **resulted in a more modest view of the country's place in the world,** or a more prudent approach to military spending. Instead, an **addiction to hegemonic status** continues to blight the prospects for sound fiscal policy. Financing the inevitable deficits inexorably turns the dollar into an imperial instrument that threatens the world with inflation.

### A2 China Turn

#### No impact uniqueness—we’ve proven that war is inevitable in the status quo

#### The only scenario for conflict with China is if the US loses hegemony

Wang 2004

(Yuan-Kang, Assist prof in the Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi U, Taipei. Ph.D. from U Chicago, Offensive Realism and the Rise of China, Issues & Studies, 40, no. 1: 173-201, http://homepages.wmich.edu/~ymz8097/Wang-offensive%20realism%20and%20china.pdf)

To show that China is not a revisionist state, Chan examines China's adherence to international rules and norms and finds that China not only has refrained from exercising its veto power in the UN Security Council but also has ratified a number of major human rights instruments. China's military expenditures as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) have declined from 3.4 percent in 1989 to 2.3 percent in 1999. Chan concludes that, compared to the United States, "China's conduct and experience do not quite qualify it for revisionism when viewed in a comparative context." Nonetheless, **such a conclusion confuses revisionist behavior with intentions**. For offensive realism, revisionism refers to intentions, not behavior. A revisionist state is one that harbors malign intentions and is "inclined to look for opportunities to gain more power."25 A state does not necessarily exhibit revisionist behavior because it may not have the capacity to do so, even though it still harbors revisionist intentions.2 6 **Should the opportunity arise, states will seek to revise the balance of power** in their favor if the expected benefits outweigh the costs. China's current power does not qualify it as a potential hegemon. According to the World Bank, the GDP of the United States in 2002 was US$10.4 trillion, comprising 32.29 percent of the world's total output. China's GDP was US$1.24 trillion, about 12 percent of the size of the American economy.27 China's defense expenditures lag far behind those of the United States. In that same year, the United States spent US$335.7 billion on defense, comprising 42.81 percent of the world's total defense expenditures, while China spent US$31.1 billion, about 9 percent of the U.S. total.28 Given this great disparity in power, China is ill-poised to challenge the United States at this point in time. As Mearsheimer points out, "great powers facing powerful opponents will be less inclined to consider offensive action and more concerned with defending the existing balance from threats by theirmore powerful opponents. Let there be an opportunity for those weaker states to revise the balance in their own favor, however, and they will take advantage of it."29

#### Heg collapse makes war inevitable

Barnett 2010

(Thomas, chief analyst at Wikistrat and a contributing editor for Esquire magazine. His latest book is "Great Powers: America and the World After Bush" (2009), World Politics Review, “The New Rules: Setting the Terms for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain”, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7164/the-new-rules-setting-the-terms-for-a-u-s-china-grand-bargain>)

**History tells us that, when a rising great power approaches the standing of the dominant system-shaping great power,** **conflict is inevitable**, either directly or in such regions where their two spheres of influence intersect. The great counterexample is the acceptance by a "rising" America of the late-19th century of Great Britain's implicit offer of a "special relationship," which allowed the latter to punch above its weight throughout the 20th century. That alliance was subsequently forged in opposition to common enemies: first the Kaiser and then Nazi Germany, followed by the Soviet Union. **China and the U**nited **S**tates **have no such common enemy of that stature**. Lacking an obvious evil to fight, we are left with only an obvious collective good to preserve: globalization. This fortunate reality nonetheless encourages zero-sum thinking: China's inevitable rise is America's inevitable decline. Instead of a world to be shared and shaped, expert voices increasingly warn of a world to be divided and destroyed by wars over resources.

#### Hegemony deters war with China

Alagappa 2003

[Muthia, Senior Fellow East-West Center PhD, International Affairs, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University, “Asian security order: instrumental and normative features”]

The United States has also intervened in the increasingly tense standoff between China and Taiwan. The U.S. goal has been to deter China from seeking a military solution (the Taiwan Relations Act of 1974 calls for the United States to come to Taiwan's aid if it is attacked) and, in addition, to dissuade Taiwan from provocative acts of independence. In March 1996, China fired missiles close to Taiwan in anticipation of Taiwanese elections. This action was meant to intimidate Taiwan and had the temporary effect of stalling shipping in the Taiwan Straits. The United States responded by dispatching two aircraft carriers and some fourteen other warships to the area. Through its strategy of "calculated ambiguity" Washington meant to deter possible Chinese aggression and simultaneously to signal its willingness to maintain a cooperative relationship with China. Washington prepared to take similar steps early in 2000 as China once again escalated its rhetoric (this time without launching missiles) in anticipation of an- other Taiwanese election (Kaiser and Mufson 2000a), rourlh, U.S. hegemony has contributed to regional order by helping to stave off in Asia the kind of **nationalist** economic competition (and attendant political friction) that plagued the world economy during the 1930s. The potential for beg- gar-thy-neighbor policies certainly emerged during the late 1990s. The Asian financial crisis was a profound shock that might well have led to closed markets, competitive devaluations, and a downward spiral of trade and growth. The management of this crisis was found in Washington rather than Tokyo or elsewhere in the region. During the crisis, the U.S. Federal Reserve lowered interest rates to assure global liquidity and maintain high growth in the United States. As the cri- sis eased, the United Stales spurred recovery by taking in the huge flood of ex- ports from emerging economies as well as from China and Japan.1' Washington's response to the crisis reflected its regional economic strategy of seeking to liber- alize the developmental capitalist markets of Japan and Southeast Asia while at the same time integrating China into the liberal world economy. It is important to recognize the limits of hegemony as a means to promote regional order. In essence, the U.S.hegemonic project in the Asia Pacific is more a holding action than a progressive strategy for resolving security problems. It is an effort to stabilize a status quo that reflects U.S. dominance. Although Washington has worked hard to keep relations among major powers in the region from deteriorating, it docs not seem to have a plan for resolving the long-standing ten sions in these relationships. In fact, since the United States does not want to en- courage a balancing coalition against its dominant position, it is not clear that it has a strategic interest in the full resolution of differences between, say, Japan and China or Russia and China. Some tension among these states reinforces their need for a special relationship with the United States. Similarly, Washington has defused regional crises in Asia without any funda- mental resolution of the underlying disputes. The series of U.S.-initiated economic concessions to North Korea, for example, reflects more an effort to buy time than a plan to transform the politics of the Korean peninsula. Korean unification, in fact, would be a mixed blessing for the United States in light of its hegemonic strategy. Unification, after all, would diminish the need for a U.S. military presence in Korea—a presence U.S. officials believe is important not only to defend South Korea but also to stabilize relations elsewhere in EastAsia. Not surprisingly, Washington sought to keep the issue of U.S. forward-deployed forces off the ta ble as the two Koreas began their detente process in 2000 (Harrison 2001). Washington's diplomacy toward the China-Taiwan dispute proceeds in a similar spirit. Decisive steps by Taiwan toward independence would provoke China and raise the potential for military conflict. An aggressive attempt by China to incorporate Taiwan would force the United Stales either to defend Tai- wan or to appease China—both of which are costly options. For the United Slates, an uneasy stalemate is preferable in current circumstances to any dramatic attempt at resolution. Washington has managed the conflict by trying to protect Taiwan without emboldening it and trying to deter China without isolating or provoking it.

### A2 Proliferation Turn

#### Prolif slow and inevitable

Tepperman 2009

(Jonathan, Deputy Editor at Newsweek, Frmr Deputy Managing Editor, Foreign Affairs, LLM, i-law, NYU, MA, jurisprudence, Oxford Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb, http://jonathantepperman.com/Welcome\_files/nukes\_Final.pdf)

The risk of an arms race—with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one—is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; **that's spread at glacial pace."** Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them **absolutely critical** to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors—Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say—might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But **the risks of a rapid spread are low**,especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.

#### Heg collapse causes rapid prolif

Kagan 2011

(Robert, History prof at Georgetown, PhD in US history, senior fellow at Brookings, member of Skull and Bones, “The Price of Power The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs”, JAN 24, 2011, VOL. 16, NO. 18, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?page=1>]

At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly “stabilize” the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan’s case would mean the **rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal.**

#### No impact to prolif

Tepperman 2009

(Jonathan, Deputy Editor at Newsweek, Frmr Deputy Managing Editor, Foreign Affairs, LLM, i-law, NYU, MA, jurisprudence, Oxford , Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb, http://jonathantepperman.com/Welcome\_files/nukes\_Final.pdf)

A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that’s a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama’s idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it’s not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn’t be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nukefree planet) that’s both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there’s never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it’s hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading “nuclear optimist” and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, “We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that **all states are rational on some basic level**. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they’re pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it’s almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn’t think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button— and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, “Why fight if you can’t win and might lose everything?” Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world’s major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there’s very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders **all came to the same safe conclusion**. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, “It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time.” The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nucleararmed enemies slide toward war, **then pull back**, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn’t do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other’s vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials’ thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it. Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it’s crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today’s nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you’d be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who’s never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes —and there’s no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but **history says otherwise**. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to “bury” the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn’t be so bad because even “if half of mankind died . . . the whole world would become socialist.” Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real recordholders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today’s international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad’s antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn’t win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.